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ABSTRACT 
Hedging Effectiveness and Market Efficiency of 
Financial Futures 
(February 1980) 
Shantaram P. Hegde, B.Com., Karnatak University, India 
M.Com., Karnatak University, India, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Joseph E. Finnerty 
Since the late 1960s interest rates in the United States have been 
generally rising and growing in volatility. Such a behavior of interest 
rates exposes the borrowers and lenders in the money and capital markets 
to increasingly uncertain costs and returns. Hedging is a traditional 
mechanism of dealing with the risk stemming from uncertain price move¬ 
ments. To provide hedging facilities to borrowers and lenders in the 
mortgage market, the GNMA futures market was first established in late 
1975. This was followed by the addition of futures contracts in short-, 
intermediate-, and long-term Treasury securities and 90-day commercial 
paper. 
The phenomenal growth registered by the financial futures markets 
raises several interesting issues. In particular, one wonders about 
their hedging effectiveness, hedging costs, market efficiency, impact on 
spot market prices, etc. The basic objectives of this investigation are 
to examine the following issues concerning the functioning of futures 
markets in 3-month T bills (of the Chicago Board of Trade), 15-year 
government bonds, and 8 percent GNMAs (both of the Chicago Board of 
Trade) during the period from January 1976 to April 1979: 
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1. Hedging effectiveness. How effective are the financial futures in¬ 
struments in reducing the interest rate risk associated with a wide 
spectrum of spot market securities? 
2. Hedge ratio. How many futures contracts should an investor intend¬ 
ing to minimize the interest rate risk sell relative to a given in¬ 
vestment in spot securities? 
3. Market efficiency. Is it possible for an investor maintaining a 
continuously adjusted portfolio of short and long positions in fu¬ 
tures and spot instruments to earn a rate of return that is consis¬ 
tently higher than the riskless rate? 
To examine the first proposition a hedging model has been developed. 
The model reveals that hedging effectiveness is a function of the inter¬ 
est rate elasticities of securities and the level and volatility of 
yields in the spot and futures markets. Based on these premises seven 
hypotheses embracing the following dimensions have been formulated: 
term to maturity of spot securities; level of default-risk; coupon ef¬ 
fect; delivery period; form of cash security; individual securities vs. 
portfolios; and bond futures vs. GNMA futures. The basic theme underly¬ 
ing these hypotheses is that hedging effectiveness of financial futures 
varies directly with the interest rate elasticities of spot and futures 
instruments and the comovement of yield changes in the two markets. 
The second proposition on the hedge ratio has been analyzed by ex¬ 
tending the hedging model to examine the relative volatility of spot and 
futures prices. The model indicates that the futures prices are more 
volatile than the spot prices given the credit risk, coupon, term, and 
yield to maturity. This suggests that the risk-minimizing hedge ratio 
is generally less than unity. 
To evaluate the hypotheses mentioned above the simple regression 
of cash price changes against futures price changes has been employed. 
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Further, the proposition on market efficiency has been examined by com¬ 
paring the weekly holding period returns on the hedged portfolios of fu¬ 
tures instruments and their underlying spot securities with the riskless 
rate. 
The empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that hedging 
effectiveness varies directly with the interest rate elasticities of 
spot and futures instruments and the comovement of yield changes in the 
two markets. The hypothesis that the risk-minimizing hedge ratio is 
generally less than unity is also well supported. The empirical results 
seem to reject the hypothesis that the T bill futures and the bond fu¬ 
tures markets were efficient during the study period. While the evi¬ 
dence on the efficiency of the GNMA, futures market is mixed, it appears 
that the level of mispricing obtaining during the period covered by the 
investigation was large enough to allow one to construct different trad¬ 
ing strategies that would have produced returns consistently in excess 
of the accompanying market risk. 
The theoretical model and the empirical findings of this research 
effort are believed to be of use to the investors in making informed and 
effective hedging decisions. Moreover, they offer potentially useful 
guidance to the managements of futures exchanges and the regulators of 
futures industry in determining the optimal terms to maturity of futures 
instruments, number and spacing of delivery periods, coupon rates, and 
variety of instruments. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest Rate Risk 
Until the late 1960s interest rates were relatively low and stable, 
but since then have been generally rising and increasing in volatility. 
The relatively higher level and volatility of interest rates confronts 
borrowers and lenders in the credit and capital markets with costs and 
returns of varying degrees of uncertainty. 
An investor’s interest rate exposure depends upon the type of fi¬ 
nancial instrument he or she holds. In the simple case of a zero-coupon 
bond the price falls with rising interest rates,and appreciates when 
rates decline. Such a capital loss or gain on a zero-coupon bond due to 
interest rate fluctuations is commonly called "price risk." 
In addition to price risk the holder of a coupon-bond is also ex¬ 
posed to "reinvestment rate risk." When interest rates go up the price 
of a coupon bond falls as before, but now the investor has an opportunity 
to reinvest the coupon receipts at higher rates. Conversely, with a de¬ 
cline in interest rates, the price of a coupon-bond appreciates in value 
but the investor is faced with lower rates for the reinvestment of coupon 
payments. The overall effect of price risk and reinvestment rate risk 
associated with a coupon-bond is commonly known as "interest rate risk" 
or "basis risk."^ Both common and preferred stocks are also exposed to 
interest risk as are quite a number of other securities such as mutual 
fund shares, unit investment trusts, annuities and mortgages. 
1 
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The interest rate risk of financial instruments is determined by a 
number of factors, such as the level of default risk, term to maturity, 
coupon, call provisions, dividend policy, and growth of earnings. A com¬ 
mon measure of the interest rate risk exposure of a security is its dura¬ 
tion. Briefly stated, duration is the weighted average maturity of a fi¬ 
nancial instrument, with the present value of cash flows used as weights. 
Coping with Interest Rate Risk 
The investor may adopt several strategies to reduce his (her) expo¬ 
sure to interest rate risk. First, he (she) may hold a coupon bond with 
a term to maturity identical to his (her) planned holding period. This 
strategy is rather naive because it still exposes the investor to rein¬ 
vestment rate risk. Moreover, it is impractical for those who have dif¬ 
ficulty forecasting their likely holding period. Second, the investor 
may diversify his (her) investment to include both short- and long-term 
securities. This strategy provides only partial relief from basis risk 
as the long-term component is still quite sensitive to interest rate 
moves. Third, the investor may hold a security or a portfolio whose 
duration is identical to his (her) planned holding period horizon. This 
immunizes the investment from interest rate risk under certain conditions 
2 
and is therefore considered the optimal strategy. 
Yet another way of coping with the basis risk is to use the futures 
market to hedge the spot position. The spot (cash) market is the market 
for immediate (spot) delivery where the terms of a transaction regarding 
quality and quantity of the commodity, time of delivery, time and mode of 
payment, etc. are commonly decided on a case by case basis by the market 
3 
participants themselves. The futures market, on the other hand, is the 
market for future (forward) delivery where excepting the price and the 
number of contracts traded, other terms such as the quality and quantity 
of the commodity in the contract, the time and place of delivery, and the 
mode of payment are standardized by the commodity exchange. This market 
is designed, among other things, to facilitate the shifting of risk due to 
uncertain spot price movements to speculators. Only a small proportion 
of transactions in this market is closed out by actual delivery of the 
commodity. The vast majority are closed out prior to delivery through 
the use of offsetting transactions. 
In a conventional hedge, the investor assumes a position in the fu¬ 
tures market of equal quantity but on the opposite side of the market to 
his (her) spot market position. Since the spot and futures prices 
typically are positively correlated, the investor’s price gain (loss) on 
the cash position tends to offset the price loss (gain) on the futures 
position, thus minimizing the basis risk associated with his (her) in¬ 
vestment . ^ 
Emergence of Financial Futures 
Until very recently such hedging could be practiced only in the 
traditional commodity and currency futures markets. But with the gener¬ 
ally increasing level and volatility of interest rates witnessed in the 
last several years, it became obvious to some market participants the 
the conventions1 strategies of coping with the basis risk were not ade¬ 
quate. A futures market in financial instruments was an obvious solu¬ 
tion. Specifically, the mortgage industry was the foremost to feel that 
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shocks of volatile interest rate behavior. Accordingly, in October 1975 
futures trading was first instituted in the GNMA securities by Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBT) in order to provide mortgage market participants 
with a new mechanism to deal with the growing interest rate risk. This 
institutional innovation was generally well received by the financial 
community and was soon followed by the addition of the three month T bill 
futures at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CMT) in January 1976. As in¬ 
terest rates continued their upward trend the new futures markets wit¬ 
nessed phenomenal growth. In the latter part of 1977, the CBT began 
trading contracts in the fifteen-year or longer government bond and the 
ninety-day commercial paper. 
Encouraged by the impressive record of new commodities, the CBT and 
the CMT respectively added one year T bills and certificate delivery 
GNMAs to the futures list in 1978, while the Amex Commodities Exchange 
(ACE) joined the futures network with trading in GNMAs. Recently, the 
CBT, the CMT, and the ACE expanded the futures trading to 4-6 year T 
note, 4-year T note, and 90-day T bills respectively. Several other ex¬ 
changes are reported to have active plans to enter the futures arena soon 
with various securities possibly including common stocks. 
Research Objectives 
The rapid growth of trading in interest rate futures raises several 
interesting issues. In particular, one wonders about the hedging per¬ 
formance, hedging costs, market efficiency, and impact on spot market 
prices of financial futures. Accordingly this investigation deals with 
the following issues relevant to the functioning of futures markets in 
3-month T bills (CMT), government bonds, and GNMAs (CBT): 
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1. Hedging performance.. How effective are the financial futures in re¬ 
ducing price risk associated with a wide spectrum of securities? 
2. Hedge ratio. How many contracts should an investor intending to 
minimize price risk sell in the futures markets for each unit of his 
(her) cash position? 
3. Market efficiency. Is it usually possible for an investor maintain¬ 
ing a continuously adjusted portfolio of short and long positions in 
futures and spot instruments to earn a rate of return which differs 
systematically from the riskless rate? 
The basic motivation for pursuing the above stated objectives stems from 
the belief that the financial futures markets are to a large extent hedg¬ 
ing markets intended to provide insurance coverage against interest rate 
4 
exposure. The rationale for the first objective is not only to assess 
their risk reduction potential but also to identify factors promoting the 
hedging effectiveness of financial futures. 
The amount of price protection that the investor obtains from fi¬ 
nancial futures obviously depends on the quality of his (her) hedging de¬ 
cision. An important aspect of the hedging decision relates to the num¬ 
ber of futures contracts that the investor should buy or sell relative to 
his (her) spot position. The second objective therefore involves an ex¬ 
amination of the optimal hedge ratio. 
The final question of interest in this study is the efficiency of 
financial futures markets. Market efficiency implies that the reward is 
proportional to the risk undertaken. Moreover, an efficient market 
should also be a more effective market for hedging,^ and thus is in the 
larger interests of the society. This market effectiveness/efficiency 
issue is particularly important in the case of futures markets because 
6 
of the strong apprehension voiced about them in some quarters of the 
6 
economy. 
The Theoretical Model 
Given the assumption that offering protection against interest rate 
risk is a primary purpose of the financial futures markets, it is legiti¬ 
mate to assume further that the market participant's basic motive in 
hedging is to minimize the price risk to which his (her) spot investment 
is exposed. A hedging model developed on this premise reveals that the 
hedging effectiveness of futures instruments depends upon the degree of 
positive correlation between cash and futures price changes. 
The focus of the model is then shifted to the determinants of cor¬ 
relation between cash and futures price changes. In the existing litera¬ 
ture it is commonly assumed that price correlation is primarily a func¬ 
tion of the term to maturity. That is, the price of a short-term secur¬ 
ity has a higher degree of correlation with another of similar maturity 
than the price of a long term security. Recall that until the 1930s the 
term to maturity was also thought to be an accurate measure of the riski¬ 
ness of a security.'7 The model brings out, however, that the interest 
rate elasticity (i.e., the duration) is a more meaningful barometer of 
price correlation than is the term to maturity considered in isolation. 
It indicates that within the broad categories of short-term, intermediate- 
term and long-term maturities, securities with high durations tend to 
have a high degree of price correlation. Accordingly it is hypothesized 
that the hedging performance of financial futures is primarily an 
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increasing function of the interest rate elasticities of spot and futures 
instruments. 
Expanding on this nexus between interest rate elasticity and hedg¬ 
ing effectiveness, the next step involves identifying the variables that 
determine the interest rate sensitivity of cash and futures instruments 
and showing how they relate to hedging performance. Accordingly, several 
subhypotheses suggesting the relationship between the following dimen¬ 
sions of interest rate elasticity and hedging performance were drawn up: 
the maturity of spot securities, the level of default risk, the coupon 
effect, the distance to delivery of contracts, the form of spot 
security—debt or equity, the type of spot security—individual issue or 
g 
portfolio, and the type of hedging instrument--the bond futures or the 
GNMA futures. 
The model is then applied to determine what constitutes the optimal 
hedge ratio for the risk-minimizing investor. It is shown that the op¬ 
timal hedge ratio is a ratio of cash price changes to futures price 
changes and that it is a function, among other things, of the relative 
volatility of spot and futures yields. The question then arises: Which 
is more volatile, the spot or the futures rate? It is argued that, for a 
given maturity, coupon, and default-risk, the futures yield is systemat¬ 
ically much more volatile than the spot. It follows then that the opti¬ 
mal hedge ratio would be less than unity. Further, it is shown that the 
hedge ratio is largely an increasing function of hedging effectiveness. 
To examine the issue of market efficiency the Black-Scholes (BS) 
option pricing principle is employed [9]. The BS model is built on the 
assumption that in an efficient market it should not be possible to earn 
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a consistently higher return than the riskless rate on a correctly hedged 
portfolio of long and short positions in the spot and futures instru¬ 
ments. Clearly, a hedged rate of return close to the riskless rate sig¬ 
nifies that the futures markets are efficient. But if the former devi¬ 
ates systematically from the riskless rate, the markets may be ineffi¬ 
cient. 
Methodology and Sample 
To investigate both the hedging performance of financial futures 
and the optimal hedge ratio, one needs to estimate the correlation coef¬ 
ficient and the slope coefficient between cash and futures price changes 
respectively. The estimates are obtained by regressing cash price > 
changes against futures price changes. Then the hedging effecitveness 
and the hedge ratio are compared across the various dimensions of in¬ 
terest rate elasticity and their statistical significance examined by 
employing correlation tests. 
The evaluation of market efficiency essentially involves estimating 
optimal hedge ratios in the first place and then comparing the returns on 
optimal hedges with the riskless rate. Employing the simple regression 
described earlier, the hedge ratios are estimated on a weekly basis. 
Based on these hedge ratios, risk-minimizing hedges are constructed and 
their weekly returns measured both before and after taking transaction 
costs into account. These returns are then compared with a rate of in¬ 
terest bereft of interest rate risk and the differences between them are 
subjected to a paired t test. 
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The comparison of hedging performance and hedge ratio across the 
various dimensions of interest rate elasticity requires a wide spectrum 
of spot and futures instruments. Accordingly, the sample used herein 
covers short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term spots, risky and 
risk-free issues, discount and non-discount coupon bonds, debt, equity, 
and hybrid securities, individual securities, fund portfolios, and 
security indices, and the near-term and distant contracts of short-term 
and long-term futures instruments. The futures markets covered in the 
study are the 90-day T bill futures (CMT), the bond futures (CBT), and 
the GNMA futures (CBT). While this study is generally based on an analy¬ 
sis of data from the period between January 1976 and April 1979, the 
length of the periods varies somewhat with each futures instrument. 
Implications 
It is hoped that this investigation provides several useful in¬ 
sights into the design and functioning of financial futures markets. 
First, it demonstrates the extent of potential interest rate risk reduc¬ 
tion that the holder of various types of spot instruments can hope to ob¬ 
tain from the three financial futures markets. Second, it is designed to 
guide the hedger in the choice of more effective long-term hedging in¬ 
struments. Third, it should help the hedger choose a more effective con¬ 
tract within each instrument. Fourth, it should provide guidance in de¬ 
termining the optimal hedge ratio. Thus the study is expected to provide 
useful insights that would promote the quality of hedging decisions. 
In addition, this investigation is intended to provide guidance to 
the futures exchanges in designing and maintaining effective hedging 
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markets. The management of futures exchanges have to determine (1) the 
term to maturity of the spot security to which the futures instrument is 
to be tied; (2) the coupon on the underlying spot security, (3) the op¬ 
timal number of delivery periods, (4) the optimal spacing of delivery 
periods, and (5) the optimal number of futures instruments within each 
broad category of term structure. The hedging model and the empirical 
results of this study are expected to be of potential help in deciding 
the above mentioned operational issues. 
Finally, the regulators, charged as they are with the responsibil¬ 
ity of ensuring that the futures markets effectively cater to the needs 
of the financial community, are interested in the hedging performance and 
efficiency of futures markets. It is believed that the theoretical model 
and the empirical findings of this study are useful to the overseeing au¬ 
thorities in exercising healthy regulation over the futures industry. 
Outline of the Study 
The next chapter reviews the literature on hedging, interest rate 
risk, and market efficiency. Chapter III presents the hedgingmodel and 
the various hypotheses of this investigation. The research design, meth¬ 
odology, and the sample are described in Chapter IV. Following this is 
the chapter containing empirical results. Finally the summary and con¬ 
clusions of the study are presented in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The traditional base of futures markets is in agricultural commod¬ 
ities. Accordingly the literature on hedging in commodity futures is 
surveyed at the outset. Then the existing studies on the measurement of 
interest rate risk and risk reduction strategies are reviewed. Finally, 
the literature on the efficiency of stock, bond, commodity futures, and 
financial futures markets is discussed. 
Hedging in Futures Markets 
The available literature on hedging in financial futures is, due to 
their brief history, relatively limited. There is, however, a vast lit¬ 
erature on hedging in the commodity futures markets. As there are many 
similarities in the functioning of these two markets, it is desirable to 
review the relevant aspects of the literature on commodity futures.'*' 
Theories of hedging. The concept of hedging has undergone substantial 
transformations over the years. Until the 1950s the primary motive of 
hedging was thought to be risk-avoidance, i.e., minimizing the variance 
of spot price movements. The hedger was assumed to hold positions in 
futures markets that were equal in magnitude and opposite to their cash 
market positions. For instance, Roy [81] described hedging behavior in 
terms of the the "safety first principle" which assumed that entrepreneurs 
sought to minimize the probability of disaster by means of hedging. 
Keynes [53] referred to futures markets as an insurance mechanism whereby 
11 
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the hedger transferred price risk to speculators through the process of 
normal backwardation. 
The theory of hedging was, however, soon reformulated by Working 
[102] following the advent of the Markowitz mean-variance approach to 
portfolio selection. Working described the hedger as an arbitrager seek¬ 
ing to maximize the expected return and minimize risk of his (her) over¬ 
all portfolio. He wrote: 
The role of risk avoidance in most commercial hedging has been great¬ 
ly overemphasized in economic discussions. Most hedging is done 
largely and may be done wholly, because the information on which the 
merchant or processor acts leads logically to hedging. He buys the 
spot commodity because the spot price is low relative to the futures 
price and he has reason to expect the spot premium to advance; there¬ 
fore he buys the spot and sells the future [p. 325]. 
Johnson elaborated the "hedger is an arbitrager" concept of Work¬ 
ing. He asserted: 
There is no distinction between the hedger and the 'ordinary1 specu¬ 
lator insofar as both are motivated by a desire to obtain a for them 
optimum combination of E(R) and V(R) as determined by their respec¬ 
tive utility functions. The only essential distinction between them 
is that the hedger has a primary market, which in this model gives 
rise to a merchandising profit [52; p. 150]. 
He developed a hedging model in the mean-variance framework. It 
accounted for the observed behavior of the hedger to take cognizance of 
not only the relative price movements but also absolute price movements, 
leading him (her) to hold very often a mix of hedged and speculative po¬ 
sitions . 
Effectiveness of hedging. Following these different interpretations, 
several approaches have been adopted to analyze the effectiveness of 
hedging. Of these, the following are noteworthy. 
13 
Stability of the basis. Some researchers have suggested the mea¬ 
surement of the basis to determine hedging effectiveness. Basis is the 
difference between the contemporaneous cash and future prices. A stable 
basis is regarded as indicative of an effective hedge since the price 
changes in cash and futures markets tend to offset each other when the 
basis is stable. The effectiveness of a hedge is measured by comparing 
the variability of cash price with that of the basis. This criterion has 
been criticized because it assumes that the hedger is not an arbitrager 
seeking to profit from the relative price movements but only a risk- 
minimizer [27; p. 77]. Another shortcoming of the basis analysis is 
that it is based on the unrealistic assumption that the hedger always 
holds a unit-to-unit hedge [52]. 
Comovement of cash and futures prices. The higher the positive 
correlation between cash and futures prices the more effective is the 
hedge, and with perfect positive correlation it is possible to eliminate 
completely the price risk of a hedged position. Johnson [53] developed 
the coefficient of determination based on cash and future price changes 
as a measure of hedging effectiveness. The factors that limit the paral¬ 
lel movement of cash and futures prices limit the effectiveness of hedg- 
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ing. Working [102], however, criticized the use of comovement of cash 
and futures prices to measure hedging effectiveness on the grounds that 
the hedger is not just a risk averter but an arbitrager as well. 
. . . the basic idea that complete effectiveness of hedging depends 
on parallelism of movement of spot and futures prices is false, and 
an improper standard by which to test the effectiveness of hedging. 
The effectiveness of hedging intelligently used with commodity stor¬ 
age depends on inequalities between the movements of spot and fu¬ 
tures prices and on reasonable predictability of such inequalities 
[pp. 547-49]. 
14 
Costs of hedging. Gray [35] discussed the structural characteris¬ 
tics of futures markets for hedging rather than the measures of effective¬ 
ness of hedging using hedging costs as a criterion of market effective¬ 
ness for hedging. Estimating profits on a consistently long position 
over a number of years in several futures markets, he concluded that 
hedging costs were low in balanced liquid markets and high in imbalanced 
markets. 
Revenue stability. This approach is based on the premise that the 
hedger considers both expected return and risk in deciding how much of 
the cash position to cover by selling futures contracts. Under this ap¬ 
proach a hedge is regarded as effective if it stabilizes revenues accru¬ 
ing to the hedger. Tomek and Gray [95] empirically tested a producer¬ 
hedging strategy that required that the production decisions be hedged by 
selling futures constracts (maturing after the harvest) prior to starting 
the production process and lifting the hedge after the harvest. They ob¬ 
served : 
. . . given a viable futures market, a necessary condition for a rou¬ 
tine hedging program to stabilize a producer's revenue is that the 
hedge be initiated at prices that are more stable year to year than 
the subsequent cash prices at which the commodity is sold. If the 
futures price is essentially as variable as the cash price, the hedge 
does not stabilize revenue. 
The empirical evidence suggests that cash and futures prices are al¬ 
most equally variable for commodities with continuous inventories. 
Hence, routine hedging by producers in such markets is unlikely to 
stabilize their revenues. For commodities such as potatoes, which 
lack continuous inventories, prices of distant futures are less vari¬ 
able than cash prices and hence producer hedging in such markets 
tends to stabilize revenue [p. 378]. 
Peck [71] took exception to the use of the traditional variance of 
cash and futures prices in evaluating income stabilizing effects of 
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hedging routines. Employing instead the forecast variance (as measured 
by the mean squared error), she found that both optimal and total hedging 
routines yielded considerable gains in stabilizing revenues. 
Interest Rate Risk 
Over the last decade interest rates have generally been rising and 
increasing in volatility. In particular, during the 1976-79 period cov¬ 
ered in this study interest rates registered pronounced variations in 
3 
level as well as volatility. While the yield curve was upward sloping 
with roughly 5 percent yield in 13 week T bills and 7 percent yield in 
15 year government bonds at the beginning of the period, it was slightly 
downward sloping at the end with a little over 9 percent short rate and a 
little lower than 9 percent long rate [97]. 
The above figures point out an important historical characteristic 
of interest rate movements. That is, the short-term rate is far more 
volatile than the long-term rate. Because of the discounting process 
involved in the price formation of debt instruments, however, the long¬ 
term price is much more volatile than the short-term price [45]. Accord¬ 
ingly, the growing volatility of interest rates exposes borrowers and 
lenders, particularly those in the long end of the market, to increasing 
basis risk. Haugen and others observed Mas a consequence of increased 
volatility in the level of rates, interest rate risk has assumed greater 
significance as a determinant of the systematic risk associated with com¬ 
mon stock” [42; p. 707]. 
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Measures of interest rate risk. The subject of interest rate risk has 
long been studied. Surveying the existing literature, it is possible to 
identify three measures of interest rate risk: (1) interest rate elasti¬ 
city, (2) duration, and (3) systematic interest rate risk coefficient. 
Interest rate elasticity. The traditional measure of the respon¬ 
siveness of a security’s price to interest rate fluctuations is its in¬ 
terest rate elasticity. For continuous compounding, the elasticity, D^, 
of the price of a security to small shifts in interest rates is given by 
D 
1 
dP 1_ 
P di 
where dP = the change in price of a security 
P = the price of a security 
di = the change in interest rates 
For discrete compounding, the corresponding formulation is 
(2-1) 
U2 ? di 
(2-2) 
where D£ = the interest rate elasticity based on discrete compounding 
i = the level of interest rates 
In both of these formulations, dP and di are inversely related, and con¬ 
sequently and D2 are negative in sign. Note that and D2 are pure 
numbers as they are ratios of percentage changes in price and interest 
rates. 
4 
Duration. The concept of duration was first developed by 
Macaulay in 1938 to measure the average term to maturity of a stream 
of cashflows [62]. He defined duration, ', as 
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D 
3 
n 
l A(t)-t(l+I) 
t=l 
l A(t)-(1+I) 
t=l 
(2-3) 
where A(t) = the cash flows over time 
I = the yield to maturity 
n = the term to maturity 
A yeah later in 1939, Hicks defined duration as the average length of 
time for which the various payments are deferred from the present when 
the times of payment are weighted by the discounted values of payments 
[43; p. 186] . Further, he showed that for small changes in interest 
rates the interest rate elasticity of a bond is identical to its dura¬ 
tion. Thus Macaulay and Hicks independently introduced the concept of 
duration as a measure of the true length of a bond. Recently, Bierwag 
and Kaufman described duration as T,the time period at which the direc- * 
tions of change in the price risk and coupon reinvestment risk 
are equal and opposite in sign” (5; p. 367]. From eq. (2-3) it is clear 
that the duration of a fixed coupon bond, D^, is given by (for discrete 
compounding) 
£ C • t [ M * n 
= t=l(l4-I)t (1+I)n 
t=l(l+I)t (1+I)n 
(2-4) 
where C = the fixed coupon receipt 
M = the face value of the bond 
I = the yield to maturity 
Thus duration is the weighted maturity of a stream of receipts or pay¬ 
ments over time. It is the summation of the present value of individual 
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cash flows multiplied by their time-points of occurrence relative to the 
current price of a security or an asset. It takes into account not only 
the length of time over which the cash flows occur but also the magni¬ 
tudes of cash flows at each point in calendar time. 
It is important to note the following with reference to eqs. (2-3) 
and (2-4) : 
1. In both the equations the term structure of interest rates is repre¬ 
sented by the nominal yield to maturity rather than the spot and for¬ 
ward rates 
2. The equations are based on the assumption that the yield curve is 
flat 
3. There is only a single change in the yield curve and this change 
takes the shape of a parallel shift 
Evidently these assumptions are quite restrictive and limit the 
value of the Macaulay-Hicks duration as a measure of interest rate sensi¬ 
tivity of a security. Since the early 1970s the increasing volatility of 
interest rates has led to a renewed interest in the theoretical proper¬ 
ties and empirical potentials of duration in measuring the basis risk. 
Several new measures of duration have been proposed to assess the impact 
of the real world behavior of interest rates on security prices and re¬ 
turns. Fisher and Weil [34], for instance, suggested the following mea¬ 
sure of duration to reflect the changing term-structure of interest 
rates. 
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C • t , M * n 
t=l t C n (i+i.) n (i+i.) 
3 3°1 J 
n - M 
l t + t 
t=i n (i+i.) n (i+i.) 
j-i 1 j-i j 
(2-5) 
where i_. = the forward rate in each period. 
Note that when the yield curve is horizontal the forward rates are all 
equal and thus [5]. 
Cooper [22] criticized the Macaulay-Hicks duration concept because 
of its reliance on the assumption of a flat term structure of interest 
rates. He showed that the concept of duration defined in eq. (2-4) is 
valid for only parallel shifts in the yield curve. Pointing out that the 
short-end of the term structure is rarely flat but rather is either ris- 
\ • V . 
ing or falling, he argued that the Macaulay-Hicks duration is not an 
adequate measure of interest rate risk for securities with maturities up 
to seven years. 
In a recent study, Ingersoll et al. [50] observed that the use of 
the yield to maturity rather than the forward rate as the appropriate 
discount rate in the present value function renders the traditional dura¬ 
tion measure unsuitable as a general proxy for basis risk. They further 
pointed out that the Macaulay-Hicks duration is an appropriate measure of 
basis risk only if the yield curve is flat and assumes shifts that are 
constant, additive, and infinitesimal. 
Bierwag [6] asserted that "the measure of duration that achieved 
immunization varies with the nature of the assumed stochastic changes in 
future interest rates" [p. 726]. He derived several theoretical measures 
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of duration that were appropriate for different stochastic changes in in¬ 
terest rates. Bierwag and Kaufman [5], however, showed that the values 
of different measures of duration do not vary greatly except at high cou¬ 
pons and long maturities and concluded that the Macaulay-Hicks duration 
is a reasonably good approximation to more complex measures of duration. 
In view of the important role of the concept of duration in this 
thesis, it is desirable to discuss the various properties of the 
Macaulay-Hicks duration. First note that duration, unlike most other 
measures of risk in finance, is not a measure of dispersion but rather of 
the (weighted) average maturity of cash flows over time. With regard to 
the pattern of cash flows over time, the duration of a zero-coupon in¬ 
strument, such as the T bill, is identical to its term to maturity, while 
the duration of a coupon-bond is less than its term to maturity. For a 
given coupon, default-risk, and yield to maturity, the duration of a 
coupon-bond selling at par or above increases at a decreasing rate, while 
that of a discount coupon bond increases and then falls with term to 
maturity [50]. 
Further, the duration of a bond varies inversely with its coupon- 
level. In other words, a high coupon bond has a shorter duration than 
another with a low coupon, given identical term to maturity, yield to 
maturity, and default-risk. Joehnk et al. [51] examined the price elas¬ 
ticity of 239 Aa rated discount bonds during several periods of falling 
interest rates between 1957 and 1974. Their findings on the interest 
rate sensitivity of bends at varying levels of discount were, however, 
mixed and they attributed their results to market imperfections. 
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The duration of all instruments generally varies inversely with the 
level of interest rates. Further, a change in the level of interest 
rates alters the relative structure of interest rate elasticities of 
various securities [42]. With regard to the level of default risk, the 
duration of a risk-free bond is more than that of a risky bond. Haugen 
and Wichem observed: 
. . . the interest elasticity of a risky, coupon bearing bond is less 
than a risk, free issue of identical maturity and nominal yield. This 
is because we are working under the assumption that the certainty 
equivalents decay for the risky issues . . . 
Risky issues are less sensitive to interest rate changes because they 
are securities of shorter duration. Their duration is shorter even 
if their maturity is of equal length, because the relative magnitudes 
of the contributions made by distant payments to the total present 
value are small relative to a risk free issue. The certainty equiva¬ 
lents for the risk free issue are the promised payments; these do not 
decay with increasing term [40; p. 123]. 
The duration of variable income securities, such as a common stock 
and other forms of wealth, is a direct function of the expected rate of 
growth of their cash flows and the length of their growth horizon [40]. 
This suggests that a growth stock is more interest rate volatile than a 
non-growth stock. Further, the duration of equity is a weighted average 
of the interest rate elasticities of assets and liabilities of the firm. 
Specifically, the duration of equity, D , is given by [41] 
D 
e 
V 
'a? 
- D 
V 
_c 
d V 
where the duration of assets 
the duration of liabilities 
the value of assets 
the value of liabilities 
(2-6) 
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Clearly, the interest rate elasticity of equity depends on the capital 
structure of the firm as well as the cash flows associated with its as¬ 
sets and liabilities. 
It is clear from the above discussion that the interest rate elas¬ 
ticity of a coupon-bond depends on its term to maturity, default-risk, 
coupon, and yield to maturity. Table 2-1 shows durations (in years) of 
bonds with different coupons, terms, and yields to maturity. A few ob¬ 
servations regarding the relative importance of coupon, yield, and term 
to maturity are worth noting: 
1. Given the yield and coupon at 8 percent (a par value bond), the dura¬ 
tion of a one year bond is 0.981 years while that of a 20 year bond 
is 10.292 years and that of a perpetual bond is 13.0 years 
2. Given the yield at 8 percent but coupon at 4 percent (a deep discount 
bond), the duration of a one year bond is 0.990 years while that of a 
20 year bond is 11.986 years. Clearly, in general the effect of cou¬ 
pon on duration is marginal 
3. Given the coupon at 8 percent, the duration of a one year bond at 
yields of 4 percent and 8 percent is virtually identical; the dura¬ 
tion of a 20 year bond at 4 percent yield is 12.181 years while it 
declines to 10.292 years at 8 percent yield 
It is evident that within the normal ranges of coupons, default- 
risk, and nominal yields, the term to maturity is the preponderant de¬ 
terminant of duration of a coupon-bond. Note, however, that the term to 
maturity is not a substitute for duration, especially for long-term bonds 
and higher coupon levels. At the long end of the market, bonds with 
widely varying maturities are quite comparable in terms of their dura¬ 
tions given yield, coupon, and credit risk. In other words, the dura¬ 
tions of a 10 year bond and a 20 year bond are far closer than their 
terms to maturity. Evidently, at normal ranges of coupon, yield and 
default-risk, long-term bonds are not all that different in terms of the 
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time value profiles of their cash flows as their terms to maturities seem 
to indicate.^ 
In the case of a zero-coupon bond, such as T bills, the duration is 
identical to the term to maturity. This implies that the level of inter¬ 
est rates has little effect on the interest rate risk of money market in¬ 
struments. This is apparent from the Table 2-1, although it does not in¬ 
clude zero-coupon issues per se. At the low coupon of 2 percent, the 
duration of a one year bond is virtually identical (0.995 years) at 4 
percent as well as 8 percent yields to maturity. 
In the light of these properties of duration of debt instruments, 
what could one speculate about the duration of a typical common stock? 
Recall that common stock is a variable income security having no fixed 
maturity. That is, it is similar to a perpetual instrument with a vari¬ 
able stream of cash flows over time. Relative to a long-term bond, it 
commonly has a higher rate of earnings and dividends and a much longer 
term to maturity. In light of the earlier observations on the relative 
importance of coupon, term, and yield to maturity in determining the 
duration of a long-term bond, it is obvious that common stock typically 
has a much longer duration than a long-term coupon bond. It should, how¬ 
ever, be noted that beyond fifty years the incremental effect of term to 
maturity on duration is negligible. 
Some empirical estimates of interest elasticities of common stocks 
and bonds were reported by Haugen and others [42]. Using a sample of 
ninety-eight regulated electric utility firms, they estimated the mean 
duration of equity at twenty years with a cross-sectional standard devia¬ 
tion of eight years and that of debt at three years during the two-month 
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period from December 1970 to January 1971. They further observed that 
the regulation of electric utilities increased the sensitivity of their 
common stock to interest rate movements in comparison to that of non- 
regulated firms. Recently, Lanstein and Sharpe [57] reported that their 
sample of 220 stocks had a mean duration of 32.6 years with a standard 
deviation of 13.8 years. 
Dual index model. In the existing literautre, one also comes 
across a decomposition of interest rate risk into systmeatic and un¬ 
systematic risks. Stone wrote: 
When holdings are concentrated in a narrow maturity range, both 
gains and losses are possible from ’pure twists' in the term struc¬ 
ture where a pure twist is defined as a change in term structure with 
the average level of interest rates constant, e.g., falling short¬ 
term rates and rising long-term rates. In contrast, by holding a 
suitably weighted average of all maturities, an investor can essen¬ 
tially eliminate the effect of pure twists so that he bears only the 
risk of level change. In analogy to the market index model, the 
risk from pure twists is nonsystematic since it can be eliminated by 
diversifying over maturity ranges but risk due to level changes can¬ 
not be diversified away if only long positions are held [92; p. 711]. 
The Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model [59,85] suggests 
that the systematic interest rate risk of a security can be estimated by 
regressing its rate of return against the return from a debt market port¬ 
folio. ^ Stone [92] proposed a dual index model consisting of debt and 
equity indexes as an alternative to the Sharpe-Lintner single index mar¬ 
ket model and described the coefficient of: the debt index as a measure 
of the systematic interest rate risk of a security. Stone's dual index 
model was empirically tested in two recent studies. Investigating the 
sources of extra-market covariation in stock returns in public utilities 
and financial institutions, Martin and Keown [64] found the existence of 
a common group factor related to interest rate sensitivity. Lloyd and 
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Shick [60] performed a more direct test of the dual index model. Using 
quarterly data on a sample of sixty commercial bank stocks over a four 
year period, they reported that the addition of the bond index improved 
the explanatory power of the model, although its omission did not bias 
equity beta estimates. 
Another recent empirical work based on multiple indexes is that by 
Haugen et al. [42] which employed a three-factor model consisting of 
debt, equity, and industry factors. Using monthly data from 1967 to 
1975 on 78 electric utility stocks and stocks of 163 non-regulated firms 
in 10 .industries, they reported that the stocks of regulated firms ex¬ 
hibited significantly higher interest rate sensitivity than those of 
non-regulated firms. 
Duration and conventional measures of risk. There is evidence to 
show that duration and the slope coefficient in the regression of secur¬ 
ity returns against an index of general level of interest rates are 
highly correlated. Comparing the slope coefficient from regressing 
monthly portfolio bond returns against the holding period return on a 
government bond index and the duration during 1947-73, Bildersee [8] 
found that the two measures had a rank correlation of 0.984. 
Further, there exists a direct relationship between the duration 
and systematic risk (beta coefficient) of a common stock. Boquist et 
al. [11] showed that: 
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Beta. 
1 
D.[cov(dG.,R ) - Cov(dK.,R )] 
i l m l m 
(2-7) 
V(R ) 
m 
where D. 
l 
the duration 
= the constant growth rate 
R^ = the return on the market portfolio 
V(R ) = the variance of R 
m m 
K_^ = the cost of equity capital 
Eq. (2-7) reveals that the systematic risk of a common stock arises from 
two sources: (1) the risk due to changes in the term-structure of inter¬ 
est rates (D^) , and (2) the risk due to changes in the expected cash 
flows of a stock relative to that of the market portfolio. 
Eddy [27] reformulated the capital asset pricing model in the 
multi-period context in terms of price forecasting errors. He wrote, 
"interest rate risk can be regarded as systematic risk in returns due to 
price forecasting errors," and that "beta coefficient is a (non-linear) 
measure of interest rate risk in the determination of expected returns on 
default free bonds" [p. 629]. 
It has also been shown that the duration of a bond is related to 
its price volatility. Hopewell and Kaufman showed that: 
(2-8) 
They observed: "for a given basis point change in market yield percent¬ 
age changes in bond prices vary proportionately with duration and are 
greater, the greater the duration of the bond" [46; p. 749]. Elaborating 
on this relationship, Bierwag et al. indicated that "for a given basis 
point change in interest rates, the relative change in bond price will be 
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greater: (a) the lower the coupon rate, (b) the lower the market yield, 
and (c) the longer the maturity1’ [7; p. 673], 
Risk reduction strategies. There are primarily four approaches to coping 
with interest rate risk: diversification, concentration, immunization, 
and hedging. As discussed earlier, diversification involves spreading 
one’s investments across the maturity range. While this strategy is ef¬ 
fective in dealing with unsystematic interest rate risk, it is of little 
help in combating the risk which stems from level changes. The second 
strategy, concentration, involves moving out of term instruments and in¬ 
to money market securities when the volatility of interest rates is ex¬ 
pected to increase. It has been pointed out earlier that although the 
short yields are more volatile than their long-term counterparts, their 
effect on duration of short-term issues is marginal. Note, however, that 
these two strategies only mitigate the adverse impact of interest rate 
changes, but do not eliminate it. 
The third approach to coping with interest rate risk is known as 
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the duration strategy (or the immunization rule). Originally propounded 
by Hicks and Samuelson, the duration theorem posits that it is possible 
to immunize the investor’s net worth against small changes in interest 
rates by equating the weighted duration of liability streams with that of 
the asset streams [38,39,43,78,82]. As applied to coupon-bearing debt 
instruments, this strategy requires that investors choose the coupon rate 
and term to maturity in such a way that the duration of the bond is equal 
to their planned holding period [34]. Bierwag [6] showed that for com¬ 
plicated stochastic changes in the term structure of interest rates. 
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duration strategy requires the diversification of a single bond invest¬ 
ment into a multi-bond portfolio. The strategy also suggests that 
holders of zero-coupon instruments can protect themselves against price 
risk by matching their expected holding periods with the term to maturity 
of these securities. 
Recently, Lanstein and Sharpe [57] pointed out that the duration 
strategy provides complete immunization only if the bond returns are per¬ 
fectly correlated. Examining the monthly returns on bond portfolios of 
varying maturities, they observed "the substantial departures from per¬ 
fect correlation show that simple duration calculations will not suffice 
to completely immunize a bond portfolio” [p. 661]. They further noted 
that the traditional notion of immunization assumes that the extra-market 
covariances^^ associated with bonds are negligible. While the extra¬ 
market covariances are small for default-free bonds, they are substantial 
for common stocks. 
As observed earlier, the possibility of hedging against interest 
rate risk has only recently become possible. The use of financial fu¬ 
tures in hedging interest rate risk associated with 3-month T bills and 
GNMA issues was recently examined by Ederington [28]. Using bi-weekly 
and 4-weekly data over January 1976 to December 1977, he employed the co¬ 
efficient of determination based on cash and futures price changes to 
evaluate the hedging performance of the T-bill futures and GNMA futures 
markets and reported that: 
1. The hedging performance of GNMA futures was superior to that of T— 
bill futures; the coefficient of determination for GNMA hedges varied 
between .661 and .817 as compared to .140 and .741 for T—bill hedges. 
The hedging performance of GNMA futures was comparable to that of 
corn futures but inferior to that of wheat futures 
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2. The long term (4-weekly) hedges were more effective than the short 
term (2-weekly) hedges 
3. The cash prices for both T-bill and GNMAs consistently exceeded fu¬ 
tures prices during the period, thus resulting in a positive change 
in the basis. This would improve returns on long hedges and reduce 
returns on short hedges 
4. Contrary to the traditional theory, the risk minimizing hedge ratio, 
(i.e., the ratio of futures to cash positions) was generally less 
than unity 
Market Efficiency 
Stock markets. The capital markets are deemed to be efficient when 
security prices quickly and effectively reflect all available information 
and thus are equal to their underlying intrinsic values [31,83]. In 
the empirical literature on stock markets, three different degrees of 
market efficiency have been examined: the weak, semi-strong, and strong 
forms of the efficient market hypothesis [31]. 
The weak form of the efficient market hypothesis posits that it is 
not possible for the investor to earn a consistently higher rate of re¬ 
turn than that of a naive buy-and-hold strategy using information from 
historical price and volume data. The available evidence demonstrates 
that stock markets in the United States for the most part have attained 
this level of efficiency [31]. 
The semi-strong form of the hypothesis claims further that security 
prices also quickly and accurately reflect all publicly availalbe infor¬ 
mation. The existing evidence on whether the United States stock markets 
have attained this level of efficiency is mixed [61; pp. 101-279]. 
The strong form of the hypothesis asserts that no investor, not 
even the specialist or the insider, can consistently earn a rate of 
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return higher than that on a naive buy-and-hold strategy. Finnerty [33] 
tested the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis by examining 
if the insiders could earn better than average profits. He concluded, 
"Insiders are able to outperform the market. Insiders can and do iden¬ 
tify profitable as well as unprofitable situations within their corpora¬ 
tions. This finding tends to refute the strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis" [p. 1148]. 
Bond markets. The efficiency of bond markets has also been examined by 
some researchers. Roll [80] noticed significant deviations from effi¬ 
ciency in the T bills market. In a later study, however, Fama [32] re¬ 
ported that the T bills market was efficient: "... during 1953-1971 
the bond market seems to be efficient in the sense that in setting one to 
six-month nominal rate of interest, the market correctly uses all the in¬ 
formation about future rates of change in purchasing power that is in the 
time series of past rates of change" [p. 282], The efficiency of the 
long-term debt markets has not yet been well explored. 
Commodity futures markets. One implication of market efficiency is that 
short-run price movements are characterized by the martingale process 
which is loosely called a random walk. The question of market efficiency 
of commodity futures has been examined through the analysis of the sto¬ 
chastic nature of futures prices. The two major theories describing the 
price formation of commodity futures are the unbiased expectations hypo¬ 
thesis and the normal backwardation hypothesis. 
Under the unbiased expectations hypothesis futures prices are re¬ 
garded as unbiased estimates of expected spot prices at the expiration of 
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the relevant contracts. Samuelson [83] showed recently that this hypo¬ 
thesis implies that futures prices follow a martingale. The normal 
backwardation hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that futures prices 
contain a downward bias in order to compensate speculators for bearing 
the risk of unexpected price fluctuations. A number of studies have 
tested these hypotheses empirically [23,24,37,79,93,94], and the general 
conclusion is that backwardation is not a normal feature of futures 
prices. While futures prices in underused, imbalanced markets (i.e., 
markets characterized by a lack of speculation) sometimes seem to exhi¬ 
bit a downward or upward bias, in balanced markets the unbiased expecta¬ 
tions hypothesis largely holds. 
There are several studies that have examined the random behavior of 
futures price-changes. In his theory of anticipatory market prices [103] 
Working described changes in futures prices as approximately a random 
walk. Larson [58], in examining daily price-changes of Chicago corn fu¬ 
tures during 1922 to 1931, and 1949 to 1958, observed both positive and 
negative serial dependence, but concluded that price changes closely ap¬ 
proached random walk behavior. While Cootner [25] found stock prices to 
be negatively correlated over short time intervals and positively cor¬ 
related over long term periods, he noted that commodity futures prices 
approached a random walk more closely than stock prices. 
On the other hand, quite a few studies have reported that futures 
prices do not follow a random walk. Employing filter rules, Houthakker 
[47,48] concluded that futures prices moved in trends. Smidt [88] used 
trading rules on the Chicago soybean daily price data over the 1952 to 
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1961 period to discover statistically significant negative serial depen¬ 
dence. In an empirical study covering the period from 1957 to 1968, 
Stevenson and Bear [91] concluded: 
The various tests applied to July com and July soyabeans suggest 
that the random walk hypothesis does not offer a satisfactory ex¬ 
planation of the movement of those speculative price series. Spe¬ 
cifically, a tendency for negative dependence in short periods of 
time and positive dependence over long periods was evident . . . 
Serial correlation and an analysis of runs substantiated the short- 
run, one- and two-day, tendency toward reversal. The success of large 
filters verifies the existence of long term trends. While the ex¬ 
istence of long term trends does not in itself contradict the random 
walk hypothesis, the profitability which was found in this analysis 
of playing long term movements on both the long and short sides over 
a buy and hold policy, does cast considerable doubt on the applic¬ 
ability of this hypothesis to the market for commodity futures 
[p . 80 ] . 
Financial futures markets. The existing literature on the market effi¬ 
ciency of financial futures has focused on the testing of the unbiased 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. This 
hypothesis implies that in an efficient market yields on financial fu¬ 
tures should be equal to implied forward rates. That is, the forward 
and futures yields should be equal for identical maturities. Examining 
the 3-month T-bill futures Poole [75] found that the nearest maturity 
T-bill futures yields were indeed approximately equal to spot T-bill 
yields, thus leaving hardly any profitable arbitrage opportunities be¬ 
tween the two markets. 
Branch provides by far the most extensive studies on financial fu¬ 
tures. Using monthly data on 3-month T-bill futures from June 1976 to 
July 1978, he found little support for the unbiased expectations hypothe¬ 
sis and reported that his results were favorable to the segmented market 
hypothesis [13]. He observed that while the cash and nearest maturity 
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long futures yields were closely related, the gap between them widened in 
favor of futures as their term to expiration lengthened. He noticed 
several profitable arbitraging opportunities associated with distant 
maturity futures which were not just temporary but consistent and persis¬ 
tent over time. He wrote 
An efficient market should drive the two sets of rates together. 
That this has not thus far happened and that there appears to be lit¬ 
tle or no progress in that direction is rather clear evidence of 
both a segmentation of the two markets (cash governments and futures 
governments), and an inefficiency in the linkage between the two mar¬ 
kets [p. 63]. 
Branch [14] further explored the exploitation of inefficiencies in 
financial futures markets for improving portfolio returns. He compared 
returns on cash securities with that on portfolios of cash and futures in 
3-month T-bills, T-bonds and GNMAs of equivalent maturities. He found 
that portfolios involving long positions in distant futures provided 
higher returns relative to spot security returns and that the portfolio 
returns generally increased with the distance to expiration of futures 
contracts. 
Lang and Rosche [56] examined 3-month T-bill futures data from 
March 1976 to March 1978 and reported results similar to Branch [13]. 
Examining the daily data on T-bill futures Puglisi [76], and Vignola and 
Dale [96] discovered persistent arbitrage opportunities and concluded 
that the T-bill futures market was inefficient. 
Several explanations for the systematic differences have been put 
forward, such as, transaction costs, default risk premium, rising futures 
yield curve, etc. While the transaction costs associated with futures 
are small, they are positive in spot markets. This has the effect of 
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raising forward rates relative to the associated futures rates and ex¬ 
plains why near-delivery futures rates are below spot rates [56]. For 
distant delivery futures, however, default risk premium becomes increas¬ 
ingly important. 
... a futures contract is not guaranteed by the U.S. government, 
but is rather guaranteed by the exchange on which it is traded. Al¬ 
though the futures contract involves delivery of T-bills that are de¬ 
fault free, the contract itself is not default free. Consequently, 
the future rate may contain a risk premium associated with default 
risk. 
This default risk factor would be more important for the future con¬ 
tracts that are further from delivery . . . [56; p. 25]. 
Due to the existence of transaction costs and default risk premium, 
future rates do not necessarily reflect the expected level of future 
interest rates. However, these results do not conflict with the pro¬ 
position that changes in market expectations of future interest rates 
can be inferred from changes in futures rates [56; p. 30]. 
A third explanation is the general expectation in the market during 
the last 2-3 years that long term interest rates are likely to rise. 
This has resulted in an upward yield structure in futures markets with 
the result that while the near-delivery futures yields are close to cash 
markets yields, yields on distant delivery futures are considerably above 
their cash market counterparts [13,14]. Other explanations are the lack 
of information regarding trading opportunities in futures, institutional 
constraints on futures trading, and thin volume of trading in distant de¬ 
liveries . 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
Propositions 
The basic propostions discussed in this chapter are: 
Proposition 1. How effective are the financial futures in coping with 
the price risk faced by a wide spectrum of cash securi¬ 
ties? 
Proposition 2. How many futures contracts should a risk minimizing in¬ 
vestor sell for each unit of his (her) long cash posi¬ 
tion? 
Proposition 3. Are the financial futures markets efficient? That is, is 
it possible to earn a consistently higher than riskless 
rate of return by maintaining a continuously adjusted 
portfolio of short and long positions in the financial 
futures and spot securities? 
The chapter begins with the development of a hedging model. In 
formulating the model it is assumed that the primary rationale underlying 
most hedge trading in financial futures is to minimize the basis risk as¬ 
sociated with spot positions. The model indicates that the coefficient of 
determination between cash and futures price changes can be employed to 
measure the effectiveness of hedging and cross-hedging strategies. It re¬ 
veals further that hedging performance is primarily a function of the 
relative interest rate elasticities of spot and futures securities. 
Following this the hypothesis regarding the hedging performance of 
thirteen week T bill futures (CMT) , bond futures (CBT) , and 8 percent 
GNMA futures (CBT) are presented in relation to: spot securities of 
varying maturities; securities of different default-risk levels; individ¬ 
ual issues vs. portfolios; discount vs. non-discount issues; form of 
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security-stocks and bonds; distance to expiration of futures contracts; 
and comparison between bond futures and GNMA futures. Finally, the hypo¬ 
theses on the risk minimizing hedge ratio and the efficiency of financial 
futures markets are discussed. 
The Hedging Model 
The impact of fluctuations in interest rates varies with the type 
of financial instruments. While the shifts in interest rates lead to a 
gain or loss in the price of a zero-coupon bond, they expose a coupon 
bond or a stock not only to price appreciation or decline but also to 
uncertain returns on the reinvestment of periodic cash flows. One way 
to cope with the basic risk exposure of a financial instrument is to 
hedge the spot market investment in the futures market. 
Consider for instance the case of a zero coupon bond investor. 
The expected return in dollars, E(ARct_) , from holding Xc units of a zero 
coupon bond is given by 
(3-1) 
where E(Pt+^ - P^.) = the expected price change associated with an un¬ 
hedged cash position 
The price risk,^ V(ARc(_), of the unhedged spot position is 
V(ARct> - XctV(CPt> 
(3-2) 
where CPt = the change in spot prices. 
The expected dollar returns, E(AR^t), on long holdings of units of fu¬ 
tures contracts (net of transaction costs, T(X^)), can be estimated by 
E(ARft) = XftE(Ft+1-Ft) - T(Xft) (3-3) 
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where E(F ^-F ) = the futures price change 
X^ = the number of futures contracts 
The Xf is positive for a long position and negative for a short 
position 
If the investor constructs a portfolio of long Xc units of a zero 
coupon bond and short X^ units of the related futures contract, the ex¬ 
pected dollar return, ECAR^), and the price risk, V(ARht_) , of the hedged 
portfolio are given by 
E(ARht) = XctE(CPt) + XftE(CFt) - T(Xft) (3-4) 
V(AEht> - XctV(CPt) + XftV(CV + 2XctXftrcft(CPt>CFt) ^ 
S(CPt)S(CFt) 
where CF^ = the change in futures prices 
r £t(CPt,CFt) = the correlation coefficient between price changes 
S(CF ) = the standard deviation of futures price changes 
S(CP ) = the standard deviation of spot price changes 
Since r ^t(CPt,CFt) can be normally expected to be positive, the 
last term in eq. (3-5) will have a negative sign in a short hedge. 
Therefore, the closer r ^ (CPt,CFt) is to one the smaller the V(AR^t). 
Assume now that the objective of the investor in constructing the 
hedged portfolio is to minimize the price risk relative to his (her) spot 
position. The number of futures contracts that (s)he has to sell short 
to minimize the price risk can be derived by differentiating eq. (3-5) 
with respect to X^ and solving for its value: 
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dV(ARht} 
dX 
ft 
-X 
2XftV(CFt) + 2Xct cov(CPt,CPt) = 0 
ft 
XctCov(CPt,CFt) 
V(CFt) 
(3-6) 
Substituting the value of X* in eq. (3-5) yields the price risk, V(AR, )*, 
associated with the risk minimizing portfolio: 
2 *1 tCov2(CP ,CF ) 
V(ARht)* = XctV(C?t)-CC 
V(CFt) 
(3-7) 
The extent of price risk reduction, 0, resulting from the hedging strate¬ 
gy, can be seen by comparing the price risk of the unhedged cash posi- 
2 
tion, Xc+_V(CPt) , with that of the hedged portfolio, V(AR^t)*: 
, , X^ Cov2(CP CF ) 
0 = xctv(CPt) - xctv(cpt) + - V(CF }-£- (3-8) 
Dividing throughout by X^^VCCP^.) indicates the percentage risk reduction 
obtained through hedging: 
e = 
0 
Xc£V(CPt) 
= 1 - 1 + 
Cov (CPt,CFc) 
V(CPt)V(CFt) 
= r 
eft 
(3-9) 
where e is a measure of the effectiveness of hedging. 
Eq. (3-9) reveals the coefficient of determination between cash and 
futures price changes estimates the degree of price protection that can 
be obtained by hedging in financial futures markets. That is, the risk 
reduction potential of a hedge is determined by the degree of correlation 
between cash and futures price changes. The investor can immunize his 
(her) hedged portfolio against basis risk if the cash and futures price 
changes are perfectly positively correlated. The lower the degree of price 
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correlation, the smaller is the amount of protection from interest rate 
risk offered by the hedge. 
Interest Rate Elasticity and Hedging Effectiveness 
Since price changes of cash and futures instruments are a function 
of their interest rate elasticities, it is critically important to estab¬ 
lish the link between the correlation coefficient of cash and futures 
price changes, rc£t> and their interest rate elasticities. It has been 
shown that the duration of a financial security measures its interest 
rate elasticity [43]. Further, the price volatility of a debt security 
to small changes in interest rates has been shown to be related to its 
2 
duration as under [46]: 
dF. 
-p- = -DitdIit 
it 
(3-10) 
where dP = the change in price of security i 
P = the price of security i 
D. = the duration - the constant of proportionality between per¬ 
centage changes in the price of security i and changes in 
its yield to maturity 
dl. = the change in yield to maturity of security i over a short 
interval of time 
For small changes in interest rates it follows from eq. (3-10) that 
CP 
t 
-D dl P 
ct ct t 
dl F 
ft t 
(3-11) 
where D = the duration of the cash security 
ct 
3 
Dft = the duration of the futures contract 
dl = the change in yield to maturity of the cash security 
c t 
dlft = the change in yield to maturity of the futures contract 
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The correlation coefficient between cash and futures price changes, r . , 
eft 
is given by 
Cov(CPt,CFt) 
(3-12) 
rcft S(CPt)S(CF ) 
Substituting eq. (3-11) in the numerator of eq. (3-12) 
r 
eft 
(3-13) 
In eq. (3-13), the covariance term in the numerator is normally 
positive due to the tendency of yield changes, dl^ and dl^, to move in 
the same direction. The equation brings out that the correlation between 
cash and futures price changes is a function of three variables: 
1. The durations of cash and futures instruments 
2. The levels of cash and futures yields, Ict and Ift> which are re¬ 
flected in the cash and futures prices, P and F^ 
3. The change in the levels of cash and futures yields, dl and dl^t; 
that is, the volatility of yields 
Assume now a common flat yield curve for both the markets and that 
the yield changes are equal. That is, F = P , and dl^t = dlct. It fol¬ 
lows that Dct = D^t. Clearly, then rcft = l‘ This signifies perfect posi¬ 
tive correlation between price changes which results in an immunizing 
* 
hedge. More realistically, however, F ^ Pfc and dl^t^dlct. When the 
yield curve is upward sloping, F^ < P^_, and when it is downward sloping, 
F >P . Further, as argued later, dl^ is commonly higher than dIQt un¬ 
der all scenarios of the term structure of interest rates. Under realis¬ 
tic conditions, therefore, the durations of cash and futures instruments 
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will not be equal to each other for a given level of default risk and 
coupon, and the r^^ will be generally less than one. 
It is thus clear from eq. (3-13) that given the level and volatil¬ 
ity of yields, the degree of price correlation is primarily a function 
of the durations of cash and futures instruments. Generalizing this re¬ 
sult to spot securities, it emerges that what determines the degree of 
price correlation between two spot issues is not the identity or proxim¬ 
ity between their terms to maturity but the extent of correspondence 
between the present value profiles of their cash flows. In other words, 
two coupon-bonds with identical durations will exhibit a higher degree 
of price correlation than another set of two coupon-issues with identical 
maturity but varying durations. 
From the standpoint of a hedging strategy, several implications of 
eq. (3-13) are noteworthy. First, matching durations of cash and futures 
instruments does not yield immunization because of the difference in the 
level and volatility of interest rates in the two markets. Second, with¬ 
in the three broad classes of term-structure—the short-term, the inter¬ 
mediate-term, and the long-term—it is reasonable to expect that the co- 
variance and variance between yield changes as reflected in 
Cov(dI P , dl. F ) and S(dl P ) *S(dI,-. F ) respectively will be similar. 
ct t it t ct t tt t 
It follows then that, within each class of the term-structure, for a 
given Dft, the higher the Dct the higher is rc£t* That is, futures in¬ 
struments provide greater price protection to more interest rate sensi¬ 
tive spot securities than to those less exposed to basis risk. It fur¬ 
ther implies that within each class of the term structure, hedging with 
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lower interest rate sensitive future instruments will be less effective 
than hedging with more interest rate elastic instruments. 
Determinants of Hedging Effectiveness 
From eq. (3-9) it is obvious that the hedging performance of finan¬ 
cial futures depends on the degree of correlation between cash and fu¬ 
tures price changes. The hedge will completely eliminate the price risk 
if the price changes are perfectly positively correlated (see eq. (3-7)). 
A perfect positive price correlation implies 
(3-14) 
where B' = the number of futures contracts in a risk minimizing hedge 
against each unit of long cash position 
When eq. (3-14) holds, the price gain (loss) on the cash position 
will be offset by the price loss (gain) on a short futures position, 
leaving the equity of the investor intact. On the other hand, a less 
than perfectly positive correlation between cash and futures price 
changes will result in the risk minimizing short hedge being only par¬ 
tially successful in coping with the price risk. The imperfect positive 
price correlation can be formulated as 
(3-15) CP = A + BCFt + E 
where A = the intercept 
B = the slope parameter indicating the number of futures contracts 
in a risk minimizing hedge for each unit of cash position 
E = the stochastic disturbance 
From the intercept. A, and the disturbance term in eq. (3-15) it 
is apparent that with imperfect price correlation the risk minimizing 
hedge containing B futures contracts for each cash bond will fail to 
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equate the cash price gain (loss) with the futures price loss (gain). 
Consequently, the variance of the risk-minimizing hedged portfolio in 
eq. (3-7) will be greater than zero. 
The degree of correlation between cash and futures price changes is 
govered by a number of factors. The unbiased expectations hypothesis 
posits that in an efficient market 
Ft - E<W (3-16) 
where E(Pt+^) = the expected price of the underlying spot security at 
the expiration of the futures contract 
Any systematic deviation from this equilibrium relationship generates 
profitable arbitraging opportunities between cash and futures markets. 
Consequently, the profit seeking moves by market participants can be ex¬ 
pected to drive the prices back to their equilibrium relationship. 
The common determinant of price generation in cash and futures mar¬ 
kets is the expected level and volatility of interest rates. Evidently 
the higher the level of expected interest rates the lower are the cash 
and futures prices. Similarly, the more volatile the expected interest 
rates the more unstable are the price movements in both the markets. 
Eq. (3-13) indicates that hedging effectiveness should increase 
with the interest rate elasticities of cash and futures instruments given 
the covariance between yield levels and changes. Interest rate sensiti¬ 
vity of spot securities is a function of several variables such as term 
to maturity, level of default-risk, level of coupon, level of interest 
rates, growth or non-growth stock, etc. 
The interest rate elasticity of futures instruments is primarily 
related to their underlying spot securities. In general, futures 
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contracts are highly sensitive to interest rate expectations. Among the 
futures instruments the T bill futures are by far the least interest rate 
sensitive because they are tied to a short-term zero-coupon instrument. 
Of the long-term futures, the GNMA futures can be expected to be less 
interest rate sensitive than the bond futures. This is because the for¬ 
mer is coupled with a cash security of twelve years to maturity while 
the latter is tied to government bonds of fifteen years or longer to 
maturity. Moreover, there tends to exist a direct relationship between 
interest rate elasticity and variance of price changes for both spot and 
futures instruments. That is, the higher the degree of interest rate 
elasticity the larger is the variance of price changes. 
What emerges from the above discussion is that the degree of cor¬ 
relation between cash and futures price changes depends on those vari¬ 
ables which determine their interest rate elasticities. Specifically, 
the determinants of their interest rate elasticities and hedging effec¬ 
tiveness are: 
1. The term to maturity of spot securities 
2. The level of default risk 
3. The distance to delivery of futures contracts 
4. The coupon effect 
5. The form of cash security—debt or equity 
6. The type of cash security—individual security vs. portfolios 
7. The type of long-term hedging instrument—bond futures vs. GNMA fu¬ 
tures 
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Hypothesis 1—Hedging Performance of Financial Futures 
Equation (3-9) shows the relation between the hedging effectiveness 
of financial futures and the degree of positive correlation between cash 
and futures price changes. Price changes in both the markets are, 
however, primarily a function of their interest rate elasticities as 
shown in eq. (3-11). It follows then that the positive correlation be¬ 
tween cash and futures price changes increases with their interest rate 
elasticities (see eq. (3-13)). That is, the higher the interest rate 
elasticities of cash and futures, the higher is the positive correlation 
between price changes. 
Hypothesis 1: The degree of price protection offered by futures instru¬ 
ments is largely a direct function of the interest rate 
elasticities of spot securities and futures contracts. 
Based on the determinants of interest rate elasticity outlined 
earlier, the following hypotheses regarding hedging performance can be 
formulated.^ 
Hypothesis 1A—Term to maturity of spot securities. The interest rate 
elasticity (duration) of a short-term zero-coupon security is identical 
to its term to maturity. For coupon-bearing bonds interest rate elasti¬ 
city increases at a decreasing rate with their term to maturity, It fol¬ 
lows then that the interest rate elasticity of most bonds exceeds that of 
the money market issues. 
The interest rate elasticity of futures instruments is related to 
that of their underlying spot securities. This implies that the T bill 
futures are less interest rate sensitive than the long-term futures, and 
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between the latter the bond futures are more responsive to interest rate 
movements than are the GNMA futures. Whether the interest rate elastici¬ 
ties of financial futures and their underlying spot securities are iden¬ 
tical or not depends on the relative levels of interest rates prevailing 
in the spot and futures markets. 
Given the above relationship between maturity and interest rate 
elasticity, it is clear from eq. (3-13) that futures prices will have a 
higher degree of correlation with spot securities of relatively long-term 
to maturity than those with short-term to maturity. 
Hypothesis 1A: Futures instruments offer superior price protection to 
long-term spot securities relative to those with short¬ 
term to maturity. 
It is worthwhile to note the following implications of this hypo¬ 
thesis : 
1. Across spot maturities, the hypothesis suggests that a 1 week T bill 
will receive lower price protection from the T bill futures hedge 
than does a hedged 26 week T bill. Similarly, a short-term bond will 
receive lower protection against price risk from a hedge with the 
long-term futures than would a similar combination with a long-term 
bond. 
2. Across hedging instruments, the hypothesis implies that the T bill 
futures will offer relatively lower price protection to money market 
issues than do the long-term futures to coupon-bonds. This is be¬ 
cause both the T bill futures and money market instruments are less 
sensitive to interest rate variations in comparison to the long-term 
futures and bonds. Eq. (3-13) shows that the degree of correlation 
between price changes of the former is lower than that of the latter 
given the behavior of yields. 
Hypothesis IB—Level of default risk. For a given maturity and nominal 
yield, the risky coupon bonds (which have a higher coupon and thus a 
lower duration) are known to be less sensitive to interest rate changes 
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than those with little default risk [40]. Among the spot securities, 
treasuries, goverments, and agencies are viewed as being virtually free 
from default-risk while the level of risk varies among corporates, 
municipals, commercial paper, and mutual fund shares. The performance 
of futures contracts terms is guaranteed by the participant’s brokers 
and sponsoring Exchanges. Moreover, the delivery instruments underlying 
the futures contracts are the related governments and agencies or docu¬ 
ments backed up by these securities. Consequently, the amount of per¬ 
ceived default risk associated with futures contracts is negligible, and 
their price changes basically reflect interest rate expectations. 
It follows that futures instruments will have a higher degree of 
price correlation with default-free spot securities than with risky 
issues. 
Hypothesis IB: The price risk reduction offered by futures instruments 
varies inversely with the level of default-risk. That 
is, the lower the level of default risk, the higher is 
the risk reduction potential available in futures mar¬ 
kets . 
Hypothesis 1C—Delivery period. By mid 1979 there were eight separate 
delivery periods of T bill futures contracts and eleven each of bond fu¬ 
tures and GNMA futures contracts being traded at any one time. All the 
three futures instruments call for delivery at quarterly intervals; the 
first contract to mature may be up to three months into the future, the 
second six months from the start and so on with the result that it is 
possible to trade T bill futures calling for delivery twenty-four months 
into the future and to trade bond futures and GNMA futures with delivery 
thirty-three months ahead. 
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According to the unbiased expectation theory, the current futures 
price is equal to the expected spot price of the underlying spot security 
on expiration of the futures contract (eq. (3-16)). During a regime of 
generally rising interest rate expectations, it follows that lower prices 
and conversely higher yields will be associated with the more distant 
contracts, and higher prices and lower yields with the near-term con¬ 
tracts. For the nearest-term contracts, the yield may be only a few ba¬ 
sis points away from its cash market counterpart due to the activities 
of profit-seeking arbitragers. 
Moreover, the existing evidence indicates that the long futures 
yield generally exceeds the corresponding implied forward rate, and 
that the difference between them increases as the delivery period ex¬ 
tends into the future [13,14]. Thus the long futures yield related to 
distant deliveries is even higher than what is implied by the unbiased 
expectation theory. 
The interest rate elasticity of all debt securities is a negative 
function of the level of interest rates [40]. This suggests that the 
near-term deliveries with relatively lower futures yields are more in¬ 
terest rate elastic than the distant contracts offering higher yields. 
From eq. (3-13) it follows that the near-term contracts will correlate 
better with a given spot price than will the distant deliveries. 
Hypothesis 1C: The near-term contracts will offer superior price 
protection to a given spot security in comparison to 
the distant deliveries. 
Hypothesis ID—Coupon effect. In general interest rate elasticity varies 
inversely with the coupon level of bonds [40]. That is, for a given term 
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and yield to maturity, a bond with a higher coupon is less sensitive to 
movements in interest rates than another with a lower coupon. For any 
given level of interest rates, a relatively low-coupon bond trades at a 
discount while a high coupon bond carries a premium. Thus, a discount 
bond is more interest rate elastic than another trading at a premium. 
The bond futures prices are tied to the fifteen year maturity 
government bonds carrying an 8 percent coupon, and the GNMA futures 
prices are related to the 8 percent GNMAs with an effective maturity 
of 12 years. The expected levels of long-term interest rates during the 
1976-79 period, however, were generally higher than 8 percent with the 
result that both futures instruments were selling for the most part at 
a discount. The only time when the first two near-delivery GNMA futures 
contracts sold slightly above par was for about five weeks beginning in 
December of 1976. And the bond futures sold marginally above par only 
during the first three months from their inception. During 1976-77 the 
GNMA futures prices ranged between 92 and 101 percent of face value and 
from 1978 through mid 1979 they varied between 86 and 95 percent. The 
bond futures steadily fell from par in January 1978 to 89 percent of 
their face value in April 1979. For both the contracts the distant 
maturities sold at larger discounts than the near-term maturities, re¬ 
flecting the rising expectations on long-term rates. 
From eq. (3-13) it is clear that the long-term futures instruments 
will have a higher degree of price correlation with a discount spot bond 
than another selling at par or premium. 
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Hypothesis ID: A discount spot bond enjoys a higher risk reduction po¬ 
tential in the long-term futures market than another sel¬ 
ling at par or premium. 
It could not, however, be construed from this hypothesis that the 
distant contracts with fatter discounts would offer mors price protection 
than the near-term contracts with yields close to spot yields. This is 
so because the relationship between the coupon and interest rate elasti¬ 
city is known in the available literature for only a given yield and term 
to maturity. The near-term and distant contracts do, however, have vary¬ 
ing yields to maturity. 
Hypothesis IE—Form of cash security. Another interesting issue is whe¬ 
ther the long-term financial futures, which are tied to debt instruments, 
offer significant price protection to equity-type securities and hybrid 
securities. Since interest rates are the common denominator in the price 
generation process of all types of securities, the price changes of all 
of them reflect interest rate movements. Of course, the degree of in¬ 
terest rate sensitivity varies across the non-debt type securities. 
Hybrid securities such as preferred stocks are more responsive to inter¬ 
est rate changes than straight equities such as common stock. Within the 
common stock category growth stocks are known to be more interest rate 
elastic than non-growth stocks [40]. This implies that of the non-debt 
type issues the price changes of hybrid securities would have the high¬ 
est degree of correlation with those of the long-term futures.^ The next 
in rank in terms of degree of price correlation would be the growth 
stocks, and the last would be the non-growth stocks. 
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Hypotmesis II: Cf the non—debt type securities, the long—tert futures 
will provide the highest degree of price protection to 
hybrid issues, the nest highest degree to growth stocks 
and the least to non-growth stocks. 
uvrethesis 1*—Individual securities vs. oortfolios. A further classi- 
- » - — - — - -- - —- — - - - • - 
fication of basis risk due to interest rate movements is: (1) risk 
by changes in the level of interest rates, and (2) risk due to 
Interest rate fluctuations around a given level. Stone [92] termed the 
that due to fluctuations around a fixed average level as unsystematic 
interest rate risk. An alternative to hedging in dealing with unsystem¬ 
atic interest rate risk is to diversify a portfolio across maturity 
ranges of debt securities. 
evidently portfolios that are diversified across the maturity range 
--e less crone to interest rate risk than are individual securities 
-tis suggests that the trice changes ot individual securities would tend 
to er degree ot corre_atrcn vote necgtng instruments tnan 
that of the diversified oortfolios 
Financial futures instruments offer superior price pro¬ 
tection to individual securities than to portfolios 
diversified across the maturity dimension. 
E-roothesis 1G—Bond futures vs. CIDiA futures. The question of interest 
here is: Of the two long-term futures, which one would ofter superior 
orIce orotact ion for spot securities? The two relevant considerations 
are: (1) the kind of interest rates these futures represent, and (2) the 
maturity of their underlying snot securities. «ni—e tne bond futures re¬ 
flect the general level of long—tern interest rate expectations m the 
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eccnomy, the GNMA futures mirror interest rate movements in the mortgage 
industry; the first is an economy-wide indicator while the second is an 
industry indicator of interest rate fluctuations. Also, the bond futures 
yield is lower than the GNMA futures yield. Further, the bond futures 
are tied to a spot bond of 15 years or longer to maturity while the GNMA 
5 percent with which the GNMA futures are coupled have an expected effec¬ 
tive maturity of 12 years. Since interest rate elasticity varies roughly 
- iall;* with term to maturity and inversely with the level of in- 
rarest r: eras, it follows that the bond futures are more sensitive to in- 
rarest r= =te movements than the GNMA futures. Note further that there are 
other in: :orrant differences in the underlying instruments regarding tax 
:s, "certaintv of timing of -payments, etc. 
can be inferred from these characteristics that the bond futures 
would ge: :erally have a higher degree of price correlation with bonds and 
sro :/.s r: :cn various industries than would the GNMA futures. 
Hyporhas: Ls IS: The bond futures market is generally superior to the GNMA 
futures market in providing protection against interest 
rate risk. This superiority is, however, expected to be 
marginal when the hedged security is related to the mort¬ 
gage industry.5 
hypothesis 2—The Hedge Ratio 
important issue that the hedger has to contend with in the pro- 
cess of : :onstructing a short hedge is the number of futures contracts to 
be sold short against each unit of cash position. That 13, the risk- 
J 7-~ y investor needs to select a hedge ratio that will nopefully 
ecnate the trice gain less j on the cash position with price loss '"gain) 
on the futures position. Assure for instance the investor executes the 
following hypothetical hedge in 1 bills. 
Table 3-1. A Hypothetical Hedge 
Date Cash Market Futures Market 
June 1 Bought 1 unit of T bills $98.00 Sold 1 contract of 
T bill futures $97.50 
August 31 Sold T bills 96.00 Bought back the 
futures 96.50 
Price loss on cash 
position $ 2.00 
Price gain on fu¬ 
tures position $ 1.00 
Given these price changes, a unity hedge (i.e., a hedge involving 
one futures contract for each unit of cash position) would have been only 
partially successful in minimizing the price risk; ignoring transaction 
costs, the investor would have incurred a net loss of $1.00. If, on the 
contrary, the investor had sold short two futures contracts, the price 
loss on the cash position would have been completely offset by the price 
gain on the futures (ignoring, again, the trading costs), and the equity 
in the position would have remained intact. 
It is apparent from the above illustration that the price-risk 
minimizing hedge ratio is the ratio of cash price changes to futures 
price changes. That is 
where ht = the hedge ratio. 
Again, h^ indicates the number of futures contracts the investor has to 
sell short against each unit of the long cash position in order to mini¬ 
mize the price risk. A least square estimate of h can be obtained by re¬ 
gressing the cash price changes against the futures price changes as 
shown in eq. (3-15) which is reproduced below: 
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CP = A + BCF + E 
*- C L 
(3-15) 
The estimator of the slope coefficient in eq. (3-15) is 
Cov(CPt,CFt) 
(3-18) 
V(CFt) 
That b =h*a risk-minimizing hedge ratio can also be seen by dividing 
eq. (3-6) by the number of bonds in the cash position, X : 
L L. 
X£t* XctCov(CPt,CFt) 
(3-19) =» b = h 
Thus in the simple regression of cash price changes against futures price 
2 
changes shown in eq. (3-15), the coefficient of determination, r ^t , is 
a measure of the hedging performance of financial futures markets while 
the slope coefficient gives an estimate of the risk minimizing hedge ra¬ 
tio. 
Since the cash and futures prices generally move in the same direc¬ 
tion, h will normally be positive. It can take negative values only when 
the Pt and F move in opposite directions, and consequently the 
Cov(CP ,CF ) la negative. A positive h Implies that the investor should 
L w 
take opposite positions in cash and futures (since these prices are posi¬ 
tively correlated), and a negative hedge ratio suggests that the investor 
should maintain the 3ame position, long or short, in both markets. 
Traditionally, it is believed that a hedge ratio of unity is opti¬ 
mal (28,52). But it is obvious from eqs. (3-17) and (3-19) that h-1 
only when CP *CF . There la, however, no reason to believe that cash 
U V 
and futures price changes will move in Identical fashion. Thus h will 
equal 1 only by happenstance. 
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It is clear from eq. (3-17) that h is a function of relative cash 
and futures price changes. For securities of nominal default risk, price 
changes are largely determined by interest rate fluctuations.7 Specific¬ 
ally, reproducing eq. (3-11) 
CPt = -DctdIctPt 
cpt - -DftdIftFt 
(3-11) 
Evidently then 
h = 
fit DctdIctPt 
CFt ' DftdIftFt 
(3-20) 
From the unbiased expectations theory, it is known that in a regime 
of rising interest rate expectations P >P , and therefore, P. >F (see 
t t+n t t 
eq. (3-16)). It then follows that for a given maturity, default risk, 
and coupon Dc{_ > D^t. But what could be said about the relative magni¬ 
tudes of dl and dl,. ? That is, which market is more interest rate 
ct rt 
volatile, spot or futures? In the context of commodity futures Blau 
[10] observed: 
. . . the futures market is more sensitive to minor changes in supply 
and demand conditions. The formulation of prices in the cash and 
futures markets has been compared to the recording of temperature by 
two accurate thermometers, one graduated in degrees and the other in 
tenths of a degree [p. 8], 
In view of the intrinsic nature of spot and futures markets in fi¬ 
nancial instruments it is intuitive to suggest that the futures markets 
are characterized by a much higher degree of interest rate volatility 
than the spot markets. That is, dl^t> dlct across all maturities. 
In recent years, the behavior of interest rates has been more vola¬ 
tile relative to their historical record. The degree of volatility, 
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however, has been far greater in the futures market than in the spot mar¬ 
ket. It is therefore argued here that dl- is, in general, so large that 
1. L 
D. dl- F > P . In other words, for a given maturity, default 
risk, ana ccurcn, C?^>CI(_. It follows from these arguments that cash 
trice changes have been generally lever than futures price changes in re- 
« k > ^ r* ' -ce ris-< _i hiring hedge ratio is generally less than 
.tv. 
-tat h < 1 if 1I_ < C- _ can also be seen from eq. (3-19). Define 
?? = II _ - I_ vhere 3 is the difcerence between futures and cash trice 
— . ('—r ^ , u 
V(CTt) 
n_ - itv i_, n_) 
(3-21) 
< 1, 
dies the tedze tacit behave across the several determinants ot 
tte term to macurccv ct snot 
security. the level tf default risk, the delivery tericc ot sutures con¬ 
s. etuity securities, incivicua- securi¬ 
ties v=. c-crctolics, and the zyte of long-term futures contract? rq, 
itrett fmtttdvt tf the novariante between cash and futures price changes. 
h will be the larger the higher the in- 
9 9 
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Hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness. Further insights into the rela¬ 
tionship between the hedge ratio and the degree of hedging effectiveness 
can be gained by comparing the coefficient of correlation between cash 
and futures price changes with eq. (3-19). 
Y 
Cov(CPt,CFt) 
eft = S(CPt)S(CFt) 
h = 
Cov(CPt,CFt) 
S(CFt)S(CFt) 
Clearly when S(CPt) = S(CFt), Y^ = h. But as has been argued be¬ 
fore generally S(CPt) < S(CFt) for low default-risk securities. This im¬ 
plies that given Cov(CPt,CFt), h is generally smaller than Y Also, 
when Ycft = 0> h = 0. Since h i-s generally larger than Y^t 
for lower ranges of Y however. 
Hypothesis 3—Efficiency of Financial Futures Markets 
The existing studies have adopted two methodologies to examine the 
efficiency of financial futures markets. The first involves the compari¬ 
son of futures yields and their associated implied forward rates [13,56, 
76,96]. A second approach compares yields on a spot security and a com¬ 
bination of futures and its underlying spot security for equivalent 
maturities [14]. Both the approaches report that markets for T-bill fu¬ 
tures, bond futures, and GNMA futures are inefficient. In this investi¬ 
gation, it is proposed to employ a different methodology based on the 
Black-Scholes (BS) option pricing principle to examine the market effi¬ 
ciency of financial futures [9]. In essence, the methodology involves 
the construction of riskless hedges of futures and their underlying cash 
market securities, and comparing the returns on hedged portfolios with 
the riskless rate of return. 
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In their seminal work on option pricing, BS observed that "if op¬ 
tions are correctly priced in the market, it should not be possible to 
make sure profits by creating portfolios of long and short positions in 
g 
options and their underlying stocks" [p. 637]. Based on this principle, 
BS derived an option pricing formula and observed that the principle 
could be applied to the valuation of many other types of capital assets. 
The evaluation of market efficiency in terms of the BS principle 
requires the construction of riskless hedges of interest rate futures and 
their underlying cash market counterparts. Suppose the investor buys a 
zero-coupon cash bond, estimates the risk minimizing hedge ratio, and 
w 
sets up a short hedge. The rate of return on the short hedge, is, 
ignoring trading costs, measured by 
R 
w <pt+i-pt>+MFt-W 
t+i 
(3-22) 
If the investor continuously adjusts the hedge ratio, the hedge in 
effect will be risk free. The price gain (loss) on the cash position 
will be virtually offset by the price loss (gain) on the futures position 
leaving the equity position of the investor intact. In an efficient mar¬ 
ket, the investor maintaining such a continuously adjusted riskless hedge 
could expect to earn only the riskless rate of return. 
Hypothesis 3: The expected return on a continuously adjusted portfolio 
of short and long positions in the financial futures and 
spot securities should not be consistently higher than the 
riskless rate. 
The financial futures markets are efficient if the return on the hedged 
portfolio does not systematically exceed the riskless rate. If, on the 
other hand, the portfolio return is significantly different from the 
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riskless rate, that will provide additional evidence that the interest 
rate futures markets are inefficient. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter begins with an outline of the design of the study. 
Then the sample of securities and portfolios is described. Following 
this is a discussion of the measurement of different variables. Finally, 
the statistical analysis and tests employed to investigate the hypotheses 
are presented. 
Research Design 
The testing of the hypotheses calls for basically two types of de¬ 
sign and methodology. Hypotheses 1 and 2 require the regression of cash 
price changes against futures price changes to estimate the coefficient 
of determination and the hedge ratio. Hypothesis 3 involves the con¬ 
struction of riskless portfolios of cash and futures and comparing the 
rates of return on these hedges with the riskless rate. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. These hypotheses deal with several dimensions of 
spot and futures instruments. Specifically, they involve the comparison 
of hedging performance and the hedge ratio across: 
1. Different maturities of spot securities 
2. Different levels of default risk 
3. Various delivery periods of futures instruments 
4. Discount and nondiscount spot issues 
5. Debt, hybrid, and equity securities 
6. Individual securities and portfolios 
7. Bond futures and GNMA futures 
A rigorous design for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 requires that when 
the hedging effectiveness and the hedge ratio are being examined along 
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one of the above dimensions the other dimensions are held constant. For 
example, if the hedging performance of bond futures is being studied 
across the maturity spectrum of individual bonds, then it is necessary to 
insure that bonds of various maturities are all of the same default risk, 
coupon effect, and security-type. Likewise, if the hedging performance 
is being compared across the coupon effect dimension—discount, premium, 
par—then it is necessary to ensure that the spot issues in the hedge are 
of the same level of default risk, maturity, security-form, and security- 
type but vary only in terms of their market price relative to their par 
value. In essence, in examining the hypothesis along one dimension, the 
securities are to be matched along other dimensions. 
This implies that what one needs is a matched sample—matched along 
at least four dimensions. Clearly, it is very difficult to construct a 
sample matched on that many dimensions. Useful insights into the func¬ 
tioning of financial futures could still be obtained even by employing 
a design that lacks the above rigor. For the most part securities in¬ 
cluded in this study fulfill the above design requirements reasonably 
well.^ 
Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis assumes a continuous adjustment of the 
hedge ratio. It supposes that the investor estimates a risk minimizing 
hedge ratio based on his (her) current expectations regarding cash and 
futures price changes and constructs a hedge. Further, (s)he is assumed 
to revise the hedge whenever his (her) expectations change. A rigorous 
testing of the market efficiency hypothesis should, therefore, provide 
for a continuous adjustment of the hedge. 
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It follows then that for a superior empirical evaluation of the 
market efficiency hypothesis one should work with continuous price data, 
using the daily price changes. Since collecting and analyzing daily data 
would have involved a voluminous amount of work, the current research ef¬ 
fort has been restricted to the investigation of weekly data. 
Three additional questions need to be discussed regarding the mar¬ 
ket efficiency hypothesis. The first concerns the choice of a spot 
security to be coupled with each of the three financial futures in con¬ 
structing riskless hedges. While the hypothesis does not require that 
any specific security be employed, the empirical considerations make it 
desirable to choose the cash market counterparts of each futures instru¬ 
ment. The underlying spot securities tend to have substantial price cor¬ 
relation with the futures and in addition, their price changes are likely 
to be more stable over time relative to futures price changes. Such a 
stable relationship between cash and futures price changes minimizes the 
error in the estimation of the hedge ratio due to the noncontinuous ad¬ 
justment of the hedge. Thus the 13 week T bill, the 15 year government 
bond, and the 8 percent GNMA are employed in constructing hedges with the 
T bill futures, bond futures, and 8 percent GNMA futures respectively. 
The second question pertains to the chdice of the riskless rate of 
return against which the hedged portfolio return is to be compared. It 
is common to represent the riskless rate by the three month T bill rate. 
That choice is, however, inappropriate in the context of this study be¬ 
cause the three month T bill rate is itself subject to interest rate 
risk. What is needed indeed is a rate with not only no default risk but 
also having as little exposure to interest rate movements as possible. 
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Thus a rate for lending and borrowing over a short period of time— 
essentially a continuously variable rate—is what is needed. 
Several choices come to mind: the federal funds rate, the one week 
T bill rate, the call money rate, the one month rate on certificates of 
deposit (CD), and the thirty day commercial paper rate. The federal 
funds rate is for overnight lending and is often erratic due to sudden 
surges in demand and supply. The one week T bill rate has a wide bid-ask 
spread due to thin trading, and thus the results may depend on whether 
the bid or the ask yield is employed. The call money rate, although 
based on the stock market collateral, is not an attractive choice because 
it seems to contain some premium for default risk. The one month commer¬ 
cial paper rate was not conveniently accessible for some time at the be¬ 
ginning of the study. While the one month CD rate has a longer term than 
is desirable, it is believed to represent money market conditions fairly 
well and thus is employed as a proxy for the riskless rate. 
Finally, the initial statement of hypothesis 3 assumes the absence 
of trading costs in the spot and futures markets. While this assumption 
is of some theoretical interest in gauging the level of market efficiency, 
it detracts from the real financial world where transaction costs are sig¬ 
nificant. From a practical viewpoint, it is more appealing to test whe¬ 
ther one could have consistently made money, net of trading costs, in ex¬ 
cess of the riskless rate by maintaining an approximately riskless hedge 
in cash and futures. Accordingly, the market efficiency hypothesis is 
examined at two levels: (1) ignoring transaction costs, and (2) adjust¬ 
ing for trading costs in computing the hedged returns. 
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Controls for Extraneous Variables 
Spot prices. The key variables in this study are cash and futures 
prices, hedge ratio, return on the hedged portfolio, riskless rate, and 
trading costs. Of these, the price variable is common to all hypotheses. 
While the futures price changes are caused predominantly by interest rate 
expectations, the cash price changes of debt securities are a function of 
a number of factors other than interest rate movements. Of particular 
importance are the term to maturity, the default risk level, and the 
coupon effect. The price of a bond approaches its face value as it moves 
toward maturity. An increase in the level of default risk causes its 
price to decline. Besides, if the bond carries a coupon that is at 
variance with the current level of interest rate germane to its maturity 
and risk level, that will cause the bond to sell at a premium or dis¬ 
count. These three factors compound the effect of interest rate changes 
on the prices of debt securities. 
The financial futures instruments are designed primarily to provide 
protection against the interest rate exposure of spot securities. As 
such, it is unreasonable to expect them to alleviate the price risk due 
to changes in the term to maturity, default risk, and coupon of spot 
securities. To make a fair and rigorous evaluation of their hedging 
performance it is therefore necessary to control for the price effects of 
maturity, default risk, and coupon. 
Clearly then it would be desirable to have a set of spot securities 
and portfolios of constant maturity, constant level of default risk, and 
constant coupon effect during the entire period of investigation. Such 
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an ideal set is, however, rarely possible to create in an empirical 
analysis. The best one could do in an empirical work is to minimize 
the noise created by the extraneous variables. 
Note that in the ideal case the control of these extraneous vari¬ 
ables requires that they be kept at a constant level during the study pe¬ 
riod. That is, any change in the term to maturity, in the level of cred¬ 
it risk, and in the level of discount or premium needs to be avoided. 
For instance, if a hedge is constructed with a thirteen week T bill, the 
control of maturity effect requires that the term of the bill be main¬ 
tained at thirteen weeks from the beginning to the end of the study pe¬ 
riod. Similarly, if one starts with a discount bond, the control of the 
coupon effect calls for maintaining the same level of discount until the 
end of the study. 
Of the three extraneous factors, by far the most difficult to con¬ 
trol in this empirical work is the coupon effect. As the interest rates 
generally rose during the study period, the level of discount or premium 
also varied. An attempt has been made to minimize the resultant com¬ 
pounding effect on security prices by periodically replacing the individ¬ 
ual issues with those that sold as close to par value as could be found. 
The maturity effect on individual securities is kept to a minimum by re¬ 
placing 
1. Each week the thirteen week T bill, the twenty-six week T bill, and 
the ninety day commercial paper with new securities of identical 
maturities 
2. Each quarter the five year T note with a new note of approximately 
identical maturity 
3. Each half year or year bonds of t years to maturity with new ones of 
approximately identical maturity 
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Due to the non-availability of suitable issues it has not been pos¬ 
sible to adhere strictly to these procedures in a few instances involving 
government bonds, corporates, and municipals. 
The default risk effect is minimized by choosing issues whose cred¬ 
it ratings as determined by the Moody's and the Standard and Poor's Fi¬ 
nancial Services did not undergo any change during the study period. 
Note that in trying to mitigate the distorting price effects these proce¬ 
dures inevitably add some further noise to the data base owing to the 
limitations on the availability of suitable issues. It is believed, how¬ 
ever, that the net result is a reduction in the overall noise level. 
These controls are probably most effective in the case of T bills since 
only their maturity needs to be held constant. The controls are less 
successful in the case of corporates and municipals rated lower than A 
due to the non-availability of an adequate number of reported issues dur¬ 
ing the study period. It has not been possible to apply such controls to 
mutual fund portfolios because of the lack of information regarding the 
detailed terms of issue of individual securities included in the port¬ 
folios . 
Futures prices. In addition to controlling the price effects of maturity, 
coupon, and credit risk on spot securities, it is also necessary to hold 
constant the distance to delivery of futures contracts. It was noted 
earlier that during the period of this study there were no more than 
eight T bill futures contracts, and eleven each of bond futures and GNMA 
futures contracts trading simultaneously. The first contract is due for 
delivery three months from its inception, the second six months later and 
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so on through the eleventh contract falling due thirty-three months into 
the future. The delivery months fixed by the Exchanges are: March, 
June, September, and December. Presumably the prices of futures con¬ 
tracts reflect interest rates expected to prevail at the time of their 
expiration. Usually interest rate expectations vary over time. For in¬ 
stance, interest rate forecasts for three months will generally differ 
from those for six months into the future. It is thus clear that the 
time dimension of expectations is critically important in understanding 
the behavior of futures yields and prices. 
With the passage of time the term to delivery of a futures contract 
diminishes, and a distant contract gradually turns into a near-term con¬ 
tract. Thus over its life-span the prices of a futures contract indicate 
interest rate expectations over varying lengths of time. 
As posited in hypothesis 1C, the term to expiration of a futures 
contract has an important bearing on its hedging performance. For rea¬ 
sons advanced earlier, the prices of a near-term contract move more in 
tandem with spot prices than do those of a distant contract. It is 
therefore apparent that the term to delivery of a futures contract needs 
to be controlled in order to provide a sound explanation for the hedging 
effectiveness of financial futures. 
In this investigation the distance to delivery of futures contracts 
is controlled at quarterly intervals. That is, contracts due for deliv¬ 
ery in three months are designated as the first (the nearest term) con¬ 
tract; contracts due for delivery from three to six months into the fu¬ 
ture are named as the second contract. Thus the eleventh contract covers 
all those contracts due between thirty to thirty-three months into the 
future. Obviously, this results in only a partial control of the term to 
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delivery, but it is believed that the procedure is reasonably adequate 
for the intended purpose. 
In order to test hypothesis 1C it is further necessary to desig¬ 
nate one of the futures contracts as the near-tens contract and another 
as the distant contract. The first contract is perhaps too near to de- 
lievery, and, as such, may not be a suitable hedging instrument despite 
the fact that it is expected to have by far the highest degree of price 
correlation with spot issues. Moreover, it nay be influenced to a size¬ 
able extent by the delivery requirements and consequently nay not aptly 
mirror the interest rate expectations of market participants. Addition¬ 
ally, the volume of open contracts may be too thin to fairly reflect fu¬ 
tures prices. 
In a similar vein, it is desirable to exclude a couple of contracts 
at the far end due to the modest number of contracts typically traded. 
An added reason justifying their exclusion is the small sample size asso¬ 
ciated with them. With these considerations in mind, the third con¬ 
tract containing all contracts due for delivery from six to nine months 
into the future is chosen to represent the near-term contract for all 
futures instruments. The sixth contract for T bill futures and the 
eighth contract for long term futures are designated as the distant con¬ 
tract. The eighth i3 preferable to the ninth contract in the case of 
long-term futures because of its considerably larger sample size. These 
choices are not believed to preclude the generalization of rindings to 
contracts in their neighborhood because of the high degree of prrce cor¬ 
relation within the two categories of contracts. 
70 
Sample 
The general criteria for sample selection have already been dis¬ 
cussed in the last two sections. They suggest that the sample should 
contain both securities and portfolios of debt, equity and hybrid forms, 
varying across the maturity, default risk, and the coupon dimensions. 
Table 4-1 describes the securities and portfolios included in the sample. 
Each of the individual securities shown in Table 4-1 in fact contains a 
series of issues which were changed periodically to control for the ma¬ 
turity and coupon effects. Appendix A presents the specific individual 
issues, their coupons, maturity, rating, interest payment dates, and date 
of inclusion in the study. The maturities shown against the individual 
securities are representative and not exact. The study covers the fol¬ 
lowing overlapping periods: 
1. For analysis involving GNMA futures—January 1976 to April 1979 
2. For analysis involving the T bill futures—March 1976 to April 1979 
3. For analysis involving the bond futures—October 1976 to April 1979 
The futures contracts began trading earlier than the beginning months 
listed above. Data for the first few weeks were not used in the study 
in order to allow the market conditions to stabilize. 
The data on individual securities and fund portfolios have been 
collected from The Wall Street Journal [97]. The security index data are 
those published in the Standard and Poor’s Security Price Index Record 
[90]. All the data are the Wednesday closing quotes. The corporate bond 
quotes are the closing quotes, the prices of government notes, bonds. 
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T bills, FNMA bonds, GNMA bonds, and municipal bonds are ask quotes, and 
the fund quotes are the net asset values without the sales charge. The 
study assumes that the investor generally holds a long cash position, and 
so the ask quotes are appropriate. 
Measurement of Variables 
For the money market securities and the T bill futures the pub¬ 
lished data are in terms of yields and thus need to be converted to 
prices. To generate the corresponding price data the following proce¬ 
dures are employed: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1 week T bill price = 100 - 
13 week T bill price = 100 - 
26 week T bill price = 100 - 
T bill futures price = 100 - 
90 day commercial 
paper price = 100 - 
7 
360 
91 
360 
182 
360 
90 
360 
90 
360 
x Ask Yield 
x Ask Yield 
x Ask Yield 
x Futures Yield 
x Yield 
(4-1) 
The published note and bond prices do not represent prices at which 
investors could have traded securities since they do not include accrued 
interest. For such issues the interest payment dates have been identi- 
2 
fied, and the weekly accrued interest is added to published prices on a 
cumulative basis. In the case of bond indices semi-annual coupon pay¬ 
ments on January 1 and July 1 are assumed. 
Under hypothesis 3, the investor is assumed to have estimated the 
first hedge ratio, ht, by utilizing the first fourteen weeks of price 
data in the simple regression shown in eq. (3-15). The successive hedge 
ratios for the t+1 week onwards are estimated by using all the previous 
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weekly price changes. The hfc is employed in constructing the hedge for 
W 
the t+lth week, and computing the portfolio return, 
W 
For the no-trading costs case, the weekly is measured as shown 
in eq. (3-22). This is subsequently converted into the annualized com¬ 
pound return, Rt+^, as under: 
Rt+1 = [(1+r”+1)52-1] x 100 (4-2) 
w 
The weekly portfolio returns net of transaction costs, Rt+^, are arrived 
at by 
R 
,W 
t+1 
(pc+i-pt-T1)+ht(Ft-Ft+1-T2) 
P +h M 
t t 
(4-3) 
where T1 = the spot commission cost 
T2 = the futures commission cost 
M = the futures margin 
The annualized compound returns, R^+^, comPutec^ as follows: 
Rt+1 = [U + Rj^i)52- 1] X 100 (4-4) 
3 
Based on the information supplied by a few brokerage houses T1 is set at 
$0.25 for all the three spot securities. This amounts to a commission 
cost of $2.50 per $1000 face value and represents the typical commission 
charged on transactions involving 50 or more bonds. The reported repre¬ 
sentative round-trip commissions during the study period are: $70 per 
contract for T bill futures ($0,007 per $100 face value) and $65 per con¬ 
tract for the long-term futures ($.065 per $100 face value). Accordingly 
T2 is set at $0,007 for T bill futures and $0,065 for long-term futures. 
The reported initial margins are: $1500 per contract for T bill and 
bond futures and $1200 per contract for GNMA futures. So M is assigned a 
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value of $0.15 for T bill futures, $1.50 for bond futures and $1.20 for 
GNMA futures. Evidently, the above costs and margins represent only part 
of the total trading costs as they ignore other incidental expenses and 
subsequent margins that the investor has to post as prices fluctuate dur¬ 
ing the course of the hedge. 
Statistical Analysis 
As discussed earlier the basic statistical technique upon which 
this investigation is founded is the simple regression of weekly cash 
price changes, CPt, against the corresponding futures price changes, CF , 
as reproduced below: 
CP = A + BCF + E (3-15) 
L* L L 
2 
The measure of hedging effectiveness, r ^ , of hypothesis 1, the hedge 
ratio, h, of hypothesis 2, and the weekly hedge ratio, ht, which is an 
input into hypothesis 3, are all derived from this statistical tool. 
In fact, for hypothesis 1 the stochastic relationship between cash 
and futures price changes described in eq. (3-15) can be analyzed either 
in terms of a bivariate correlation model, or equivalently, in terms of 
the simple regression model. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are based on the latter 
model, however. So the simple regression model is employed in evaluating 
all the hypotheses. 
The regression model is based on a number of assumptions. Of par¬ 
ticular importance are those relating to the distributions of E^, CP^, 
CF^_, and B. It assumes that the E^. are serially independent and are nor¬ 
mally distributed with a zero mean and constant variance. Further, the 
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CP are supposed to be independent with a homoscedastic conditional nor¬ 
mal distribution given the CF . The parameter B is assumed to be con¬ 
stant over time, and the regression relationship between CP and CF is 
L 
taken to be linear. 
There is very little evidence regarding the conditional distribu¬ 
tion of CP^ given CF^. A few studies do, however, offer evidence on 
rates of return in stock and bond markets. Fama found that the stock 
market returns have a fat-tailed distribution [29,30]. Westerfield [99] 
examined the distributions of dividend adjusted daily return relatives 
for 315 common stocks listed on the New York Exchange during the period 
1968-69 and found them to be slightly assymetric, highly leptokurtic, 
4 
and non-stationary in calendar time. On the distribution of bond market 
returns, Roll [80] reported that the T bill price changes are non-normal 
while Fama [32] in a later study concluded that the first differences in 
one month T bill returns are nearly normal. Garbade and Silber [35] 
examined the daily bid and ask price dispersions of forty-eight treasury 
coupon issues in 1975 and found them to be negatively skewed, fat-tailed 
and non-stationary. 
Schneeweis and Schweser [84] investigated the one month holding 
period portfolio returns of corporate industrial, public utility, and mu¬ 
nicipal bonds of varying ratings based on the Moody’s yield series dur¬ 
ing the 1952-75 period. They reported that the monthly bond portfolio 
returns are significantly positively skewed and leptokurtic. Investigat¬ 
ing further the monthly holding period returns on government bonds 
across a wide range of maturities during 1961-73, they found that the 
distributions deviate from normality with slightly positive skewness and 
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kurtosis. In addition, the commodity futures price changes are known to 
deviate from normality [88,91]. 
This evidence suggests the likelihood of non-normal distributions 
of cash and futures price changes. Even if the conditional distribution 
of CPt given CF is not normal, it is not improper to employ simple re- 
2 
gression to estimate r ^ and h so long as the price changes are uncor¬ 
related over time. According to Neter and Wasserman, "No matter what 
may be the functional form of the distribution on e^ (and hence of Y.) , 
the least square method provides unbiased point estimators of and g^ 
which have minimum variance among all unbiased linear estimators" 
[69; p. 47]. 
In a similar vein, Kmenta wrote: 
If the assumption that the disturbance is normally distributed is 
dropped, the least squares estimators of the regression coefficients 
are still BLUE, since this property is independent of the form of the 
form of the parent population. This means that even without the as¬ 
sumption of normality the least squares estimators are unbiased and 
have the smallest variance among all linear unbiased estimators. 
However, they can no longer be claimed to be efficient . . . [55; 
pp. 247-8]. 
Likewise, Malinvaud observed, "When the hypothesis of normality no 
longer holds exactly, the estimators of the coefficients are still effi¬ 
cient in the class of linear estimators, but not generally in the class 
of all regular estimators" [68; p. 30]. 
With regard to the serial correlation between price changes, eco¬ 
nomic theory does imply that the price changes are non-autoregressive 
since the information underlying them is thought to be generated in a 
random fashion. In "A Theory of Anticipatory Prices," Working observed 
that "the actions of traders seeking to evaluate a nearly continuous flow 
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of new information bearing upon price would create conditions of nearly 
continuous price change, changes which would be nearly random since the 
occurrence of new information itself is random" [73; p. 253]. Further, 
Samuelson [83] demonstrated that in an efficient market futures prices 
behave according to a martingale.- 
« 
The available empirical evidence on the autoregressive character of 
price changes is mixed. While Fama [29, 32] reported that the stock and 
T bill returns are uncorrelated over time, Smidt [88] and Stevenson and 
Bear [91] found low order serial dependence in the distribution of com¬ 
modity futures price changes. In view of 'this, evidence, on. normality 
and autoregression, it seems fair to conclude that the employment of 
2 
simple regression to estimate r^^ and h is appropriate. 
Hypothesis Testing 
If the location, scale, and shape parameters of the distributions 
of price changes deviate considerably from those of a normal distribu¬ 
tion , there are five possible ways to deal with the situation. The 
first is to see if the data can be converted to normality through some 
kind of mathematical transformation [12]. The second is to trim off ex¬ 
treme observations before employing the regression technique [44]. The 
third is to use robust estimators^ that are not greatly influenced by 
outliers [49]. 
The need for adopting the second or the third approach has received 
a lot of attention in recent years. Andrews et al. [3] demonstrated the 
inefficiency of least squares relative to more robust estimates of loca¬ 
tion for a wide variety of distributions. Ramsay [77] compared the 
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performance of least square estimators of regression coefficients with 
those of maximum likelihood type estimators across different levels of 
contamination of normal populations and reported that up to 25 percent 
rate of contamination the latter are more efficient than the former. In 
a similar vein, Hogg [44] and Andrews [4] recommended the use of robust 
£ 
regression rather than least squares when the distributions are non- 
Gauss ian. 
The fourth approach to deal with non-Gaussian distributions is to 
use non-parametric estimates and tests.^ Finally, one may go ahead with 
the traditional tests as if the distributions were normal but exercise 
extreme care in interpreting the results. 
The last alternative is adopted in this study, leaving any statis¬ 
tical refinements for future research. Although this is a suboptimal 
choice, it is justified on two grounds. First, the t tests to be used 
here are known to be fairly reliable in the face of moderate departures 
from normality [69; p. 48]. According to Malinvaud, 
The significance level of the tests ... is not very sensitive to 
deviations from normality, when the tests are applied to the compari¬ 
son of means of independent samples. The F test and the two-tailed 
t-test have a significance level near that given by the tables [63; 
p. 298]. 
Reviewing the works of Cochran [20] and Srivastava [89] on the 
power of the analysis of variance tests, Banks [4] observed 
When the analysis of variance procedures are applied to measurements 
of quantitative data arising from continuous distributions . . . 
failure of the data to follow the symmetrical bell—shaped normal 
distribution introduces no serious errors into the significance 
levels of the F test . . . 
From a series of investigations in which F tests were applied to data 
derived from deliberately created non-normal distributions, Cochran 
. . . estimated that the true probability corresponding to the 
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tabulated 5 percent significance level of the F distribution might be 
somewhere between 4 and 7 percent: for the 1 percent level, the true 
probability limits might be taken as 1/2 and 2 percent [pp. 72-3]. 
Second, the adverse effects of non-normality vary inversely with 
the sample size. According to Winkler and Hays 
When the sample size is fairly large and when the parent distribution 
is roughly unimodal and symmetric, the T distribution apparently 
still gives an adequate approximation to the exact (and often unknown) 
probabilities of intervals for T under these circumstances. ... In 
effect, if the sample size is large enough so that the normal 
probabilities are good approximations to the T probabilities anyway, 
then the form of the parent distribution is more or less irrelevant 
[101; p. 367]. 
In this study the sample size is fairly large. For tests involving near- 
term T bill and GNMA futures contracts. The number of observations are 
commonly in the region of 160, while for the near-term bond futures con¬ 
tract it is around 70. For the distant contracts, the sample sizes are 
g 
small and vary from about 40 to 120. 
Correlation test. It is perhaps helpful to recapitulate briefly 
the various operational subhypotheses on hedging performance before pro¬ 
ceeding with a discussion of the relevant statistical tests. An overview 
of the subhypotheses is presented in Table 4-2. 
A general pattern of tests for the above hypothesis can be formu¬ 
lated as : 
V r21 = r31 
V 
2 2 
T* T" 
21 31 
(4-5) 
Or, equivalently, if the r’s are all positive 
V r21 r31 
V r21 > r31 
(4-6) 
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where r0^ stands for the first part of each of the subhypotheses for 
which a higher r^ is posited. 
r^-^ indicates the second part of each sub hypothesis with a sup- 
posedly lower r . 
Table 4-2. An overview of hedging effectiveness hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1A. The long-term coupon bonds will receive more price pro¬ 
tection than the short-term zero-coupon securities. 
Hypothesis IB. The futures instrument will offer more effective price 
protection to default-free securities than to risky is¬ 
sues . 
Hypothesis 1C. The near-term futures onctracts will perform more suc¬ 
cessfully than the distant contracts. 
Hypothesis ID. The hedges involving discount spot issues will be more 
successful than those coupled with non-dsicount securi¬ 
ties . 
Hypothesis IE. The hybrid securities will receive favorable price pro¬ 
tection relative to the straight common stocks. 
Hypothesis IF. The futures instruments will provide more price protec¬ 
tion to individual securities than portfolios diversified 
across terms to maturity. 
Hypothesis 1G. In general, the bond futures will outperform the GNMA fu¬ 
tures in cross-heding. 
Note that r^ and r^ may themselves be correlated, rather substan¬ 
tially at times. The appropriate statistic for testing the difference 
between two correlated rs is described in [65], and involves the follow¬ 
ing t test: 
t 
(r21 r 
/2 (1-r^-r 
31 
2 
31 
)/(N-3)(l+r23) 
~r23+2r21r31r23 
(4-7) 
where N = the sample size 
r = the correlation between r^ and r^^ 
The test requires that the two sets of observations being compared 
be of equal sample size. The t statistic in (4-7) is known to be 
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reliable even when the observed distribution deviates considerably from 
normality [65] . It is. interpretable with the help of the standard normal 
distribution table for N exceeding 50. Note, however, the reliance that 
one can place on the test results depends on how seriously the observed 
distributions deviate from the various underlying statistical assumptions. 
Hypothesis 2 claims that the hedge ratio h would be generally less 
than unity. That is, from eq. (3-15) 
B = 1 
H,.: B < 1 
A 
(4-8) 
This calls for the following t test: 
t 
b - B 
S(b) 
(4-9) 
where S(b) = the standard error of b 
Hypothesis 2 further claims that the B^ associated with the r^ of 
each of the subhypotheses outlined in Table 4-2 1A to 1G will be greater 
than related to r^ (see eq. (4-6)). This requires testing for the 
difference between two slope coefficients. To do so would involve the 
standardized regression coefficients, BETAs: 
S(CF ) 
BETA ■ 
(4-10) 
But 
S(CFt) 
bS(CPt) = r 
(4-11) 
Essentially then the test for the difference between the slope coeffi¬ 
cients of the simple regression is identical to the test for the 
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difference between correlation coefficients. Thus the test described in 
eq. (4-6) is equally valid here. 
Paired t test. Hypothesis 3 posits that the return on hedged portfolio, 
Rt+^, would not consistently exceed the riskless rate, RR , in an effi¬ 
cient market. To test this hypothesis, define the excess return, ER 
t+1 
as 
ER 
t+1 
= R 
t+1 
- RR 
t+1 
(4-12) 
Then, 
V ERt+i = 0 
V ERt+i » 0 
(4-13) 
The null hypothesis implies that the futures markets are efficient while 
the alternative indicates market inefficiency in the sense that positive 
excess returns occur not by chance but systematically. 
The appropriate test statistic for eq. (4-13) is described by 
Winkler and Hays [101]: 
t 
MER 
t+1 
S(ERt+i) 
(4-14) 
The paired t test shown in eq. (4-14) is based on the assumption 
that the population distributions of R ^ and RRt+-^ are normally distri¬ 
buted with homogeneous variances. While there is little evidence on the 
distributional properties of RRt+^, Fama's [32] results indicate that the 
first differences in one month T bill returns are nearly normal. Regard¬ 
ing variances, it is safe to assume that the hedged returns are consider- 
10 
ably more disperse than the riskless rate. 
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3cv serious is the effect of violations of the above mentioned as¬ 
sumptions on the testing procedure described in eq. (4-14)? In the con¬ 
text of testing for the difference between two means, Winkler and Hays 
observed: 
The first assumption, that of a normal distribution in the popula¬ 
tions, is apparently less important of the tvo. As long as the 
sample size is even moderate for each group, quite severe departures 
from normality seem to make little practical difference in the con¬ 
clusions reached ... On the other hand, the assumption of homo¬ 
geneity of variances is more important. For samples of equal size, 
relatively big differences in the population variances seem to have 
relatively small consequences for the conclusions derived from a I 
statistic [101; pp. 371-72]. 
Clearly, the use of a fairly large sample size in this study miti¬ 
gates the problems inherent in the data with respect to employing the 
paired t test. How much faith could one place on this testing procedure 
in gauging market efficiency is, however, an empirical question and de¬ 
pends on the seriousness of the observed departures from normality and 
homogeneity of variances. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
A careful evaluation of empirical results requires an understanding 
of the underlying statistical distributions of relevant random variables. 
Accordingly the chapter begins with an examination of the distribution of 
cash and futures price changes. This is followed by a discussion of the 
empirical results relating to the hedging performance, the hedge ratio, 
and the market efficiency of financial futures. 
Distribution of Price Changes 
Cash price changes. Table 5-1 presents the distribution of price changes 
of selected cash and futures instruments; a more comprehensive tabular 
presentation is included in Appendix B. A few points need to be borne in 
mind in interpreting these statistics. First, the quality of published 
financial statistics on debt securities is much less accurate than those 
on stocks. The published price and yield quotes not only do not repre¬ 
sent the prices at which actual transactions take place in the market but 
are also subject to more measurement errors and imprecision as they ig¬ 
nore small price changes. While the minimum price changes of coupon- 
bearing governments, agencies, and futures contracts are quoted in 32nds 
of one percent, those of exchange-listed corporates are reported in 
eighths of a percent, and of municipals in increments of one-half of one 
percent. Moreover, the price quotes of exchange—listed corporates, which 
are employed in this study, are not representative quotes in that most of 
their volume takes place in the over-the-counter market. 
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TABLE 5-1. Distribution of weekly price changes—selected issues 
1976-79a 
(1) 
Security 
I. Individual issues 
1. T bills—13 weeks 
2. Commercial paper—90 days 
3. T notes—5 years 
4. T bonds—15 years 
5. GNMA 8 percent 
6. AT&T bonds 
7. GPAP bonds 
II. Fund portfolios 
1. MOA 
2. FUSG 
3. KMBF 
4. Amlnv 
III. Security indices 
1. S&P CORP 
2. S&P LT GOVT 
3. S&P 500 
IV. Futures instruments 
A. T bill futures 
1. Nearterm contract 
2. Distant contract 
B. GNMA futures 
1. Nearterm contract 
2. Distant contract 
C. Bond futures 
1. Nearterm contract 
2. Distant contract 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
N Mean SD SR K-SZ 
164 -.006 .052 11.36 1.7 On 
164 -.005 .044 11.07 3.29n 
161 .103 .444 7.67 1.26 
167 .104 .709 7.75 1.18 
172 .102 .531 7.11 1.19 
169 .081 .898 9.59 1.46n 
169 .144 .967 6.51 1.31 
164 -.002 .072 5.97 2.82n 
172 -.004 .063 10.79 1.83n 
99 -.005 .036 5.56 0.86 
172 .016 .160 5.75 1.26 
172 .048 .449 7.57 0.86 
172 .037 .453 6.51 1.01 
172 .050 1.733 5.41 0.48 
164 -.004 .053 5.51 1.05 
149 -.001 .063 9.48 1.24 
172 -.051 .569 6.52 .88 
134 -.045 .672 9.12 1.25n 
81 -.155 .744 5.26 0.62 
59 -.104 .776 5.04 0.71 
n = does not fit the specified normal distribution based on the observed 
mean and variance at .05 level 
aThe coverage of the time period varies across the instruments. For de 
tails see the secton on sample in Chapter IV. 
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Second, the interest rates were generally increasing during the 
study period and were near their peak towards the end of the period. 
Consequently, the expected value of price-changes is negative. This is 
clearly reflected in the price changes of futures contracts and of money 
market issues which are consistently negative with few exceptions. The 
bond futures have a higher absolute mean price-change and standard devia¬ 
tion since they belong to the recent more volatile interest rate period. 
Third, the reported mean price-change of coupon issues is generally posi¬ 
tive. This is due to the addition of accured interest to the prices 
quoted in the financial press in order to arrive at prices that investors 
have to pay on purchase of coupon bonds. Assuming a coupon of 8 percent 
per annum, the accrued simple interest on a weekly basis is roughly $0.15, 
and for a 4 percent annual coupon it is close to $0.08. Thus the reported 
weekly mean price changes for coupon issues include accrued interest of 
approximately these magnitudes and are hence generally positive. 
It was asserted earlier that for a given maturity, coupon, and de¬ 
fault risk futures yields are normally more volatile than spot interest 
rates and as a result futures price changes and standard deviations are 
expected to be higher than those of spot issues. A comparison of mean 
price changes of the 13 week T bills and 90 day commercial paper with 
that of the T bill futures reveals that the former are slightly greater 
than the latter. In the case of the GNMAs, the spot price change is 
about twice that of the futures price change. For government bonds, in 
contrast, the futures price changes exceed the spot both before and af¬ 
ter adjusting for the sample size. Thus the evidence on the hypothesized 
higher volatility of futures rates seems to be mixed. 
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Some caution is, however, called for in making inferences based on 
the mean price changes. While a normal distribution is fully described 
by the first two moments about the mean, it is not necessarily true of a 
non-normal distribution. In the latter case, the mean may be less reli¬ 
able as a measure of central tendency. The findings presented later in¬ 
dicate that the futures price changes are as a class more nearly normally 
distributed than are the spot price changes. It follows that any infer¬ 
ence on the relative volatility of cash and futures price changes based 
on their means could be misleading. 
l.In the case of long-term instruments, the spot prices include the 
weekly accrued interest while the futures contract prices do not reflect 
any accrued interest. If the accrued interest is eliminated from spot 
prices, the futures do seem to have a slight edge over the former. The 
published commercial paper quotes are meant to be a general indicator 
of money market conditions, and are believed to contain more measurement 
errors relative to the T bill futures. 
Note further that the futures prices are settlement prices while 
the spot T bill prices are asked and the spot long-terms are closing 
prices. Finally, the futures markets are regulated by the exchanges 
while the spot securities are not generally traded on exchanges and 
thus are largely traded in an unregulated market. The normal daily 
price limits for long term futures are 75 basis points above or below 
the previous day’s settlement price while for the T bill futures it is 
50 basis points [17,19], 
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Notwithstanding these problems with the comparison of mean price 
changes between cash and futures instruments, it still seems legitimate 
to go ahead with a review of their standard deviations. Clearly the lat¬ 
ter are not affected by the addition of an approximately constant weekly 
accrued interest to price changes. A comparison of standard deviations 
suggests that futures price changes are more volatile than those of spot 
issues. In quite a few instances, even the spot issues with sizably 
longer maturities than that of futures contracts tend to have lower 
standard deviations (see Appendix 3). Overall the findings, although 
mixed, seem to favor the proposition that the futures price changes are 
generally greater than their spot counterparts. 
From the standpoint of hypothesis testing the critically important 
question is: How closely do the spot and futures price changes approach 
normal distributions? Or rather, how serious is the departure of the 
distributions of price changes from normality? To this end the student- 
ized ranges, SR, are reported in column 5. In addition skewness and 
kurtosis are also reported in Appendix B. The studentized range is a 
statistic which indicates the range of observations in the sample in 
terms of the maximum price change minus the minimum price change divided 
by the standard deviation. Clearly it is very sensitive to extreme 
values and is widely used as a reliable statistic in assessing the dis- 
2 
tributional properties of stock market data. 
In interpreting the reported studentized ranges it is useful to 
note a few of their typical values for sample sizes comparable to the 
ones used in this study. In samples of 60, 150, and 200 cases from a 
normal distribution the probability that the studentized ranges will 
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be equal to or. less than 5.93, 6.64, and 6.85 respectively is .99 
[26]. 
It is apparent from Table 5-1 that quite a few distributions of 
spot price changes of debt securities deviate from normality. Of the 
debt securities the money market issues appear to be more non-normal than 
the coupon-bearing issues. A further look at skewness and kurtosis pre¬ 
sented in Appendix B reveals that with a few exceptions the distributions 
of spot price changes are negatively skewed and they are consistently 
leptokurtic relative to normal distribution. While the degree of nega¬ 
tive skewness is marginal, the extent of leptokurtosis is often marked. 
Across maturities, money market issues tend to be characterized by higher 
degrees of leptokurtosis than coupon issues. 
What can be inferred from these distributional properties? First, 
the higher values of SR suggest that the distributions of price changes 
of debt securities are generally fat-tailed. That is, the samples come 
from distributions where the probabilities of observations far from the 
mean are higher than if the distributions were normal. Relative to the 
normal, these distributions contain more extreme positive and negative 
price changes. Second, the negative skewness denotes that while the ex¬ 
treme values lie left of the mean, the cases cluster on the right.side of 
the mean. That is, of the extreme values, the negative price changes far 
exceed the positive price changes. Third, the sizable degrees of lepto¬ 
kurtosis reveal that the central portion of these distributions contains 
more price changes than does the normal distribution. 
Futures price changes. The distribution of futures price changes, on the 
other hand, presents some interesting contrasts (see Appendix B for more 
90 
details). Both the bond futures and the GNMA futures price changes are 
nearly normally distributed while those of T bill futures price changes 
are more non-normal. The bond futures price changes are generally thin¬ 
tailed reflecting relatively smaller probabilities of extreme values. 
Unlike the spot and the other two futures, the bond futures have a slight 
amount of positive skewness denoting a tendency for extreme values to lie 
to the right of the mean. With a few exceptions the futures price 
changes are marked by a slight degree of leptokurtosis. 
Across the delivery periods, the distributional properties tend to 
be largely stable. The nearest term contract in all futures instruments 
is, however, associated with the distributions that are relatively more 
skewed to the left and more peaked. Note also that of the contracts 
chosen to represent the near term and distant delivery periods, the T 
bill futures and GNMA futures distant contracts fail to represent accu¬ 
rately the distributional properties of the contracts around them. Re¬ 
call, however, that they were chosen to represent other contracts because 
of the larger number of observations associated with them. 
How do the distributions of price changes of debt and futures con¬ 
tracts compare with those of stock price changes? The distributions can 
be compared only at the portfolio level since the sample does not in¬ 
clude any individual stocks. From Table 5-1 it is apparent that the 
changes in the S&P 500 Common Stock Price Index are characterized by a 
nearly normal, thin-tailed platykurtic distribution. The distributions 
of price changes of two stock funds—AmCap and Amlnv—are also nearly 
normal, but leptokurtic. The distributions of long-term futures compare 
very favorably with the distributions of stock price changes. 
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The Kolmogorov-Smimov goodness of fit test. Given the mixed signals on 
the distributions of price changes it is perhaps desirable to go further 
and do a nonparametric distribution test. Column 6 in Table 5-1 lists 
the Kolmogorov-Smimov Z statistic. In essence, this test computes the 
maximum absolute difference between the hypothesized normal distribu¬ 
tion and the observed sample distribution. Multiplying this difference 
by the square root of the sample size gives the Z statistic. The smaller 
the values of Z, the closer is the approximation between the observed 
distribution and the theoretical distribution. At a significance level 
of 0.05 the null hypothesis that the price change distributions of T bill 
(13 weeks), commercial paper, AT&T bonds. Fund for U.S. Government Secur¬ 
ities (FUSG), Mutual of Omaha America (MOA), and GNMA distant futures 
contract are normally distributed was rejected. In the remaining cases, 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
It emerges from the foregoing analysis that sizable departures from 
normality occur in the case of money market issues and funds. In all 
other cases it seems safe to assume that the distributions of price 
changes are nearly normal. 
Correlation between futures price changes. Another question relevant to 
the correlation tests to be done later is whether the price changes of 
different futures contracts are uncorrelated. As interest rate changes 
across industries as well as maturities are highly correlated so will 
be the price changes generated by them. The correlation matrix pre¬ 
sented in Table 5-2 shows that the correlations among futures price 
changes—both across contracts and across instruments—are substantial. 
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TABLE 5-2. Correlation matrix of futures price changes3 
1976-1979b 
T Bill Futures Bond Futures GNMA Futures 
Nearterm Distant Nearterm Distant Nearterm Distant 
T Bill Futures 
1. Nearterm 1.00 
2. Distant .72 1.00 
Bond Futures 
1. Nearterm .63 • '-4
 
00
 
1.00 
2. Distant .49 .66 .97 1.00 
GNMA Futures 
1. Nearterm .69 .62 .92 .90 1.00 
2. Distant .49 .45 .88 .91 .95 1.00 
aThe sample sizes are identical to those reported in Table 5-1 
The coverage of the time period varies across the instruments. For de¬ 
tails see the sample section of Chapter IV. 
The statistical implication is that in comparing the hedging performance 
of futures instruments across spot issues, delivery contracts, and be¬ 
tween instruments themselves, the test employed should provide for the 
fact that the correlation coefficients are themselves substantially cor¬ 
related. 
Hedging Effectiveness 
The principal thesis of this investigation is that hedging perform¬ 
ance is largely a function of the interest rate elasticities of cash se- 
curities and futures instruments. Interest rate elasticity has several 
dimensions and those considered in this study are: maturity, level of 
default risk, coupon effect, delivery period, form of cash security, type 
of cash security, and type of futures contracts. Based on these dimen¬ 
sions, many subhypotheses regarding hedging performance have been formu¬ 
lated. 
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It is necessary to construct a number of tests for each of the sub¬ 
hypotheses. As observed in the methodology chapter, the research design 
requires that when a test is being done across one dimension, all other 
dimensions must be held constant. This requirement is evidently a theo¬ 
retical ideal and can only be approximately fulfilled in an empirical 
analysis owing to numerous limitations on data availability. 
The maturity dimension. Hypothesis 1A posits that futures contracts will 
4 
yield a superior hedging performance with relatively long-term spot is¬ 
sues compared to those with short-terms to maturity. The relevant tests 
on this hypothesis are reported in Table 5-3. 
The first column in Table 5-3 lists the two hedges being compared 
in each of the tests. The first hedge in each test is hypothesized to 
perform superior to the second hedge. r21 t*ie correlati°n coefficient 
associated with the supposedly "more effective" hedge, r^ is the corre¬ 
lation coefficient of the "less effective" hedge, indicates the cor¬ 
relation between the two spot securities in each test. The subscript "1" 
refers to the hedging instrument, "2" to the spot issue in the "more ef¬ 
fective" hedge, and "3" to the spot security in the "less effective" 
hedge. N denotes the sample size which is usually equal in both the 
hedges.^ The entry in column 6 is the t statistic derived from eq. 
(4-6). The alternative hypothesis for each of the tests is that r^^ is 
greater than r^l* That is, the first hedge is more effective than the 
second hedge as the spot maturities in the first hedge axe ..longer than: 
those in the second hedge. 
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TABLE 5-3. Hedging effectiveness and term to maturity 
of spot securities 1976-1979^ 
(1) 
Test 
(2) 
r21 
(3) 
r31 
(4) 
r23 
(5) 
N 
(6) 
t 
1. T bill 26e-TBIF3 vs. T bill 1-TBIF3 .64 .22 .46 164 6.714a 
2. T bill 26-TBIF3 vs. T bill 13-TBIF3 .64 .57 .82 164 1.937b 
3. T bond 24-TBOF3 vs. T note-TB0F3 .89 .60 .63 58 5.517a 
4. T bond 24-TB0F8 vs. T note TB0F8 .89 .57 .63 58 6.053a 
5. S&P C0RP-TB0F8 vs. S&P ST GOVT-TBOF8 .79 .37 .45 59 4.889a 
6. S&P LT G0VT-TB0F8 vs. S&P ST GOVT- 
TB0F8 .76 .43 .43 59 3.615a 
7. SUSG-TB0F3 vs. M0A-TB0F3 .37 .43 .24 59 - .423 
8. T bond 15-TB0F8 vs. T bill 13-TBIF3 .81 .67 .22 58 2.800a 
9. GNMA 8%-GNMAF8 vs. T bill 13-TBIF3 .71 .59 .31 134 1.992b 
10. T bond 24-TB0F8 vs. T bill 1-TBIF3 .88 .27 .04 59 7.981a 
11. AT&T-TB0F8 vs. CP-TBIF3 .69 .37 -.05 59 2.755a 
12. FNMA-GNMAF8 vs. CP-TBIF3 .64 .08 .20 130 6.506a 
13. T bond 24-TB0F8 vs. T bond 9-TBOF8 .88 .86 .94 58 .921c 
14. FUSG-TB0F8 vs. M0A-TB0F3 .38 .43 .26 59 - .354 
15. S&P C0RP-TB0F8 vs. S&P ST G0VT-TB0F3 .79 .43 .45 59 4.229a 
16. T bond 24-TBOF8 vs. T note-TB0F3 .88 .60 .63 57 5.122a 
a = 
b = 
c = 
significant at .01 level [t*=2.06] 
significant at .05 level [t*=1.28] 
significant at .10 level [t*=0.84] 
d. The coverage of the time period varies across securities . For de- 
tails see the sample section of Chapter IV 
e. The numbers associted with the spot securities listed in column (1) 
denote their terms to maturity. For example: 
T bill 26 = 26 week T bill 
TBIF3 = Nearterm T bill futures contract 
TBIF6 = Distant T bill futures contract 
TB0F3 = Nearterm bond futures contract 
TB0F8 = Distant bond futures contract 
For further details see the sample description provided in Table 4—1. 
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Given that the distributions of price changes underlying some of 
the above tests are non-normal, the primary thing of interest is whether 
the correlation coefficients are in hypothesized directions. Table 5-3 
shows that of the seven tests all but one are consistent with the hypo¬ 
thesis. The one that runs contrary to the hypothesis involves two fund 
portfolios, the FUSG which is a longterm government bond fund and the Y> 
MOA, a money market fund composed largely of short-term governments. 
Note that the price quotes used for fund portfolios are their published 
net asset values without the sales charge. The net asset values repre¬ 
sent the market value of the portfolio of securities and cash balances 
after adjusting for the liabilities of mutual funds [100]. It is pos¬ 
sible that the observed results might be due to the use of the net asset 
values rather than the market values of fund portfolios. 
The t values are reported in column 6. The examination of the 
second, third, and fourth moments about the mean and the non-parametric 
test results indicated earlier that the distributions of price changes of 
several securities deviate from normality, the departures being more 
serious in the case of money market issues. How serious are the effects 
of these departures on the confidence intervals and significance levels 
of the t test have not been examined in this investigation. Accordingly 
it is thought prudent to avoid any discussion of the significance of 
tests in the analysis of results. The observed t values and their signif¬ 
icance levels are, however, reported in order to enable the reader to 
make his (her) own judgment regarding the reliability of the findings of 
this study. 
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Another interesting question in this context is the relative im¬ 
portance of different dimensions of interest rate elasticity in determin¬ 
ing hedging effectiveness. Tests 8 through 16 in Table 5-3 are intended 
to evaluate the relative effects of the maturity and delivery period 
dimensions on hedging performance. In each of these tests, a relatively 
long-term spot is coupled with the distant contract and a short-term 
spot with the near-term contract. From hypothesis 1C it is obvious that 
these results are biased against the maturity hypothesis. Yet all but 
one of the results are in favor of hypothesis 1A. It is thus evident 
from these findings that the term to maturity is far more important than 
the delivery period of futures contracts in determining hedging per¬ 
formance. Furthermore, notice from tests 8 through 12 that of the three 
financial futures the long-term futures are considerably more effective 
than the T bill futures in affording price protection. 
The default-risk dimension. The default-free securities are more in¬ 
terest rate sensitive than the risky securities since the former carry 
a lower coupon than the latter. Additionally they follow interest rate 
movements much more closely than do risky issues. Accordingly hypothe¬ 
sis IB contends that futures instruments offer more price protection to 
default-free securities than to risky issues. 
Table 4 presents the relevant empirical tests. The rationale un¬ 
derlying these tests is set out below: 
Test 17. T bill 13 has a lower level of default risk than even the high 
grade commercial paper 
Test 18. AT&T issues are rated Aaa while those of the GPAP Baa 
Test 19. MUNI2 issues are rated Baa or better 
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TABLE 5-4. Hedging effectiveness and level of default-risk 
of spot securities 1976-1979 
(1) 
Test 
- (2) 
r21 
(3) 
r31 
(4) 
r23 
(5) 
N 
(6) 
5 
17. T bill 13-TBIF3 vs. CP-TBIF3 .57 .10 .25 164 5.935a 
18. AT&T-TB0F8 vs. GPAP-TB0F8 .69 .23 .25 59 3.861a 
19. AT&T-TB0F8 vs. MUNI 2-TB OF 8 .69 .57 .43 59 1.279b 
20. M0A-TBIF3 vs. SMR-TBIF3 .35 .21 .27 164 1.582b 
21. FUSG-TBOF8 vs. KMBF-TB0F8 .38 .35 .33 59 .217 
22. AMBAL-TB0F8 vs . AMINV-TB0F8 .47 .28 .78 59 2.459a 
23. AMBAL-GNMAF8 vs. AMINV-GNMAF8 .40 .28 .79 34 2.317a 
24. S&P C0RP-TB0F8 vs. S&P MUNI-TB0F8 .79 .59 .64 59 2.924a 
25. S&P LT GOVT-TBOF8 vs. S&P MUNI-TB0F8 .76 .59 .58 59 2.226a 
a = significant at .01 level 
b = significant at .05 level 
c = significant at .10 level 
[t*=2.06] 
[t*=1.28] 
[t*=0.84] 
Test 20. MOA is made up of mostly short-term governments while a large 
portion of SMR is invested in commercial papers 
Test 21. FUSG is a government securities fund while KMBF is that of 
municipal bonds 
Test 22. AMBAL is a balanced fund with over 30 percent in fixed income 
securities while AMINV is predominantly a stock fund. Fixed 
income securities are less prone to default risk than common 
stocks on account of their prior claim on earnings and assets 
of the issuing firm 
Test 23. The intent here is to broadbase the tests across futures in¬ 
struments 
Test 24. Both the indices relate to high grade bonds but it is believed 
that investors tend to perceive that high grade corporates 
generally involve a lower level of default risk than high grade 
municipals especially since the financial debacle of New York 
City. 
Test 25. Credit risk associated with government bonds is lower than that 
of municipal bonds. 
98 
A comparison of with reveals that the results are decisively in 
favor of the hypothesis. All of the nine tests reported in Table 5-4 
are in favor of the hypothesis and in a large number of cases the dif¬ 
ference between the correlation coefficients is substantial. 
The delivery period dimension. The delivery requirement drives the fu¬ 
tures prices towards their underlying spot security prices, and this de¬ 
livery effect on price movements varies inversely with the futures con¬ 
tract’s distance to expiration. Further, the near-term contract is more 
interest rate elastic than the distant contract. Accordingly, Hypothesis 
1C posits that the.near-term contract provides superior price protection 
in comparison to the distant contract. 
The empirical results are presented in Table 5-5. Note that 
in this context refers to the correlation between the near-term and dis¬ 
tant contracts. It is apparent that the results are in favor of the hy¬ 
pothesis. It may however be noted that the support for the hypothesis 
varies across hedging instruments. While the near-term contracts in the 
T bill futures markets prove clearly superior to their distant counter¬ 
parts , in the long-term futures markets their superiority seems only mar¬ 
ginal. This is in fact reflected in the futures correlation matrix pre¬ 
sented earlier in Table 5-2. It is evident from that matrix that the 
correlation between the near-term and distant contracts in the bond fu¬ 
tures as well as GNMA futures is much higher than the corresponding cor¬ 
relation in the T bill futures. 
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TABLE 5-5. Hedging effectiveness and term to expiration 
of futures contracts 1976-1979 
(1) 
Test 
(2) 
r21 
(3) 
r31 
(4) 
r23 
(5) 
N 
(6) 
t 
26. AT&T-TBOF3 vs. ATT-TB0F8 .73 .69 .97 59 1.799b 
27. MUNI2-TB0F3 vs. MUNI2-TBOF8 .59 .57 .97 59 .757 
28. T note-TB0F3 vs. T note-TB0F8 .60 .57 .97 56 1.117c 
29. T note-GNMAF3 vs. T note-GNMAF8 .72 .67 .80 125 1.292b 
30. T bond 24-TBOF3 vs. T bond 24-TBOF8 .89 .88 .97 59 .678 
31. GNMA8%-GNMAF3 vs. GNMA8%-GNMAF8 .72 .71 .80 136 .275 
32. T bill 13-TBIF3 vs. T bill 13-TBIF6 .59 .39 .72 134 3.796a 
33. T bill 26-TBIF3 vs. T bill 26-TBIF6 .67 .47 .72 134 4.122a 
34. DLA-TBIF3 vs. DLA-TBIF6 .27 .19 .72 134 1.271c 
35. FNMA-GNMAF3 vs. FNMA-GNMAF8 .71 .64 .80 134 1.826b 
36. T note-TBIF 3 vs. T note TBIF6 .70 .60 .72 125 2.107a 
37. S&P C0RP-TB0F3 vs. S&P C0RP-TB0F8 .83 .79 .97 59 2.250a 
38. FUSG-TB0F3 vs. FUSG-TB0F8 .37 .38 .97 59 - .330 
a = significant at .01 level 
b = significant at .05 level 
c = significant at .10 level 
The coupon effect dimension. Given the term and yield to maturity, a 
relatively low coupon bond is more sensitive to interest rate movements 
than another with a high coupon. In regimes of high interest rates, 
this implies that a coupon bond trading at a discount is more interest 
rate elastic than air otherwise similar non-discount bond. Based on this, 
hypothesis ID claims that futures instruments accord superior price pro¬ 
tection to discount coupon bonds relative to those selling at par or 
premium. 
Table 5-6 exhibits the results bearing on this hypothesis. While 
tests 39, 40, 46, and 47 favor the hypothesis, the others run counter to 
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TABLE 5-6. Hedging effectiveness and the coupon effect 
of spot securities 1976-1979 
(1) 
Test 
(2) 
r21 
(3) 
r31 
(4) 
r23 
(5) 
N 
(6) 
t 
39. GNMA8%-GNMAF8 vs. GNMA9%-GNMAF8 .71 .68 .73 134 .704 
40. S&P C0RP-TB0F3 vs. AT&T-TB0F3 .83 .73 .73 80 2.264a 
41. S&P LT GOVT-TBOF3 vs. T bond 15- 
TB0F3 .81 .82 .81 79 - .274 
42. S&P LT GOVT-TBOF3 vs. T bond 1- 
TB0F3 .65 .87 .65 78 -4.741a 
43. S&P MUNI-TB0F3 vs. MUNI2-TBOF3 .52 .54 .53 81 - .229 
44. S&P MUNI-GNMAF3 vs. MUNI2-GNMAF3 .24 .30 .53 171 - .740 
45. S&P ST GOVT-TBOF3 vs . T note-TB0F3 .39 .66 .52 77 -3.164a 
46. S&P LT G0VT-TB0F3 vs. FUSG-TB0F3 .81 .41 .45 81 5.766a 
47. S&P MUNI-TBOF3 vs. KMBF-TB0F3 .56 .27 .45 81 2.948a 
a = significant at .01 level 
b = significant at .05 level 
c = significant at .10 level 
it. It is, however, necessary to keep in mind a few points in interpret¬ 
ing the results. First, tests 40 through 45 are biased against the hypo¬ 
thesis because they compare a portfolio against an individual security. 
The portfolio effect is not expected to be sizable, however, since these 
portfolios are not diversified across maturity ranges. 
Despite this basis,test 40 clearly supports the hypothesis and 
tests 41, 43, and 44 deviate only marginally. Tests 46 and 47 are free 
from the portfolio bias in the sense that one portfolio is compared with 
another. Yet the results might have been biased in favor of the hypothe¬ 
sis because the fund portfolios are generally more diversified across 
maturity ranges than index portfolios. 
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Second, recall that the impact of the level of discount on interest 
rate elasticity is marginal (see Chapter III). So even though the index 
portfolios represent deep discount spot instruments, the price protection 
they receive is not expected to be much higher than that associated with 
non-discount issues. Overall, the tests do offer some support for and 
some against the coupon effect hypothesis and thus call for further in¬ 
vestigation. 
The security-form dimension. This hypothesis argues that hybrid securi¬ 
ties will receive more.price protection from hedging in financial futures 
markets than do common stocks. The following tests are set up to evalu¬ 
ate this hypothesis: 
Test 48. AmBal-TB0F8 vs. AmCap-TB0F8. Both AmBal and AmCap are balanced 
funds, but the proportion of investment in fixed income securi¬ 
ties was over 30 percent for AmBal and about 10 percent for 
AmCap during the study period. It is therefore expected that 
futures contracts will offer more price protection to AmBal 
than to AmCap. 
Test 49. AmBal and Amlnv hedged with TB0F8. Amlnv is a stock fund with 
over 98 percent investment in common stock 
Test 50. AmCap and Amlnv hedged with TB0F8. Not only that AmCap is a 
balanced fund while Amlnv is a stock fund, but also the former 
was classified as a growth fund while the latter as a maximum 
capital gain fund by Weisenberger Financial Services during 
the study period [100]. Growth stocks are known to be more 
sensitive to interest rate than non-growth stocks. 
The test results are reported in Table 5-7. Clearly, all of the 
results are consistent with the hypothesis. Further, even the differ¬ 
ences in results are in anticipated directions. The correlation coeffi¬ 
cient associated with the balanced fund is more than that of the growth 
fund, and the latter exceeds the correlation coefficient pertaining to 
the stock fund. 
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TABLE 5-7. Hedging effectiveness and form 
of spot securities 1976-1979 
(1) 
Test 
(2) 
r21 
(3) 
r31 
(4) 
r23 
(5) 
N 
(6) 
t 
48. AmBal-TB0F8 vs. AmCap-TB0F8 .47 .33 .88 59 2.472a 
49. AmBal-TB0F8 vs. Amlnv-TB0F8 .47 .28 .78 59 2.459a 
50. AmCap-TB0F8 vs. Amlnv-T0BF8 .33 .28 .89 59 .845c 
a = significant at .01 level 
b = significant at .05 level 
c = significant at .10 level 
The security-type dimension. Portfolios that are made up of securities 
of varying maturities are bereft of unsystematic interest rate risk while 
an individual security suffers from both systematic and unsystematic in¬ 
terest rate risk. Accordingly, hypothesis IF states that hedging with 
financial futures provides more price protection to individual securities 
than to diversified portfolios. 
Partial evidence in favor of this hypothesis was obtained in test¬ 
ing the coupon effect hypothesis. Additional tests which are not clouded 
by the coupon effect are shown in Table 5-8. It is fair to assume that 
the fund portfolios are reasonably well diversified since they contain 
debt securities of various maturities. The results unambiguously support 
the hypothesis. 
The hedging instrument dimension. The final question examined here is 
whether a choice between the two long-term futures instruments matters. 
Based on their industry yield and maturity characteristics it was hypo¬ 
thesized that the bond futures generally provide superior price protec¬ 
tion compared to the GNMA futures. 
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TABLE 5-8. Hedging effectiveness and type of 
spot securities 1976-1979 
(1) 
Test 
(2) 
r21 
(3) 
r31 
(4) 
r32 
(5) 
N 
(6) 
t 
51. T bill 13-TBIF3 vs. MOA TBIF3 .57 .35 .24 164 2.860a 
52. T bond 24-TB0F8 vs. FUSG-TB0F8 .88 .38 .47 59 7.676a 
53. MUNI2-TBOF8 vs. KMBF-TB0F8 .59 .35 .39 59 2.041b 
a = significnat at .01 level 
b = significant at .05 level 
c = significant at .10 level 
The empirical results are exhibited in Table 5-9. While the re¬ 
sults are generally in favor of the hypothesis, the difference in the. per¬ 
formance of the two hedging instruments appears marginal. The high de¬ 
gree of correlation among different long-term interest rates and the 
small difference in the maturity of the futures contracts’ underlying in¬ 
struments seem to diminish the slight edge that the bond futures have over 
the GNMA futures. 
TABLE 5-9. Comparison of hedging effectiveness of bond 
futures and GNMA futures 1976-1979 
(1) 
Test 
(2) 
r21 
(3) 
r31 
(4) 
r23 
(5) 
N 
(6) 
t 
54. AT&T-TB0F8 vs. AT&T-GUMAF8 .69 .68 .91 59 .247 
55. MUNI2-TB0F8 vs. MUNI2-GNMAF8 .57 .51 .91 59 1.288b 
56. FNMA-GNMAF3 vs. FNMA-TB0F3 .74 .72 .92 76 .642 
57. Amlnv-TB0F8 vs. Amlnv-GNMAF8 .28 .27 .91 59 .186 
58. S&P C0RP-TB0F8 vs. S&P C0RP-GNMAF8 .79 .74 .91 59 1.443b 
59. S&P MUNI-TB0F8 vs. S&P MUNI-GNMAF8 .59 .60 .91 59 - .222 
60. GPAP-TB0F8 vs. GPAP-GNMAF8 .23 .25 .91 58 -.361 
b = signfleant at .05 level 
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Hedge Ratio 
That futures yields are systematically more volatile than spot 
rates implies that for a given maturity, coupon and defulat risk the mag¬ 
nitude of price changes of spot securities will normally be less than 
those of futures instruments. This will result in the covariance between 
cash and futures price changes being lower than the variance of the lat¬ 
ter. Consequently, the risk-minimizing hedge ratio is generally expected 
to be less than unity. 
Table 5-10 presents the hedge ratios for a selected number of is¬ 
sues across the three futures instruments. It is obvious that the empir¬ 
ical results are preponderantly consistent with the hypothesis and devi¬ 
ate from it only in a few cases. Given these results there is little 
need to carry out statistical tests to show that the hedge ratio is less 
than unity. 
Further, the hypothesis implies that smaller hedge ratios will be 
associated with those issues which are less interest rate elastic rela¬ 
tive to futures instruments, while larger hedge ratios will go with 
those spots with interest rate sensitivity exceeding that of futures con¬ 
tracts. Money-market issues, fund portfolios, and risky bonds belong to 
the first category, and long-term issues, and discount coupon bonds fall 
into the latter group. A closer look at the empirical results reveals 
that this indeed is the case. Notice, in particular, CP, MOA (both be¬ 
long to the money market group), FUSG (a fund portfolio), AT&T, T bond 24 
(long-term bonds), and S&P MUNI (a discount bond portfolio). It was also 
argued that hedge ratio and hedging performance are directly related to 
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Table 5-10. Selected hedge ratios 
(1) 
Securities 
(2) ; (3) 
T Bill Futures^ 
TBIF3 TBIF6 
(4) 
Bond 
TB0F3 
(5) 
Futures 
TB0F8 
(6) 
GNMA 
GNMAF3 
(7) 
Futures 
GNMAF8 
1. T bill 13 .56 
(.06) 
.29 
(.06) 
2. CP .08 
(.07) 
.06 
(.06) 
3. MOA .47 
(.10) 
.44 
(.09) 
4. T notes .42 
(.11) 
.36 
(.12) 
.66 
(.09) 
.37 
(.10) 
5. T bond 15 .68 
(.22) 
.77 
(.24) 
.99 
(.18) 
.79 
(.17) 
6. T bond 24 1.03 
(.14) 
1.06 
(.14) 
1.08 
(.14) 
1.05 
(.12) 
7. FNMA .70 
(.14) 
.57 
(.16) 
.60 
(.16) 
.20 
(.16) 
8. GNMA8% .53 
(.13) 
.62 
(.14) 
.88 
(.10) 
.56 
(.10) 
9. AT&T .94 
(.33) 
1.61 
(.32) 
1.05 
(.24) 
.68 
(.24) 
10. FUSG .04 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
.05 
(.01) 
11. DTEB .04 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
.07 
(.01) 
12. Keystone B-l .02 
(.05) 
.02 
(.05) 
.06 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
13. AmBal .09 
(.01) 
.07 
(.02) 
.08 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
14. Amlnv .11 
(.03) 
.07 
(.03) 
.09 
(.02) 
.07 
(.02) 
15. S&P CORP .45 
(.07) 
.47 
(.08) 
.70 
(.06) 
. 46 
(.06) 
16. S&P LT GOVT .45 
(.06) 
.44 
(.06) 
.64 
(.05) 
.46 
(.06) 
17. S&P MUNI .55 
(.10) 
.59 
(.11) 
.65 
(.16) 
.40 
(.17) 
18. S&P 500 1.26 
(.25) 
.94 
(.30) 
.84 
(.39) 
.44 
(.38) 
a = Hedge ratios for other securities 
pendix D. 
in the sample are reported in Ap- 
b = Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of hedge ratios 
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each other. That is, higher hedge ratios go with superior hedging per¬ 
formance and lower hedge ratios are related to inferior hedging perform¬ 
ance. As shown under the methodology chapter, the testing procedures for 
the hedge ratio-hedging performance relationship and hypothesis 1 are 
equivalent. Since the empirical results have been strongly in favor of 
hypothesis 1 along almost every dimension, it follows that the hedge 
ratio-hedging performance hypothesis is also supported to a similar ex¬ 
tent. 
Market Efficiency 
A number of investment strategies could be used to test the market 
efficiency of financial futures. A broad outline of such tests is exhib¬ 
ited in Table 5-11. 
Market efficiency implies that the expected return on a portfolio 
is proportional to (or at best no higher than that justified by) its mar¬ 
ket risk [9,59,85]. The minimum risk Black-Scholes hedging strategies 
involve constructing a portfolio of long spot and short futures positions 
such that the price gain (loss) on the spot position is completely offset 
by the price loss (gain) on the futures position. In the mixed hedging 
strategies the long spot and short futures positions are combined in pro¬ 
portions that are different from the risk-minimizing hedge ratio. Con¬ 
sequently the mixed hedging strategies are more risky than the Black- 
Scholes hedging strategies. By far the most risky are the speculative 
investment strategies since they involve no offsetting positions in the 
spot and futures markets. A trader following speculative strategies is 
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primarily or exclusively either at the long end or at the short end of 
either or both the spot and futures markets. 
The advantage of employing the BS hedging strategy to assess market 
efficiency is that one does not have to be concerned with the measurement 
of risk associated with hedged returns (since the accompanying risk is by 
definition at a minimum). All that one needs to show is that the excess 
returns of the hedged portfolio are not consistently positive. Using 
mixed hedging and speculative strategies requires, however, the measure¬ 
ment of both risk and returns on hedged portfolios and demonstrating that 
the returns are proportional to the risk involved. 
This investigation confines itself to the minimum risk hedging 
strategy in examining the market efficiency of financial futures. Within 
the minimum risk strategy, the strategy involving long spot and short 
futures positions has been directly tested and the likely consequences of 
adopting the opposite strategy of short spot and long futures positions 
are analyzed without employing any testing procedures. The concept of 
market efficiency implies that the return on a risk-free security should 
not be consistently higher than the riskless rate. Accordingly a risk¬ 
less portfolio created by continuously adjusting a hedge of long and 
short positions in spot and futures instruments should earn no more than 
the riskless rate. To test this hypothesis thirty hedges of long spot 
and short futures positions were constructed: 
1. T bill 13 hedged with each of the T bill futures contracts 
2. Government bond 15 hedged with each of the bond futures contracts 
3. GNMA 8 percent hedged with each of the GNMA futures contracts 
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While the hypothesis does not require that the underlying spot is¬ 
sues be employed in constructing hedges, it does call for continuous ad¬ 
justment of the hedged ratio in order to maintain a riskless hedge. In 
this investigation the hedges are revised on a weekly basis and this is 
likely to make them more risky than would have been the case if they had 
been continuously adjusted. The imperfections in the hedge stemming from 
discrete adjustment of the ratio could, however, be mitigated by choosing 
those spot issues which have a relatively stable time series correlation 
with futures prices. Clearly, the underlying spot instruments would be 
expected to have by far the most stable and predictable relationship with 
futures. Thus the returns on hedges involving the futures instruments 
and their spot market counterparts should not contain appreciable measure¬ 
ment errors as a result of the use of weekly rebalancing. The hedged re¬ 
turns are first computed ignoring spot and futures transaction costs. 
Later, the returns net of transaction costs are analyzed. 
Hedged returns without transaction costs. The distributional properties 
of price changes of individual spot securities and futures instruments 
were discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The reader will recall, 
however, that while a linear combination of independent normal random 
variables is also normally distributed, the cash and futures price 
changes are not independent. Thus knowing their individual distributions 
does not help to determine the distribution of hedged returns. Accord¬ 
ingly, the distributional statistics pertaining to hedged returns are re¬ 
ported in Table 5-12. 
no 
TABLE 5-12. Returns before transaction costs on hedged 
portfolios of futures instruments and their 
underlying spot securities 1976-1979 
Contract 
T Bill Futures Hedges Bond Futures Hedges GNMA Futures Hedges 
Mean 
(SD) 1 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
SR 
(N) 
Mean Skewness SR 
(SD) (Kurtosis) (N) 
Mean Skewness 
(SD) (Kurtosis) 
SR 
(N) 
1 -.37 -.42 9.18 10.38 1.53 6.04 9.01 .84 7.48 
(1.86) (7.67) (127) (26.90) (4.96) (53) (20.23) (3.38) (130) 
2 -.22 -.62 10.81 7.61 1.96 7.02 8.72 1.90 9.09 
(2.34) (11.04) (151) (28.49) (8.43) (62) (24.83) (11.18) (153) 
3 -.22 -.73 10.89 7.15 .90 6.31 8.07 .15 7.04 
(2.30) (11.73) (151) (20.97) (3.17) (62) (18.84) (2.13) (153) 
4 -.25 -.40 11.21 6.39 .92 6.18 7.92 -.14 5.95 
(2.40) (12.66) (151) (21.13) (3.23) (62) (18.66) (1.14) (153) 
5 -.27 -.29 11.21 6.53 .68 6.57 8.28 .37 6.97 
(2.49) (12.58) (151) (21.30) (3.96) (62) (21.32) (2.22) (153) 
6 -.34 -.30 10.63 6.79 1.04 6.55 7.37 .12 6.50 
(2.77) (10.98) (136) (25.44) (4.17) (62) (19.88) (1.30) (144) 
7 -.37 -.08 8.91 7.10 .66 5.45 8.02 2.20 8.86 
(3.18) (7.91) (88) (26.60) (2.28) (41) (25.35) (12.64) (116) 
8 -.39 -.08 8.89 6.81 .38 5.50 5.84 .22 6.32 
(3.21) (7.77) (88) (26.76) (1.95) (41) (18.72) (1.41) (116) 
9 6.64 .15 5.23 7.61 .16 6.64 
(27.98) (1.46) (41) (18.37) (.id (66) 
10 6.90 .44 5.65 7.54 .29 4.68 
(28.37) (2.34) (41) (18.61) (.54) (66) 
11 7.57 .32 5.51 6.14 .10 4.44 
(26.44) (1.76) (41) (21.14) (-.04) (44) 
SD = Standard deviation 
N = Sample size 
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The sample sizes vary from about 40 to about 150 and at. these, levels 
the theoretical studentized ranges (SR) corresponding to .01 and .99 
fractiles of a normal distribution vary from 3.46 and 6.64. In particu¬ 
lar in samples of 40, 60, 80, 100, and 150 the probability that the stu¬ 
dentized range will be equal to or less than 5.54, 5.93, 6.18, 6.36, and 
6.64 respectively is .99 [26]. Comparing the observed SRs with the above 
theoretical values one could not reject the hypothesis that hedged re¬ 
turns in the bond futures and GNMA futures markets are nearly normally 
distributed while those in the T bill futures markets are relatively less 
normal. Note, however, that the studentized range provides a reliable 
test of normalities only when the alternative distribution is of the fat¬ 
tailed variety such as the stable. 
It is apparent that the return distributions are leptokurtic across 
all futures markets with the tails being substantially fatter in the T 
bill futures than in other markets. The degrees of skewness are general¬ 
ly small. While the distribution is negatively skewed in the T bill fu¬ 
tures, the skewness is positive in all but one contract in the long-term 
futures markets. 
In a regime of (unanticipated) generally rising interest rates a 
short hedge is expected to involve a price loss on the cash position and 
a price gain on the futures position. If the hedge is maintained risk¬ 
less by continuously adjusting the positions, the difference between the 
futures price gain and the cash price loss in an efficient market should 
not systematically vary from the riskless rate. 
From Table 5-12 it is obvious that the mean hedged returns in the T 
bill futures are close to zero with a consistently negative sign which 
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implies that the cash price loss typically exceeds the futures price 
gain. Note, however, that the distributions across all T bill futures 
contracts are negatively skewed implying that the observations cluster 
to the right side of the negative mean return and that the extreme obser¬ 
vations are mostly negative. Furthermore, the sharp degree of leptokur- 
tosis suggests that the central portion of the distribution contains a 
relatively large proportion of observations and that the tails are fat 
relative to the normal distribution. 
The mean hedged returns in the long-term futures markets are, in 
contrast, consistently positive. Recalling that the prices of long-term 
spot bonds include accrued interest, it should be noted that the mean 
hedged returns for both bonds and GNMA futures are not far from their 
coupons. It can be inferred then that the spot price loss excluding the 
weekly accrued interest is approximately equal to the futures price gain. 
Note further that the hedged returns in the long-term futures are highly 
volatile relative to those in the T bill futures market. 
Excess hedged returns. In order to test for market efficiency it is 
necessary to compare the hedged returns obtained above with a rate of in¬ 
terest that is free from interest rate risk. That is, it needs to be 
shown that the excess of hedged returns over the riskless rate does not 
systematically exceed zero. For reasons advanced earlier, the one month 
certificate of deposit (CD) rate is employed as the proxy for the risk¬ 
less rate. 
Given that the annualized compound hedged returns in the T bill fu¬ 
tures are consistently negative, it is clear that the excess hedged 
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returns will be 37ste1na.tica.lly negative with even larger magnitudes. 
Evidently any statistical testing is unnecessary. Thus a hedger in the T 
bill futures market would have, by maintaining a weekly hedge, on average 
lost a little more than the risklesa rate instead of earning the riskless 
rate of return. How does this compare with the existing evidence on the 
efficiency of T bill futures? These studies show that the long T bill 
futures yield tends to exceed the corresponding implied forward rate. In 
other worda, a combination of long 3pot and long futures has a higher 
yield than a long cash position of identical maturity. By implication 
the 3hort futures yield is lower than the corresponding implied forward 
rate. As a result, a combination of long spot with 3hort futures will 
have a lower yield than that on a long cash position of identical matu¬ 
rity. Since thi3 study employs a short hedge, it appears that at least 
part of the observed negative return is due to the reported tendency of 
the short futures yield to lag behind the implied forward rate. 
Furthermore, the available evidence indicates that the gap between 
the long futures yield and the implied forward rate tends to increase in 
favor of the former as the distance to expiration of futures contracts 
increases. From Table 5-12 it is apparent that the absolute mean return 
excluding that of the nearest contract also steadily increases as the 
delivery period stretches into the future. As the available evidence im¬ 
plies, distant contracts have higher negative returns than do the near- 
term contracts. Recall that the data for distant contracts are available 
for only the more recent study period while the near-term contract data 
come from the entire 3tudy period. Interest rates were generally rising 
from late 1977 until mid—1979,and thus these higher levels of interest 
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rates cover most of the period for which the absolute mean returns across 
delivery periods were found to increase. Therefore the apparent increas¬ 
ing tendency may in some way be related to that particular time period. 
Also, note that the sample sizes for distant contracts are smaller than 
those of near-term contracts. 
The mean excess returns on the T bill futures hedges varied from 
-.22 to -.39 percent with the standard deviations ranging from 1.86 to 
3.21 percent during the study period. The one month CD rate which is 
used here as a proxy for the riskless rate had a mean of 6.5 percent and 
a standard deviation of 1.7 percent during the same period. Thus the 
short hedger in the T bill futures market would have on average lost (in¬ 
cluding opportunity costs) about 7 percent per annum. The existing evi¬ 
dence suggests that a little less than two percentage points of this loss 
could be explained by the tendency of the long futures yield to exceed 
the corresponding implied forward rate [13,14]. Conceivably part of the 
remaining difference is due to the weekly rather than the daily rebalanc¬ 
ing of the hedge ratio. There does not seem to be any reasonable explana¬ 
tion for the remainder of the difference. 
What are the implications of these findings for an opposite hedging 
strategy involving a short spot position and a long futures position? In 
terms of financial theory, the investor going short borrows the spot 
security from a security lender, usually a broker who in turn gets it 
from those who buy on margin. The security is then sold and the proceeds 
are assumed to be invested in risk-free short-term securities whose term 
to maturity is approximately equal to the term of the short-sale. The 
short-seller is assumed to deposit these short-term securities with the 
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lender as a collateral for the borrowed security. When the market price 
of the borrowed security rises, the short-seller is required to make fur¬ 
ther deposits with the security lender and if the price falls the excess 
deposits are made available to the short-seller. Note, however, the 
lender may be expected to be satisfied with relatively smaller deposits 
because of the hedged protection enjoyed by the short-seller. Further¬ 
more, if the borrowed security is a coupon-bearing instrument the short- 
seller is obliged to pay to the lender an amount equal to the interest 
payments that would otherwise have been received during the term of the 
short sale. When the short sale is closed out the borrower returns the 
security to the lender in exchange for the collateral security (assuming 
no transaction costs). 
Thus in theory the short sale generates cash for the borrower of 
the security. Part of this cash goes to meet the margin requirements on 
the long futures position and the rest can be used for investing in other 
short-term securities. Where a coupon-bearing security is borrowed the 
interest income from the short-term investment can be applied to satisfy 
the accrued coupon on the borrowed security. It follows then that the 
short sale in theory would generate capital for the short seller. Since 
the hedge is by definition riskless and the strategy involves no capital 
investment, the expected return should not systematically vary from zero 
in an efficient market. 
In order to analyze the short spot and long futures hedging strate¬ 
gy define the weekly holding period dollar return, ARt+^, on the hedged 
portfolio as: 
pt+i-pt+VFt+i 
(5-1) 
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During a regime of rising interest rate expectations, the hedge involving 
a short spot and a long futures position is expected to yield a price 
gain in the spot market, Pt - P ^ >0, and a price loss on the futures po¬ 
sition, Ft+^ - F <0. Further, as the prices are generally expected to 
fall in such a period, one might also assume that the short seller would 
be required to make few additional deposits. 
The earlier findings indicate that the hedger with a long spot and 
a short futures position in T bills would have earned a consistently 
negative return during the study period. This implies that the hedger 
following an opposite strategy of short spot and long futures positions 
would have earned a consistently positive return during the same period.^ 
In light of this it is difficult to accept the hypothesis that the T bill 
g 
futures market was efficient during the study period. 
Mean excess hedged returns before transaction costs on the bond and 
GNMA futures are exhibited in Table 5-13. The mean returns vary from 
-2.27 percent to 2.26 percent for the bond futures, the ranges of stand¬ 
ard deviations being 20.88 percent to 28.41 percent. If one examines the 
returns on the eleven bond futures hedged portfolios individually, each 
of them does not seem to be systematically different from zero. Note, 
however, that ten out of eleven mean portfolio returns are negative. 
Thus a joint consideration of all the mean portfolio returns seems to 
reject the hypothesis that the bond futures market was efficient during 
9 
the study period. 
For the GNMA futures the mean excess returns range between -2.80 to 
2.49 percent with the standard deviations being in the neighborhood of 20 
percent. While the returns on-the first seven portfolios are positive. 
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TABLE 5-13. Mean excessive returns before transaction costs 
on hedged portfolios of long-term futures and ; 
their underlying spot securities 1976-1979 
Bond Futures Hedge 
Contract 
MER 
(SD) 
t 
(DF) 
1 2.26 .61 
(26.80) (.53) 
2 -.57 -.16 
(28.41) (62) 
3 -1.03 -.39 
(20.88) (62) 
4 -1.79 -.67 
(21.11) (62) 
5 -1.65 -.61 
(21.27) (62) 
6 -1.38 -.43 
(25.48) (62) 
7 -1.81 -.44 
(26.58) (41) 
8 -2.11 -.50 
(26.72) (41) 
9 -2.27 -.52 
(27.92) (41) 
10 -2.01 -.45 
(28.32) (41) 
11 -1.34 -.33 
(26.43) (41) 
MER = mean excess return 
SD = standard deviation 
DF = degrees of freedom 
t = observed t values. All the t* 
.01 level. 
GNMA Futures Hedge 
MER 
(SD) 
t 
(DF) 
2.49 
(20.10) 
1.41 
(130) 
2.17 
(20.75) 
1.09 
(153) 
1.53 
(18.85) 
1.00 
(153) 
1.37 
(18.72) 
.91 
(153) 
1.74 
(21.38) 
1.01 
(153) 
1.34 
(19.93) 
.81 
(144) 
1.00 
(25.39) 
.43 
(166) 
-1.17 
(18.71) 
-.68 
(116) 
-.60 
(18.36) 
-.27 
(66) 
-.67 
(18.59) 
-.29 
(66) 
-2.80 
(20.97) 
-.89 
(44) 
were found to be insignificant at 
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those on the last four are negative. Thus on the basis of an individual 
as well as a joint examination of the eleven portfolio returns one cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the GNMA futures market was efficient during 
the study period. It may, however, be noted that the mean excess returns 
generally diminish across delivery periods (though erratically at times) 
in both the long-term futures markets. This behavior of returns is 
generally consistent with the existing evidence on the short futures 
yield to fall farther behind the implied forward rates as the distance 
to maturity of contracts rises. This diminishing trend in the GNMA port¬ 
folio returns runs counter to the concept of market efficiency. Thus the 
evidence obtained in this investigation on the efficiency of GNMA futures 
market is mixed. 
Hedged returns net of transaction costs. The foregoing analysis is 
principally of theoretical interest as the trading costs in spot and fu¬ 
tures markets were ignored in estimating hedged returns. The more im¬ 
portant issue from a practical standpoint, however, is: Can a market 
participant make consistently higher returns, net of all trading costs, 
than the riskless rate by maintaining continuously adjusted long and 
short positions in spot and futures instruments? 
Several types of trading costs are encountered in the spot and fu¬ 
tures markets, and they vary from dealer to dealer as well as over time. 
Spot trades involve a commission cost plus a transaction fee for small 
orders. In futures markets a participant is confronted with commissions 
and margins that vary across the type of futures instrument. Day trade 
round trip commissions are lower usually by about a third than the 
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regular commission rates. Futures margins are depository in nature, and 
are of two types, initial and maintenance. While initial dollar margins 
in a transaction are fixed, maintenance margins vary with price volatil¬ 
ity with participants asked to post additional maintenance margin if 
prices move against them. Typically, maintenance margins (in percent) 
are three-fourths of initial margins. Brokerage firms may require house 
margins which exceed the exchange set minimum. Further, some Exchanges 
allow posting a portion of the margin sums in treasuries. 
In this study only a few typical transaction costs are considered. 
For spot deals a commission cost of a quarter of a point ($0.25 per $100 
face value) is subtracted from price changes of T bills 13, T bonds 15, 
and GNMA. 8 percent. The round trip commission costs employed are $70 per 
contract for T bill futures and $65 per contract for both long term fu¬ 
tures. The initial margins considered are $1500 per contract for both T 
bill and bond futures and $1200 per contract for GNMA futures. The ini¬ 
tial margins are treated as part of initial investment in the short hedge. 
Inquiries with several brokers indicated that these rates are fairly typi¬ 
cal across the industry and were relatively stable over time during the 
study period."^ While these costs are not exhaustive, it is believed 
that they represent at a. minimum a substantial part of actual trading 
costs. 
The mean annualized compound hedged returns net of transaction 
costs are presented in Table 5—14. The most striking result is that both 
the bond futures and the GNMA futures have consistently negative returns. 
The positive returns with no trading costs in the long-term futures were 
in the neighborhood of 7 to 8 percent, but after accounting for 
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TABLE 5-1.4. Mean returns after transaction costs on hedged 
portfolios of 
derlying spot 
futures instruments 
securities 1976-1979 
and their un- 
Contract 
13 week 
Mean 
(SD) 
T bill-TBIF 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
15 year T 
Mean 
(SD) 
bond-TBIF 
Skewness 
(Kurtosis) 
8% GNMA-GNMAF 
Mean Skewness 
(SD) (Kurtosis 
1 -12.93 
(1.63) 
-.47 
(7.61) 
-6.41 
(22.32) 
1.44 
(4.70) 
— 7.68 
(17.12) 
.93 
(3.89) 
2 -12.67 
(2.05) 
-.68 
(.0.96) 
-7.26 
(24.40) 
1.94 
(8.40) 
-7.37 
(20.87) 
1.82 
(10.52) 
3 -12.69 
(2.02) 
-.80 
(11.62) 
-7.82 
(17.91) 
.87 
(3.08) 
-7.86 
(16.05) 
.21 
(2.17) 
4 -12.71 
(2.11) 
-.48 
(12.50) 
-8.40 
(18.11) 
.91 
(3.18) 
-7.63 
(16.02) 
-.07 
(1.13) 
5 -12.73 
(2.18) 
-.35 
(12.44) 
-8.48 
(18.19) 
. 66 
(3.89) 
-7.45 
(18.21) 
.38 
(2.03) 
6 -12.76 
(2.43) 
-.35 
(10.85) 
-7.69 
(21.99) 
1.07 
(4.27) 
-8.48 
(16.66) 
.12 
(1.31) 
7 -12.90 
(2.78) 
-.10 
(7.85) 
-8.27 
(22.72) 
.63 
(2.22) 
-8.53 
(21.01) 
2.04 
(11.44) 
8 -12.91 
(2.81) 
-.10 
(7.70) 
-8.63 
(22.81) 
.34 
(1.87) 
-8.80 
(16.00) 
.19 
(1.22) 
9 -8.77 
(23.84) 
.12 
(1.42) 
-8.59 
(15.49) 
.14 
(.04) 
10 -8.58 
(24.13) 
.39 
(2.22) 
-8.65 
(15.68) 
.26 
(.42) 
11 -7.95 
(22.51) 
.29 
(1.69) 
-10.37 
(17.73) 
.08 
(.01) 
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usually comes from the broker’s inventory, some of which may belong to 
those purchasing securities on margin.^ The short seller commonly re¬ 
ceives no interest on the deposits and is additionally required to main¬ 
tain a certain amount of equity in his (her) account in times of adverse 
price changes. Thus a short sale in the spot market in reality usually 
requires not only a certain amount of capital investment, but even the 
transaction costs in terms of lost interest on deposits, payment of ac¬ 
crued coupon during the period the bond is on loan, commissions, premium 
payments, etc. are higher than those associated with a long spot posi¬ 
tion. 
To examine the returns on a hedged portfolio of short spot and long 
futures positions, define the weekly holding period dollar returns net of 
T 
transaction costs, AR ,, as 
* t+1* 
AR t+i= (pt+i-pt-V +VFt+i-W (5-2) 
where T^ = the transaction costs on short sale in the spot market 
In a period of rising interest rate expectations, the short spot 
sale is expected to yield a price gain, Pt-Pt+^>0, and the long futures 
position a price loss, - Ft<0. From the earlier analysis, which ig¬ 
nored transaction costs, it is apparent that the sum of the spot and fu¬ 
tures price changes for an opposite hedging strategy would be slightly 
positive (between 0.2 and 0.4 percent) in the case of T bill futures. It 
follows then that to make positive returns on the opposite strategy, the 
transaction costs would have to be very low. It thus seems that the 
"outsiders," that is the market participants other than the financial in¬ 
termediaries, could not have earned consistently positive returns on the 
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minimum risk portfolio of short spot and long futures positions in the T 
bills market. 
Note, however, the "insiders,’' that is the brokers and dealers, 
with their easy access to securities held in the street name, enjoy low 
trading costs. These intermediaries could have sold short the margin 
based securities from their inventories and gone long on the futures to 
create a minimum risk hedge in T bills. This would have involved very 
little capital investment and insignificant trading costs. If one recog¬ 
nizes the return on the investment of short sale proceeds, such a strate¬ 
gy would have produced consistently positive returns for the insiders 
during the study period. 
In the case of bond futures the earlier analysis ignoring transac¬ 
tion costs brought out that in ten out of eleven cases the returns on the 
long spot and short futures hedging strategy were generally a couple of 
percentage points lower than the riskless rate. In view of the high 
transaction costs associated with the opposite strategy, it seems that 
the outsiders combining short spot and long futures positions would 
have encountered a consistent loss of substantial magnitude. The in¬ 
siders with their negligble trading costs would also have incurred a net 
price loss of a couple of percentage points less than the riskless rate 
but would have had the proceeds from the short sale available for further 
investment. It seems reasonable to assume that the insiders could have 
earned at least the riskless rate of return on the investment of short 
sale proceeds. Accordingly the insiders in the bond futures market would 
have earned consistently positive returns in excess of the net price loss 
in ten out of eleven cases reported in Table 5—13. Thus the analysis of 
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the opposite strategy seems to support the earlier finding that the bond 
futures market was not efficient during the study period. 
The outsiders in the GNMA futures market xrould have incurred con¬ 
sistent losses by adopting the short spot and long futures hedging stra¬ 
tegy because of high transaction costs associated with the spot short 
sale. The results that the insiders would have obtained seem to vary 
with the distance to maturity of futures contracts. The findings re¬ 
ported in Table 5-13 suggest that the insiders using the last four con¬ 
tracts in the opposite strategy would have earned consistent profits in 
excess of the net price loss while those employing the first seven con¬ 
tracts would probably have incurred consistent losses. Thus the analysis 
of the opposite strategy does not seem to clarify the mixed evidence on 
the market efficiency of GNMA futures witnessed in the case of long spot 
13 
and short futures hedging strategy. 
One could perhaps go further and speculate about the consequences 
of following the mixed hedging and speculative strategies in the futures 
market. The findings obtained in this investigation seem to suggest that 
both the outsiders and insiders would have found enough mispricings in 
the financial futures markets to earn returns systematically in excess of 
the accompanying market risk by following investment strategies other 
than the minimum risk hedging strategy tested in this investigation. 
Hedging Effectiveness and Returns 
It is of interest to examine the relationship between hedging per¬ 
formance and hedging returns. From eq. (3-22) the expected return on a 
risk minimizing short hedge, E*(R +^), is given by 
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E(CPt) - rcft(CPt,CFt)S(CPt) 
(5-3) 
PtS(CFt) 
Clearly, a higher degree of positive correlation between cash and futures 
price changes, r ^t(CPt,CFt), lowers the expected return on the risk 
minimizing portfolio. That is, a more effective hedge will have a lower 
expected return than a less effective hedge. This is because with a 
higher degree of correlation, the price gain (loss) on the spot position 
tends to be more nearly offset by the price loss (gain) on the futures 
position. 
In Table 5-14 are assembled some data on hedging effectiveness and 
costs. Note that the negative returns net of transaction costs observed 
earlier are termed hedging costs in this context. Note further that the 
sample sizes for hedging costs associated with T bill futures and GNMA 
futures are far larger than those of bond futures. If a comparable sam¬ 
ple size for the former two were chosen, the hedging costs for those mar¬ 
kets would probably be even higher because of the rising interest rates 
during the latter part of the study period. 
From the correlation coefficients between cash and futures price 
changes it is obvious that the T bill futures are the least effective. 
The performance of the two long-term futures is comparable although the 
GNMA futures have a slight edge over the bond futures. Recall however, 
that in cross-hedging bond futures are generally superior to GNMA fu¬ 
tures. 
As anticipated the T bill futures have the highest hedging costs of 
all. The costs in the long-term futures markets are comparable. That 
the distributions of hedging costs are far more disperse in the long-term 
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TABLE 5' -15. 
i 
Hedging effectiveness and costs 
Correlation Coefficient Cost 
Hedge N = 170 N = 135 N = 80 N = 60 (SD) N 
I. T bill futures 
1. T bill 13- 
TBIF3 .57 .59 .69 .67 12.69 151 
2. T bill 13- 
TBIF6 .39 .44 .40 12.76 136 
II. T bond futures 
3. T bond 15- 
TB0F3 .82 .84 7.82 62 
4. T bond 15- 
TB0F8 .81 8.63 41 
III. GNMA futures 
5. GNMA8-GNMAF3 .68 .72 .86 .88 7.86 153 
6. GNMA 8-GNMAF 8 .72 .81 .85 8.80 116 
futures market than the T bill futures market can be attributed to the 
higher degree of interest rate elasticity of the former. Thus it clearly 
emerges that the more effective long-term futures markets have a lower 
mean hedging cost (negative return) than the less effective T bill fu¬ 
tures market 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter first reviews the objectives underlying the current re¬ 
search effort and summarizes its findings. Then the insights gained into 
the functioning of financial futures markets and the implications for 
their management are discussed. Following that up is a note on the 
limitations of this study. Finally the areas for further research are 
outlined. 
Review of Objectives and Results 
The following problems were explored in this investigation: 
1. How effective are the financial futures instruments in mitigating the 
price risk faced by an investor in spot securities? 
2. How many futures contracts should an investor intending to minimize 
his (her) price risk exposure sell for each unit of cash security? 
3. Is it possible for an investor maintaining a virtually risk-free 
hedge in the financial futures markets to earn a rate of return con¬ 
sistently higher than the riskless rate? That is, are the financial 
futures markets efficient? 
To evaluate the first problem a hedging model was formulated which re¬ 
vealed that the effectiveness of hedging instruments is a function of the 
various facets of interest rate elasticity. The empirical results based 
on this model indicate that: 
1. The futures instruments provide superior price protection to rela¬ 
tively long-term spot issues in comparison to those with a short term 
to maturity 
2. Among the financial futures, the long-term futures are more effective 
hedging vehicles than the T bill futures 
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3. The futures instruments are more successful in hedging the interest 
rate exposure of default-free spot securities than that of risky is¬ 
sues 
4. The discount coupon bonds enjoy a marginally superior price protec¬ 
tion in the futures markets in comparison to those selling at par or 
a premium 
5. Across the delivery periods, the near-term contracts perform better 
than the distant contracts as hedging instruments 
6. The price protection provided by the long-term futures to hybrid spot 
securities is relatively greater than what they offer to common 
stocks. Within the common stock category, the growth stocks enjoy 
superior price protection relative to the non-growth stocks 
7. Between individual securities and diversified portfolios, the finan¬ 
cial futures exhibit a superior hedging performance with the former 
8. Of the long-term futures, the bond futures have a slight edge over 
the GNMA futures in coping with interest rate risk 
The problem concerning the optimal hedge ratio was analyzed employ¬ 
ing the slope coefficient from a simple regression of cash price changes 
against futures price changes. The empirical findings confirm the hypo¬ 
thesis that the risk-minimizing hedge ratio is normally less than one and 
that it varies directly with the hedging effectiveness of futures instru¬ 
ments . 
The market efficiency hypothesis was investigated by comparing the 
returns on weekly hedges of the three financial futures and their spot 
market counterparts with the one month CD rate as a proxy for the risk¬ 
less rate. The results indicate that gross of trading costs an investor 
would have earned roughly the same as the one month CD rate in the long¬ 
term futures makrets; but lost marginally in the T bill futures market. 
Further, if the transaction costs are taken into account, the results 
show that the investor would have lost money in all the futures markets 
instead of earning the riskless rate, the magnitude of loss varying from 
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about 12 percent in the T bill futures to about 8 percent in the long-term 
futures markets. 
With these results in hand, the analysis was then extended to see 
if there existed a clear relationship between hedging effectiveness and 
hedged returns. The findings support the hypothesis that hedging costs 
(negative returns) are lower in the more effective long-term futures mar¬ 
kets than those in the T bill futures market. 
Insights and Implications 
Why do the financial futures provide superior price protection to 
some spot securities relative to others? A general, rather naive, an¬ 
swer is that the correlation of futures price changes with those of spot 
issues varies from security to security. But that begs the question: 
What is it that makes future price changes correlate better with some 
spot price changes? As shown in the hedging model, the pivotal variable 
determining price correlation is the interest rate elasticity of cash 
and futures instruments.^ 
The term to maturity—a key consideration. The theoretical model shows, 
and the empirical results confirm, that each financial futures instrument 
offers more price protection to more interest rate elastic spot securi¬ 
ties than those with a lower interest rate sensitivity. A key determin¬ 
ant of interest rate elasticity is the term to maturity. It then follows 
that a 26-week T bill enjoys greater price protection in the T bill fu¬ 
tures market than a 13 week T bill. Likewise, a 25-year government bond 
can have more of its interest rate risk reduced in the bond futures 
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market than a 15-year government bond. Conversely, a one-week T bill and 
a nine year government bond receive less price protection in their re¬ 
spective hedging markets relative to a thirteen-week T bill and a 
fifteen-year government bond. It is evident then that the term to 
maturity of spot securities is a very important factor to consider in 
hedging decisions. Moreover, note that the greater is the interest rate 
exposure of a spot security the higher the price protection available in 
the futures markets. 
Prerequisites for an effective network of futures markets. The model 
further suggests that hedging effectiveness varies across the futures 
instruments as a function of their interest rate elasticities. That is, 
the futures instruments that are more interest rate sensitive provide 
superior price protection in relation to the less interest rate elastic 
instruments. Thus the protection provided by the T bill futures to the 
thirteen-week T bill is less than the protection provided by the GNMA 
futures to the 8 percent GNMAs, and that provided by the bond futures to 
the fif teen year government bonds is marginally lower than that offered 
by the GNMA futures to its underlying spot security. 
What is the policy implication of this finding? Does it now sug¬ 
gest that to be more effective hedging vehicles the futures instruments 
* 
should also be designed to be more interest rate elastic? 
A. Optimal terms to maturity. There are several ways to augment the 
interest rate elasticity of futures instruments. By far the most import¬ 
ant and practical of them is to tie the futures instruments to spot secu¬ 
rities of long maturities within each of the maturity classes, namely the 
An optimal set short-term, the intermediate-term, and the long-term, 
of futures instruments is outliend below: 
1. A short-term futures instrument tied to a one year T bill 
2. An intermediate-term futures instrument coupled with a T note of ten 
years to maturity 
3. A long-term futures instrument related to a government bond of 
twenty-five years to maturity 
4. An industry-based futures instrument for securities of each key in¬ 
dustry in the economy 
Compare the existing futures instruments with the optimal set. Of 
the three Treasury maturities recommended above, only the one year T 
bill futures was being traded in mid-1979. While it is true that the 
open interest in the one year T bill futures has been substantially 
smaller than that in the 90-day T bill futures, it should be borne in 
mind that the former has been in existence for about one and one-half 
years while the latter has been trading for about three and one half 
years. Further, the 15 year bond futures and the newly instituted 4 to 
6 year Treasury note futures fall considerably short of the recommended 
terms to maturity. 
Looking at the current maturities of futures instruments, one won¬ 
ders whether they were chosen based on the volume of trading of their 
underlying spot securities. The theoretical model reveals, however, that 
the interest rate elasticities and the comovement of yield changes in the 
spot and futures markets, not the volume of business of underlying spot 
securities, are the key determinants of hedging effectiveness. 
Some important considerations other than the term to maturity in 
constructing an optimal set of futures instruments are the importance of 
an industry in the national economy and its capacity to sustain a 
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separate futures market. A case in point is the GNMA futures market. 
The empirical results obtained in this study show that the hedging per¬ 
formance of this market is marginally superior to that of the bond fu¬ 
tures in offering price protection to the spot 8 percent GNMAs. Note 
that this is so despite the lower effective maturity and higher yield 
associated with the GNMA futures. Given the public policy objective of 
providing adequate financing for housing and the large volume of trading 
in the GNMAs, a separate futures market may be justified even though 
their hedging performance is not considerably superior to the cross¬ 
hedging potential available in the bond futures market. 
B. Optimal number of delivery periods. How many delivery periods are 
optimal for each hedging instrument? The evidence obtained in this 
study indicates: 
1. In all the futures markets, the near-term contracts are generally 
more effective hedging tools than the distant contracts. Across the 
futures instruments, the near-term contracts seem to be less effec¬ 
tive in the T bills futures than in the long-term futures markets 
2. In the T bill futures markets, the distant contracts are significant¬ 
ly less effective than their counterparts in the long-term futures 
makrets 
3. In the long-term futures markets, the superior performance of the 
near-term contracts over their distant counterparts is less impres¬ 
sive than that in the T bill futures market 
Note that these findings are highly time-specific. That is, they per¬ 
tain to a regime of generally rising and highly volatile interest rates. 
It may further be noted that a partial explanation for observations 2 
and 3 above lies in the behavior of short-term and long-term interest 
rates. It is well established in the existing interest rate literature 
that short-term rates are relatively more volatile than long-term rates. 
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An implication arising from this behavioral pattern is that the yield 
differential between the near-term and distant contracts in the T bill 
futures market exceeds that in the long-term futures. An examination of 
the actual data confirms it [97]. 
The above explanation is only partial, however. The available 
evidence on market inefficiency indicates that the long futures yield in 
all markets deviates farther from the corresponding implied forward rate 
as the terms to delivery of the contracts increase. The higher yields 
associated with the distant contracts reduce their interest rate elasti¬ 
city and consequently render them less effective. One may speculate 
that the T bill futures market is relatively less efficient than the 
long-term futures markets and as such the difference in the effective¬ 
ness of distant and near-term contracts in the former market exceeds 
that obtaining in the long-term futures markets. 
Although the empirical results of this study pertain to the rising 
interest rate period, the theoretical model is not grounded in any par¬ 
ticular market situation. The model is versatile enough to draw viable 
inferences applicable to other types of interest rate periods as well. 
In a period of generally stable interest rates, the model suggests that 
the difference in hedging performance of the near-term and distant con¬ 
tracts would be minimal. On the contrary, a period of generally falling 
interest rates would tend to make the distant contracts superior to the 
near-term contracts. Again, the difference in hedging effectiveness 
across delivery periods would be much less pronounced for the long-term 
than the short-term futures market because of the generally higher vola¬ 
tility of short rates over long rates. 
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It is conceivable that regardelss of the expected behavior of in¬ 
terest rates, the nearest-term futures contract may have a high degree 
of price correlation with spot securities because of the "delivery ef¬ 
fect." That is, the delivery requirement on futures contracts would 
tend to drive the two prices together in all market situations. Despite 
its high price correlation, the nearest-term contract is commonly not a 
useful hedging vehicle on account of its brief life span. 
Yet another important consideration in determining the optimal num¬ 
ber of delivery periods is the commitment requirements of market partici¬ 
pants. In other words, the hedging facilities that the futures markets 
provide should be tailored to how far in advance the borrowers and lend¬ 
ers have to make commitments in the spot markets. The "commitment-time" 
usually varies from industry to industry. A builder may have to make 
commitments farther in advance than a bond-dealer, or a corporate trea¬ 
surer, or an exporter. It is conceivable that the commitment-time con¬ 
sideration may call for contracts with long delivery periods, but the 
expected interest rate behavior might render them less effective. Yet 
it would be desirable to provide for such long delivery periods because 
partial price protection is better than none. 
What emerges from the above discussion is that there are basically 
three important determinatns of the optimal number of delivery periods: 
the term-structure of futures contracts, the expected behavior of in¬ 
terest rates, and the commitment—time requirements of borrowers and 
lenders. Of the three criteriar the last is probably the most important 
for the simple reason that some price protection is commonly better than 
none. The importance of the second determinant is contingent upon the 
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first due to the less volatile nature of long interest rates in relation 
to short rates. Accordingly, the expected interest behavior should be 
given more attention in determining the optimal number of futures con¬ 
tracts in the short-term futures market compared with the intermediate- 
or long-term futures markets. It follows then that the predominant con¬ 
sideration in deciding the optimal number of contracts in the long-term, 
and perhaps even the intermediate-term, futures markets is the commit¬ 
ment-time requirements of market participants. 
In the short-term futures market, the desirable number of contracts 
varies with the expected behavior of interest rates given the commitment 
time needs of borrowers and lenders. While a lesser number of contracts 
would be optimal in a regime of rising and volatile interest rates, a 
larger number would be desirable when interest rates are generally ex¬ 
pected to decline in level and volatility. 
Further, the higher volatility of short-rates implies that spacing 
the short-term futures contracts closer than the long-term futures con¬ 
tracts might add to the hedging utility of the former. It may therefore 
be desirable to have monthly delivery periods in the short-term futures 
instead of quarterly delivery periods. 
C. Optimal coupon rate. That a discount coupon bond is more interest 
rate elastic than another trading at par or premium implies that a dis¬ 
count term futures instrument would be a more effective hedging vehicle 
than another with no discount. Whether a bond with a given coupon trades 
at discount or not evidently depends on the current and expected level of 
Thus the general guidance that the model provides is to interest rates. 
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keep the coupon on the spot security underlying the term futures instru¬ 
ments lower when the yield curve is. downward sloping than when it is up¬ 
ward sloping. 
It is apparent from the existing theory, however, that the effect 
of normal ranges of coupon on interest rate elasticity is small relative 
to that of term to maturity. Consequently, the differential gain in 
hedging effectiveness from two instruments with low and high coupons may 
be marginal in both rising and falling interest rate periods. According¬ 
ly it is desirable to keep the coupon on spot securities attached to the 
term futures instruments at a conservative level across all interest rate 
horizons. 
D. Optimal variety of instruments. A further policy question in de¬ 
signing an effective network of futures markets is: What is the optimal 
number of hedging instruments in the short-term, intermediate-term, and 
long-term futures markets? In other words, does there exist a real need 
for a separate futures instrument for commercial paper, certificates of 
deposit, repurchase agreements, etc. in addition to the one year T bill 
futures in the short-term futures market? Likewise, do separate instru¬ 
ments for municipal bonds, auto-industry related issues, etc., apart 
from the government note and bond futures, add significantly to the 
practical utility of term futures markets? 
The answer largely depends on the behavior of interest rates and 
consequently that of interest rate elasticities, across the various seg¬ 
ments of the economy. The Treasury issues are the foremost choice for 
establishing futures markets because they are by far the most 
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representative barometers of interest rate movements all over the econo¬ 
my. There is a genuine need for financial security-based, or industry- 
based interest rate futures markets in addition to the Treasury based 
futures only if the level and movement of interest rates vary consider- 
3 
ably across financial instruments and industries. 
The available evidence indicates that within the three term struc¬ 
tures the interest rates are highly correlated across the various seg¬ 
ments of financial markets, and that the level differences are commonly 
within 2-3 percentage points. Given the marginal impact of the coupon 
effect on interest rate elasticity and the empirical evidence on the 
general cross-hedging superiority of the bond futures over the GNMA fu¬ 
tures obtained in this investigation, it seems safe to speculate that 
a plethora of futures instruments does not add significantly to the 
utility of the futures market network. 
Finally the need for a futures market to deal with transnational 
interest rate risk can also be analyzed within the broad framework of 
the hedging model employed in this study. To the extent that level dif¬ 
ferences are not sizable across national boundaries and that interest 
rate volatilities are similar in different financial centers of the 
world, a separate futures market for hedging international commitments 
may not be of much use. The issue is, however, not simple, and needs to 
be examined in conjunction with the functioning of currency futures. 
E. Futures market for common stocks. Assume that the philosophy of a 
futures market for stocks is to provide some insurance against their in¬ 
terest rate exposure. Do the theoretical model and empirical findings 
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of this study suggest a need for, and provide some guidance on the de¬ 
sign of, such a futures market? Clearly the answer largely lies in the 
interest rate elasticity of stocks and the level and volatility of spot 
and futures rates. 
Duration is the common measure of interest rate elasticity across 
all financial instruments. The net interest rate exposure (that is, 
duration) of a common stock depends on a number of factors such as the 
depth of capital investment, the payback period of assets, the debt- 
equity structure of the firm, the dividend payout ratio, the expected 
rate of growth in earnings and dividends, and the extent of regulation 
of the industry [42]. 
Commonly the durationof stocks is substantially greater than that 
of debt securities; a difference of the order of about five times is not 
unusual. Given such a wide difference in the durations of stocks and 
debts, the hedging model implies that the price protection available for 
stocks in the futures markets for debt securities may be inadequate, or 
even scanty. So the guidance available from the theoretical model seems 
4 
to underscore the need for a separate futures market for common stocks. 
The empirical evidence obtained in this investigation vindicates this 
inference drawn from the model in that the price protection available 
for a stock fund and the S&P 500 Common Stock price index in the exist¬ 
ing long-term futures market was found to be substantially lower than 
that available to debt securities. 
Some guidelines the model offers for the design of a stock futures 
market can be laid down now.. First, it is apparently desirable to estab¬ 
lish an equity futures market using stocks with high duration. As 
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observed in the context of debt futures the higher the interest rate 
elasticity of the hedging instrument the larger is its risk reduction 
potential. Second, tying the equity futures market to an individual 
growth stock rather than a portfolio of growth and non-growth stocks 
might promote its hedging effectiveness because of the tendency of the 
latter to have lower duration than the former. 
Third, the optimal number of stock hedging instruments depends on 
the difference in duration of stocks and yield volatilities across in¬ 
dustries. A variety of hedging instruments is called for only if such 
differences are considerable across industries. Fourth, noting the low 
volatility of long rates, the optimal number of delivery periods and 
their spacing appears to be predominantly a functionof the needs of 
holders of stocks. Finally, it is obvious that the chosen stocks must 
contain little default risk. Evidently, the above guidelines are broad 
and inexhaustive. The whole issue is a complex one, and calls for fur¬ 
ther investigation. 
How many contracts to buy or sell? The model, along with the empirical 
results, suggests that the hedger should take into account primarily 
three factors in deciding this question: (1) the relative volatility of 
spot and futures yields, (2) the interest rate elasticity of the spot 
security being hedged, and (3) the term-structure of interest rates. 
Given the maturity, coupon, and default risk, an upward sloping yield 
curve implies that the spot price is less than the futures price, and 
that the spot duration is higher than the futures1 interest rate elas¬ 
ticity. Given further the relative volatility of spot and futures 
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yields, a rising yield curve would signal the risk-minimizing investor 
to hold a relatively large number of futures contracts. In light of 
this, the investor faced with a falling yield curve needs to hold rela¬ 
tively fewer futures contracts. 
The model further suggests that for a given relative volatility of 
rates and yield curve, the number of futures contracts in a riskless 
hedge varies directly with the duration of the spot security. To see 
this, recall that the hedge ratio is an increasing function of hedging 
effectiveness, which, in turn, varies in step with spot duration. 
Finally, given the yield curve and spot duration, a hedger needs to sell 
relatively fewer contracts when the expected volatility of the futures 
rate is higher than that of the spot. 
Limitations 
In drawing inferences from the empirical findings, it is important 
to keep in mind the assumptions underlying the theoretical model and the 
limits of the methodology and the sample. First, the model assumes that 
the primary motive for hedging is risk-minimization. From a public poli¬ 
cy standpoint, it is perhaps a legitimate assumption of hedging behavior. 
Even from the practical viewpoint, the assumption is believed to describe 
the hedging behavior of a substantial part of market participants. 
Despite these justifications, the model is rather restrictive in 
portraying the market behavior of participants. The available litera¬ 
ture on commodity futures and investments argues that a hedger is more 
of an arbitrager than a risk-minimizer. According to this theory, the 
basic motive of hedging is to profit from relative price movements 
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between cash and futures markets. To the extent that such a pattern of 
hedging behavior is appropriate for the financial futures, the model 
needs to be modified. It is debatable, however, whether the models of 
hedging behavior in commodity and financial futures should be identical. 
The question involves implications for public policy and monetary policy 
and calls for further research. 
The methodological weaknesses of the study are primarily in the 
choice of weekly data. It is believed that the use of daily data would 
improve the quality of empirical findings on market efficiency by reduc¬ 
ing the error in the estimation of the hedge ratio. The conclusions 
reached here are not, however, expected to be altered by this inverval- 
ing effect. Moreover, as observed earlier, the attempt to control for 
maturity, coupon effect, and default risk has introduced some errors in¬ 
to the data base, but they are expected to be random and on balance in¬ 
consequential . 
Finally, the sample employed lacks a suitable number of discount 
coupon bonds and individual stocks. This is partly an error in planning, 
rather than a limitation due to the non-availability of suitable issues. 
The inclusion of these two groups of securities would have enhanced the 
value of the study. Furthermore, the sample comes from a period of gen¬ 
erally rising and volatile interest rates, and as such there is need for 
caution in generalizing the findings to other regimes of interest rate 
behavior. 
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Extensions 
The study indicates quite a few directions for future research. 
In the first place, it is desirable to replicate the market efficiency 
analysis employing the daily data. Further, certain propositions re¬ 
garding the interest rate elasticity of futures instruments and relative 
volatility of futures rates have not been directly tested in this study. 
Given their critical importance in determining hedging effectiveness and 
hedge ratio, they deserve further attention. 
The relationship between hedging effectiveness and hedging costs 
seems to provide another fertile area for future research. In this work, 
the negative returns were called hedging costs. A more appropriate 
definition of hedging costs is the difference between unhedged and hedged 
returns. The model implies that hedging costs, thus defined, tend to in¬ 
crease with hedging effectiveness. It is worth investigating whether the 
empirical analysis would support this implication. 
The unbiased expectations hypothesis of the term structure of in¬ 
terest rates implies that an efficient market is also an effective mar¬ 
ket for hedging since the spot and futures prices are linked by the im¬ 
plied forward rates. This linkage between market efficiency and hedging 
effectiveness has not been examined in detail in this investigation and 
deserves further research. Finally, an examination of the stability of 
the hedge ratio over time would be useful to a market participant in 
maintaining an effective hedge. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Chapter I 
The term "basis" has two distinct connotations. In the financial 
literature, the term "basis point” refers to the one hundredth part of a 
percentage point of interest rate. Changes in interest rates are mea¬ 
sured in terms of basis points, and their impact on the value of finan¬ 
cial securities is called "basis risk." In the futures market litera¬ 
ture, on the other hand, basis means the difference between spot and fu¬ 
tures prices. In this study, the term "basis risk" is used in the for¬ 
mer sense. 
2 
According to Fisher and Weil, "a portfolio of investments in bonds 
is immunized for a holding period if its value at the end of the holding 
period, regardless of the course of interest rates during the holding 
period, must be at least as large as it would have been had the interest 
rate function been constant throughout the holding period. 
If the realized return on an investment in bonds is sure to be at 
least as large as the appropriately computed yield to the horizon, then 
that investment is immunized" [34; p. 415]. The conditions under which 
the duration strategy immunizes an investment are discussed in Chapter 
III. Fisher and Weil empirically tested the duration strategy by compar¬ 
ing the realized terminal wealth for a given holding period with the 
promised terminal wealth and reported that this strategy performs better 
(in spite of its unrealistic assumptions) than the naive strategy of 
holding a coupon bond with term to maturity equal to one’s planned holding 
period. 
3 
For a detailed discussion of spot and futures markets in commodi¬ 
ties see Blau [10] and Johnson [52]. 
4 
For a discussion of the basic premises of financial futures mar¬ 
kets see [17,18,19]. 
r“ 
^This is implied by the unbiased expectations theory of the term 
structure of interest rates according to which the linkage between spot 
and futures prices is provided by implied forward rates. 
^Specifically the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board have re¬ 
portedly protested to the Commodities Futures Trading Commission that fu¬ 
tures trading distorts the spot prices for government securities [15,68]. 
^This is apparent from Macaulay [62]. He wrote, "for a study of 
the relations between long and short term interest rates, it would seem 
highly desirable to have some adequate measure of 'longness.' Let us 
use the word 'duration* to signify the essence of the time element in a 
loan ... It is clear that ’number of years to maturity’ is a most inade¬ 
quate measure of ’duration.”’ [p. 74] 
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Hereinafter the terms ,?bond futures" will be used to refer to the 
15 year T bond futures instrument. 
Chapter II 
^"The three publications of the CBT [16,72,73] provide an extensive 
reference on the commodity futures markets. 
2 
For a discussion of factors limiting the effectiveness of a hedge 
see [10]. 
3 
In its "... Introduction to the Interest Rate Futures Markets," 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) observed: 
Since the late 1960s, interest rates in the United States have risen 
and have fluctuated as in no other period in their history. His¬ 
torically, both long- and short-term interest rates were less than 6 
percent. But in recent years, borrowers and investors in the credit 
market have been exposed to increasingly higher interest rate risks 
[18; p. 2]. 
A survey of the Federal Reserve Bulletins points out the generally rising 
level and volatility of various interest rates during 1976-79. For an 
overview of the behavior of interest rates from 1967 see [19] . 
4 
In a strict sense, interest rate elasticity and duration are not 
measures of risk because risk by definition assumes a certain utility 
function. For a discussion on common misinterpretations of duration see 
Bierwag et al. [7]. 
^The coupon rates and yields in Table 2-1 are based on semi-annual 
compounding. 
£ 
Hopewell and Kaufman [46] even suggested that it might be more 
useful to derive the yield curves with respect to duration rather than 
term to maturity. Recently, Bierwag and Kaufman attributed the sub- 
optimal results of various bond portfolio strategies to the inadequate 
attention given to duration [50]. 
For a detailed discussion of the limitations of the traditional 
concept of duration as a general measure of basis risk, see Ingersoll et 
al. [50]. 
^On the use of single and multiple indices to describe the security 
return generating processes, see Alexander [1], Cohen and Pogue [21], 
King [54], and Sharpe [85,86]. 
O 
See Lanstein and Sharpe [57] for a detailed discussion on the re¬ 
lation between duration and systematic risk of a stock. 
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9 
According to Ingersoll et al. [50], MAn asset is said to be im¬ 
munized against a shift in interest rates if its postshift holding period 
return is at least as great as the holding period return would have been 
in the absence of the shift" [p. 634]. 
"^Extra-market covariances are covariances among security returns 
due to factors other than the common market factor which includes changes 
in interest rates. The non—market factors include industry factors and 
factors unique to the firm. For a detailed discussion of extra-market 
covariances, see Cohen and Pogue [21], King [54], and Sharpe [86]. 
Chapter III 
Note that the model holds for coupon bonds as well as stocks. 
When applied to coupon bonds, the model assumes that the bond prices 
include accrued interest. This is appropriate because although the pub¬ 
lished prices of coupon issues do not include accrued interest, the 
buyers have to pay for it. Note further that the price quotations for 
stocks reflect expected dividend payments. 
The price risk, V(ARct), represents the interest rate risk asso¬ 
ciated with a security only to the extent price changes are caused by 
interest rate movements. There are, however, a number of factors other 
than shifts in interest rates which contribute to price changes. To men¬ 
tion a few, changes in the term to maturity, coupon, level of default- 
risk, expected rate of growth in earnings and dividends, and capital 
structure of the firm. The price risk defined above reflects the inter¬ 
est rate exposure of a security to the extent that these other factors 
are held constant over time and as such do not contribute to price 
change. 
In this investigation the research design employed minimizes the 
price effect of factors other than changes in interest rates. Therefore 
the price risk as defined in eq. (3-2) is believed to be a close ap¬ 
proximation to the interest rate risk associated with a security, and 
the two terms are used interchangeably. 
2 
There is no unique measure of duration. The specific measure of 
duration varies with different types of stochastic shifts in the term- 
structure of interest rates. In this dissertation, the Macaulay-Hicks 
duration is employed in spite of the fact that it is based on the un¬ 
realistic assumption of a flat term structure of interest rates and 
parallel shifts therein. This is because as Bierwag [6] indicated the 
differences between the simple traditional measure and the more sophisti¬ 
cated measures of duration are not critical within the normal ranges of 
coupon and yield. Further, the empirical work by Fisher and Weil [34] 
shows that the traditional duration is a useful measure despite all its 
unrealistic assumptions regarding the behavior of interest rates. 
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3 
The application of the concept of duration to a futures instrument 
poses some difficulties. The central theme of duration is the relative 
importance of the time value of interim and final cash flows associated 
with a security. Although the futures instrument is tied to a spot secu¬ 
rity of given coupon and maturity, the cash flows associated with it are 
quite different from those related to the underlying spot security. On 
purchase or sale of the contract, the investor pays the margin and com¬ 
mission costs. The interim cash flows associated with the contract are 
those related to the maintenance margin. When the contract expires, the 
holder of the instrument receives or pays the agreed price and gets back 
the margin money. Note, however, that only a small number of contracts 
are closed out by actual delivery. When the contract is terminated be¬ 
fore delivery, the holder receives or pays the price difference after ad¬ 
justing for the margin. It is thus clear that there are no coupon cash 
flows associated with the futures instrument. 
Further, the term to expiration of the long-term futures contract 
is far shorter than the term tp maturity of a long-term bond, while the 
opposite is commonly true for the short-term futures instrument. In view 
of these it is thought that the use of the phrase, "interest rate elasti¬ 
city" rather than "duration" is more meaningful in the context of the 
futures instrument as the former is not laden with the notion of present 
value of cash flows. 
4 
The discussion that follows refers primarily to debt instruments. 
While the implications of the discussion for common stocks are fairly 
apparent, a detailed treatment of the subject is left for future investi¬ 
gation. 
^As observed earlier, the duration of a common stock is typically 
way above that of a long-term bond. Note, however, that when a common 
stock is hedged in the long-term futures market the covariance term in 
the numerator of eq. (3-13) is expected to be considerably lower, and the 
standard deviation of the spot price change in the denominator much 
larger, than those associated with a bond hedge or even a hybrid security 
hedge. Consequently, the correlation between cash and futures price 
changes will be relatively lower for a common stock hedge. 
rhis can be attributed to two reasons. First, the covariance term 
in eq. (3-13) will be higher for the GNMA futures hedge than the bond fu¬ 
tures hedge. Second, the standard deviation of the GNMA futures price 
changes will be lower for the former than that for the bond futures 
hedge. 
^This assumes that the term to maturity and coupon level are held 
constant. 
^One implication of this relation is that h is likely to assume 
values equal to or greater than unity for relatively long-term spot 
issues. 
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B-S derived the following option valuation formula 
P o 
where 
r 
t 
s 
c(d) 
£n 
e 
Psc(di) ' pEe rt°(d2) 
£n(ps/pE) +(r+(l/2)s2)t 
St 
1/2 
^n(ps/pE) +r~ (l/2)s )t 
_ 
st 
option price 
stock price 
exercise price of option 
the continuously compounded riskless interest rate 
time remaining before expiration of option 
standard deviation of the continuously compounded annual 
stock return 
cumulative normal density function 
natural logarithm 
2.71828 
They showed that the perfect hedge ratio is equal to the term c(d^) in 
the valuation formula. Employing the B-S principle it can be shown that 
Ft= Ewhich is the basic premise of the unbiased expectations hy¬ 
pothesis . 
Chapter IV 
■^Tote, however, that in a few instances it has not been possible to 
control the various dimensions as rigorously as demanded by the design. 
It is believed, however, that in spite of such inadequacies, the insights 
gained would still be useful in understanding the performance of financial 
futures. 
2 
The credit ratings, maturity and interest payment dates of indivi¬ 
dual issues were identified from the two Moody’s publications [66,67]. 
JThe information on trading costs were obtained over telephone from 
the following sources: 
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(1) Bernard J. Doherty 
Vice President-Retail Sales 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. 
1 Federal Street 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Telephone: (617)482-3600 
(2) Richard P. Ziencina 
Commodity Specialist 
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. 
Valley Bank Tower 
1500 Main Street 
Springfield, Massachusetts 01115 
Telephone: (403)734-7311 
4 
Two models have been proposed to explain the process of price- 
change generation in the stock market. The stable paretian hypothesis 
posits that price changes measured over calendar time follow the symme¬ 
tric stable laws with a characteristic exponent 9 which lies between 1 
and 2. The subordinated stochastic processes theory, on the other hand, 
claims that price changes come from mixtures of normal distributions 
stemming from the accumulation of several small pieces of information 
during a particular period of time. Westerfield [99] examined these two 
hypotheses and reported that the common stock price changes were better 
described by the subordinated probability model. 
^While there are several shades of meaning of the term "robust," a 
typical one is that given by Andrews [4]: "techniques of fitting are 
said to be robust of efficiency when their statistical efficiency remains 
high for conditions more realistic than the utopian cases of Gaussian dis¬ 
tributions with errors of equal variance" [p. 523]. 
Typically robust estimation of regression coefficients involves 
minimizing the sum of the pth power of the absolute values of residuals. 
Hogg, for example, recommends the following adaptive robust regression 
procedure: 
1. Find some reasonable estimators of the regression coefficients 
that are not influenced too much by outliers . . . 
2. Compute the residuals from that fitted expression and determine 
the length of tails . . . 
3. Recompute estimates of the regression coefficients using a loss 
function consistent with the lengths of the tails [44; p. 917]. 
7For a review of adaptive distribution-free procedures see Hogg 
[44]. 
8On the question of sample size that leads to convergence of the T 
and the normal distribution, Winkler and Hays further observe. How 
large is 'large enough' to permit the use of normal tables? If the popu 
lation distribution is truly normal, a sample size of 30 or 40 permits a 
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quite accurate use of the normal tables. . . . For most purposes a v of 
30 or 40 should be large enough to permit the use of the normal tables" 
[101; p. 366]. 
9 
In the general context of testing for the significance of r, 
McNemar [65] observed, "There is evidence, as with the t test for means, 
that sizable violations of the assumptions are tolerable. . . ." 
[p. 138]. He states further that the test statistic described in (4-7) 
follows the T distribution with N-3 degrees of freedom when the null hy¬ 
pothesis of no difference between the two r’s holds. 
"^Refer to the discussion on volatility of futures yields in Chap¬ 
ter III. 
Chapter V 
For a discussion of other problems involved in the collection and 
analysis of bond price data, see [84]. 
2 
Fama and Roll [30] observed that the studentized range provides a 
fairly reliable test of normality when the alternative distribution is 
stable symmetric non-normal. 
3 
Note from eq. (3-13) that the comovement of yield changes in spot 
and futures markets is another important determinant of hedging effective¬ 
ness. Yield changes are , however, not a decision variable in the sense 
that they are beyond the control of individual market participants in a 
perfect market. The interest rate elasticity or duration, on the other 
hand, is a strategic variable in that the investor can partially influ¬ 
ence the price response to a given shift in interest rates by selecting 
the level of credit risk, coupon, and term to maturity appropriate to his 
(her) investment objectives. From the hedging strategy point of view, 
therefore, focusing the attention on the relationship between interest 
rate elasticity and hedging performance is important. 
^In this study the terms "hedging effectiveness" and "hedging per¬ 
formance" are used synonymously. Further, the superior (inferior) hedg¬ 
ing performance is defined in terms of a high (low) degree of correlation 
between cash and futures price changes. It is, however, conceivable 
that others might use different criteria such as costs and returns in 
gauging hedging performance of financial futures. 
^The sample sizes underlying an<^ r31 variec^ slightly in some 
instances and the difference was around 5. In such cases the reported N 
in Table 5-3 is the average of the two samples. 
^The hedging performance results associated with bond funds are 
particularly unimpressive. For hedging performance results associated 
with several other securities included in the sample, see Appendix D. 
150 
Note that the net price changes in the range of 0.22 to 0.39 per¬ 
cent are approximately equal to the typical commission revenue of 0.25 
percent obtained during the study period. 
g 
It may be noted that these observations are to some extent specu¬ 
lative since the minimum risk hedging strategy involving short spot and 
long futures positions has not been rigorously examined in this study. 
While the spot and futures price changes are identical in the two types 
of minimum risk strategies outlined in Table 5-11, the strategies differ 
in terms of transaction costs and cash flows generated by the spot short 
sale. A detailed examination of the short spot and long futures minimum 
risk strategy is left for future research. 
9 
The available evidence on the efficiency of long-term futures is 
scanty. Of the studies reviewed earlier, Branch [14] reported that 
long futures yields in the long-term futures markets were higher than 
their corresponding implied forward rates during the 1976-78 period. 
"^The brokerage houses from whom this information was obtained are 
listed in footnote 3 to Chapter IV. 
"^Securities purchased on margin are left in the custody of the 
brokerage house and are registered in its name. It is a common practice 
among brokerage firms to lend these margin-based securities to short 
sellers. 
12 
In the case of long-term futures the opposite strategy of short 
spot and long futures positions, would have resulted in a net negative 
price change before transaction costs during the study period. So the 
analysis of the opposite strategy is not of interest. 
13 
The methodology employed above assumes the efficiency of the re¬ 
lated spot markets and thus provides a joint test of the market effi¬ 
ciency of spots and futures instruments. 
Chapter VI 
^"Note again from eq. (3-13) that the other two variables influenc¬ 
ing price correlation are the level and volatility of spot and futures 
yields. 
The rationale for recommending a network of financial futures 
based on the three-tier term-structure can be deciphered from eq. (3-13). 
It is clear from that equation that yield volatility in spit and futures 
markets plays an important role in determining hedging effectiveness. 
Yield volatility is known to vary considerably across the maturity spec¬ 
trum. Short-term yields are far more volatile than long-term yields, and 
the volatility of intermediate-term yields can be expected to fall in be¬ 
tween those of the former two. In the light of this, behavioral pattern 
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of yields, it appears that a separate market each for short-term instru¬ 
ments, intermediate-term instruments, and long-term instrumen s would be 
conducive to the evolutionof an effective network of futures markets. 
3 
This statement is to be read in conjunction with the need for key- 
industry based futures instruments discussed earlier. 
^While interest rate exposure is the major source of risk for most 
bonds, it is only one of several such sources for stocks. In the latter 
case, the uncertainty associated with the expected cash flows may be even 
more important than the basis risk [57]. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A—1. Specific Issues of Individual Securities^* 1976—79 
'y 
Interest 
Issue Coupon Maturity 
o 
Rating^ 
Payment 
Dates 
Date of^ 
Inclusion 
1. General Motors Ac¬ 
ceptance Corporation 
a. Notes 8.62 1985 A MN15 1/07/76 
b * Junior Subordi—j.- 
nate Notes 8.125 1986 A A015 1/05/77 
c.. Notes 7.350 1987 Aaa JJ15 1/04/78 
d. Notes 8.200 1988 Aaa FA15 7/05/78 
2. American Telephone 
and Telegraph 
a. Debentures 8.700 2002 Aaa JD1 .1/07/76 
b. Debentures 7.125 2003 Aaa JD1 .1/05/77 
c. Debentures 8.800 2005 Aaa MN15 1/04/78 
d. Debentures 8.625 2007 Aaa FA1 1/03/79 
3. General Telephone 
and Telegraph 
a. Sinking Fund 
Debentures 9.750 1995 Baa FA15 ..1/07/76 
b. Sinking Fund 
Debentures 9.375 1999 Baa MN15 1/04/78 
4. Georgia Power and 
Alabama Power 
a. Debentures 11.625 2000 Baa FA1 1/07/76 
b. Debentures 8.875 2003 Baa FA1 7/06/77 
c. Debentures 9.750 2004 Baa JD1 1/04/78 
d. Debentures 10.875 2005 Baa A01 1/03/79 
5. Municipal Assist¬ 
ance Corporation 
of New York 
a. 11.000 1983 Baa FA1 1/07/76 
b. 9.000 1985 Baa FA1 1/05/77 
c. 8.000 1986 Baa JJ1 1/04/78 
6* Ohio Turnpike and 
Municipal Assist¬ 
ance Corporation 
of New York. 
a. 3.250 1992 Aa JD1 1/07/76 
b* 9.375 1992. Baa JJ1 7/06/77 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Issue Coupon Maturity Rating 2 
Interest^ 
Payment Date of^ 
Dates Inclusion 
7. Treasury Notes 
a. 6.875 May 1980 MN15 1/07/76 
b. 7.000 Feb.1981 FA15 4/07/76 
c. 7.375 May 1981 MN15 7/07/76 
d. Gove mmen t b ond 7.00 Aug. 1981 FA15 10/06/76 
e. 7.000 Nov.1981 MN15 7/06/77 
f. Government bond 6.375 Feb.1982 FA15 4/06/77 
g* 7.000 May 1982 MN15 7/06/77 
h. 8.125 Aug. 1982 FA15 10/05/77 
i. 7.875 Nov. 1982 MN15 1/04/78 
j • 8.000 Feb.1983 FA15 5/03/78 
k. 7.875 May 1983 MN15 7/05/78 
1. 8.000 Feb.1985 FA15 11/01/78 
8. Treasury Notes—9 
years 
a. Gove mmen t b ond 6.375 1984 FA15 1/07/76 
b. 7.875 1986 MN15 1/05/77 
c. 8.000 1986 FA15 7/06/77 
d. 7.625 1987 MN15 1/04/78 
e. 8.125 1988 MN15 7/05/78 
f. 8.750 1988 MN15 1/03/79 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Government Bonds— 
15 years 
a. 8.250 1990 MN15 1/07/76 
b. 7.250 1992 FA15 7/06/77 
c. 7.875 1993 FA15 1/04/78 
d. 8.625 1993 FA15 10/04/78 
e. 9.000 1994 FA15 1/03/79 
Government Bonds— 
24 years 
a. 7.875 ..1995-00 FA15 1/07/76 
b. 8.375 ..1995-00 FA15 1/05/77 
c. 8.000 1996-01 FA15 1/04/78 
FNMA Issues 
a. 8.200 Jul. 1984 JJ10 1/07/76 
b. 7.950 Nov.1984 MS10 7/07/76 
c. 6.900 Dec.1984 JD10 1/05/77 
d. 7.650 Mar.1985 MS11 7/06/77 
e. 7.250 Jul.1985 JJ10 10/05/77 
f. 7.900 Oct.1985 A010 1/04/78 
g. 8.200 Mar.1986 MS10 4/05/78 
h. 7.950 Jul. 1986 JJ10 7/05/78 
i. 9.200 Apr.1986 A010 1/03/79 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Issue Coupon Maturity Rating^ 
Interest^ 
Payment 
Dates 
Date of^ 
Inclusion 
World Bank Issues 
a. 8.150 Jan.1985 JJ1 1/07/76 
b. 8.600 Jul.1985 JJ15 1/05/77 
c. 8.850 Dec.1985 JD15 7/06/77 
d. 8.375 Jul.1986 JJ1 1/04/78 
The list includes intermediate-term and long-term issues only. 
The money-market issues included in the sample were changed every week 
and so are too many to be listed here. 
2 
The ratings reported here are those assigned by the Moody’s [66]. 
The government and agency issues were all rated Aaa during the study 
period. 
3 
The interest payments were identified from [66,67]. The coupon 
is payable semi-annually in all cases. MN15 denotes May and November 15. 
4 
Indicates the date when the specific issue was included in the 
study. Note that the successive dates in this column indicate when the 
previous issue was replaced. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE B-l. Distribution of price changes— 
selected spot securities 1976-79 
Security Cases Mean ST) Skewness Kurtosis SR 
Individual issues 
1. T bills 1 week 164 -.001 .005 - .175 6.203 9.00 
2. T bills 13 weeks 164 -.006 .052 - .996 13.116 11.36 
3. T bills 26 weeks 
4. Government notes— 
164 -.011 .086 .010 10.699 10.63 
5 years 
5 . Government bonds— 
161 .103 .444 - .917 4.276 7.67 
9 years 
6. Government bonds— 
167 .089 .565 - .977 7.618 9.30 
15 years 
7. Government bonds— 
167 .104 .709 -1.370 6.652 7.75 
24 years 170 .088 .702 - .530 2.714 7.82 
8. GNMA 8 percent 172 .102 .531 - .696 2.314 7.11 
9. GNMA 9 percent 172 .115 .479 - .714 1.907 6.92 
10. CP—90 days 164 -.005 .044 .109 13.701 11.07 
11. AT&T bonds 169 .081 .898 -1.901 12.434 9.59 
12. GPAP bonds 169 .144 .967 .055 1.681 6.51 
13. Muni 2 bonds 171 .172 .687 .177 .989 5.82 
14. FNMA bonds 163 .118 .498 .014 1.541 6.52 
Fund portfolios 
1. DLA 164 -.000 .005 2.474 20.055 10.00 
2. SMR 164 -.000 .005 - .044 .966 4.00 
3. MOA 164 -.002 .072 -1.741 3.747 5.97 
4. FUSG 172 -.004 .063 - .413 10.585 10.79 
5. KMBF 99 -.005 .036 - .073 .25 5.56 
6. AmBal 172 .007 .100 - .214 .181 5.5 
7. AmCap 172 .026 .149 - .235 1.718 6.98 
8. Amlnv 172 .016 .160 - .988 2.141 5.75 
Security indices 
1. S&P CORP 172 . .048 .449 - .357 2.556 7.57 
2. S&P LT GOVT 172 .037 .453 - .482 1.278 6.51 
3. S&P IT GOVT 172 .015 .527 - .575 1.839 6.43 
4. S&P ST GOVT 172 .022 .626 - .386 9.876 9.62 
5. S&P MUNI 172 .124 .682 - .015 .494 5.66 
6. S&P 500 172 .050 1.733 - .086 -4.900 5.41 
^SD = the standard deviation of price changes 
2 
SR = the studentized range 
3 
K-S Z = the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 
n denotes that the price changes do not fit the normal distribution based 
on the observed sample mean and the variance at 5 percent level 
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TABLE B-2. Distribution of price changes— 
futures instruments 1976-79 
Contract Cases Mean SD1 Skewness Kurtosis 
2 
SR 
3 
K-SZ 
T 
1. 
bill Futures 
Contract 1 137 .003 .052 -1.381 8.503 8.56 1.410n 
2. Contract 2 164 -.005 .059 - .040 3.610 8.000 1.222 
3. Contract 3 164 -.004 .053 - .383 .569 5.51 1.050 
4. Contract 4 164 -.003 .055 - .126 .847 6.14 .997 
5. Contract 5 164 -.002 .053 - .214 1.055 6.60 .936 
6. Contract 6 149 -.001 .063 .644 7.589 9.48 1.242 
7. Contract 7 101 -.004 .039 - .414 .546 5.13 -.931 
8. Contract 8 101 -.003 .040 - .200 .879 5.45 .814 
T 
1. 
bond Futures 
Contract 1 67 -.088 .742 - .001 .442 4.96 .597 
2. Contract 2 81 -.163 .930 - .300 4.621 7.76 .865 
3. Contract 3 81 -.155 .744 .195 .384 5.26 .622 
4. Contract 4 81 -.163 .769 .082 .540 5.24 .577 
5. Contract 5 81 -.148 .728 .071 .286 5.25 .663 
6. Contract 6 81 -.151 .888 .111 2.251 6.78 .720 
7. Contract 7 59 -.105 .781 .225 .212 4.96 .622 
8. Contract 8 59 -.104 .776 .317 .356 5.04 .714 
9. Contract 9 59 -.103 .814 .323 .848 5.50 .691 
10. Contract 10 59 -.101 .785 .340 .390 4.99 .642 
11. Contarct 11 59 -.101 .727 .263 - .159 4.65 .548 
GNMA Futures 
1. Contract 1 140 .005 .570 - .761 2.107 6.58 .806 
2. Contract 2 172 -.054 .597 - .400 1.413 7.02 .774 
3. Contract 3 172 -.051 .569 - .430 1.360 6.52 .879 
4. Contract 4 172 -.050 .575 - .430 1.533 6.64 .834 
5. Contract 5 172 -.048 .564 - .495 1.506 6.91 .959 
6. Contract 6 163 -.041 .541 - .322 2.111 7.34 .866 
7. Contract 7 134 -.048 .578 .344 1.976 6.96 .653 
8. Contract 8 134 -.045 .672 -1.964 13.643 9.12 1.249n 
9. Contract 9 81 -.111 .572 .191 .919 5.86 .772 
10. Contract 10 81 -.111 .569 .230 1.04 5.98 .690 
11. Contract 11 59 -.096 .638 .168 .755 5.53 .634 
^SD = the standard deviation of price changes 
2 
SR = the studentized range 
3 
K-S Z = the Kolmogorov-Smimov Z 
n indicates that the price changes do not fit the normal distribution 
based on the observed sample mean and variance at the 5 percent level 
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TABLE C-l. Distribution of hedged returns—1976-79 
transaction costs ignored 
Contract Cases Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis SR 
I 
II 
III 
T bill 13 weeks 
T 
1. 
bill futures 
Contract 1 127 - ...371 
2. Contract 2 151 - .221 
3. Contract 3 151 - .218 
4. Contract 4 151 - .248 
5. Contract 5 151 - .268 
6. Contract 6 136 - .343 
7. Contract 7 88 - .368 
8. Contract 8 88 - .390 
T 
T 
1. 
bond 15 years 
bond futures 
Contract 1 53 10.381 
2. Contract 2 62 7.608 
3. Contract 3 62 7.152 
4. Contract 4 62 6.392 
5. Contract 5 62 6.526 
6. Contract 6 62 6.794 
7. Contract 7 41 7.101 
8. Contract 8 41 6.805 
9. Contract 9 41 6.636 
10. Contract 10 41 6.904 
11* Contract 11 41 7.569 
GNMA 8 percent 
GNMA futures 
1. Contract 1 130 9.012 
2. Contract 2 153 8.717 
3. Contract 3 153 8.070 
4. Contract 4 153 7.917 
5. Contract 5 153 8.283 
6. Contract 6 144 7.972 
7. Contract 7 116 8.020 
8. Contract 8 116 5.843 
9. Contract 9 66 7.607 
10. Contract 10 66 7.537 
11. Contract 11 44 6.139 
1.861 - .418 7.686 9.18 
2.339 - .622 11.044 10.81 
2.302 - .729 .11.732 10.89 
2.401 - .410 12.656 11.21 
2.486 - .289 12.578 11.21 
2.766 - .302 10.975 10.63 
3.180 - .083 7.911 8.91 
3.214 - .081 7.766 8.89 
26.898 1.526 4.962 6.04 
28.488 1.955 8.432 7.02 
20.968 .896 3.174 6.31 
21.132 .922 3.234 6.18 
21.297 .685 3.959 6.57 
25.442 1.045 4.170 6.55 
26.599 .658 2.275 5.45 
26.765 .378 1.946 5.50 
27.978 .152 1.463 5.23 
28.374 .442 2.336 5.66 
26.437 .324 1.759 5.51 
20.227 .840 3.379 7.48 
24.833 1.900 11.182. 9.09 
18.843 .146 2.133 7.05 
18.665 - .143 1.137 5.95 
21.332 .374 2.224 6.97 
19.879 .122 1.297 6.50 
25.352 2.195 12.645 8.86 
18.721 .218 1.406 6.32 
18.368 .159 .110 4.64 
18.614 .294 .537 4.68 
21.144 .098 - .041 4.44 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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TABLE C-2. Mean returns on hedged portfolios 
net of spot commission costs 1976-79 
13 week T 
Mean 
Return 
bill-TBIF 
Standard 
Deviation 
15 year 
Mean 
Return 
T bond-TBOF 
Standard 
Deviation 
8% GNMA—GNMAF 
Mean Standard 
Return Deviation 
-.63 1.86 6.41 25.19 5.25 19.47 
-.33 2.33 5.57 27.64 5.62 23.81 
-.35 2.30 4.93 20.31 5.06 18.25 
-.36 2.40 4.27 20.55 5.35 18.21 
-.39 2.48 4.17 20.63 5.54 20.72 
-.42 2.76 5.10 25.01 4.36 18.94 
-.56 3.17 4.35 25.75 4.40 23.84 
-.57 3.20 3.92 25.85 4.19 18.29 
3.76 27.01 4.80 17.72 
~ . 3.98 27.34 4.72 17.95 
4.71 25.51 2.90 20.31 
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TABLE D-l. Hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness, 
money market issues and T bill futures 
1976-79 
Contracts 
1 week 
h 
T bills 
2 
r 
13 week 
h 
T bills 
2 
r 
26 week 
h 
T bills 
2 
r 
1 .04 .20 .80 .64 1.30 .56 
(.01) (136) (.05) (.10) 
2 .02 .05 .48 .31 .90 .36 
(.01) (163) (.06) (.09) 
3 .02 .05 .56 .32 1.06 .39 
(.01) (163) (.06) (.10) 
4 .02 .03 .48 .26 .90 .31 
(.01) (163) (.06) (.id 
5 .02 .02 .45 .21 .82 .24 
(.01) (163) (.07) (.12) 
6 .01 .02 .29 .12 .59 .17 
(.01) (148) (.06) (.id 
7 .01 .01 .53 .16 .87 .15 
(.01) (100) (.12) (.21) 
8 .01 .01 .48 .14 .79 .13 
(.01) (100) (.12) (.21) 
“Hi = the hedge ratio 
2 
r = the coefficient of determination between ash and futures price 
changes 
2 
Figures in parentheses in the h columns are the standard errors of h 
and those in the r^ columns are the degrees of freedom. 
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TABLE D-l (continued) 
CP DLA SMR MOA 
Contracts h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r 
1 .15 
(.07) 
.03 .04 
(.01) 
.14 .03 
(.01) 
.07 .69 
(.10) 
.25 
2 .12 
(.06) 
.03 .02 
(.01) 
.05 .02 
(.01) 
.04 .35 
(.09) 
.08 
3 .08 
(.07) 
.01 .03 
(.01) 
.08 .02 
(.01) 
.04 .47 
(.10) 
.12 
4 .06 
(.06) 
.01 .03 
(.01) 
.08 .03 
(.01) 
.09 .48 
(.10) 
.13 
5 .05 
(.06) 
.0 .03 
(.01) 
.07 .03 
(.01) 
.08 .48 
(.10) 
.13 
6 .06 
(.06) 
.01 .01 
(.01) 
.03 .01 
(.01) 
.03 .44 
(.09) 
.14 
7 .04 
(.11) 
.0 .0 
(.01) 
.0 .04 
(.01) 
.12 .40 
(.18) 
.05 
8 .03 
(.11) 
.0 .01 
(.01) 
.0 .05 
(.01) 
.14 .38 
(.18) 
.04 
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TABLE D-2. Hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness 
Government and municipal fund portfolios 
and longterm futures 1976-79 
FUSG1 DTEB KMBF 
TBOF GNMAF TBOF GNMAF TBOF GNMAF 
Contract h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r 
1 .04 .13 .05 .24 .03 .07 .05 .08 .01 
.05 
.02 
.07 
(.01) (66) (.01)(139) .01 (66) (.02) (79) (.01) (.01) 
2 .03 .13 .05 .23 .02 .09 .05 .13 .01 
.04 
.02 
.08 
(.01) (80) (.01)(171) (.01) (80) (.04) (98) (0) (.01) 
3 .04 .17 .06 .27 .04 .14 .06 .16 .01 
.07 
.02 
.14 
(.01) (80) (.01)(171) (.01) (80) (.01) (98) (.01) (.01) 
4 .04 .16 .06 .28 .04 .13 .07 .17 .01 10 
.03 
.15 
(.01) (80) (.01)(171) (.01) (80) (.02) (98) (.01) (.01) 
5 .04 .15 .06 .25 .04 .13 .07 .17 .01 .07 
.02 
.13 
(.01) (80) (.01)(171) (.01) (80) (.01) (98) (.01) (.01) 
6 .03 .15 .06 .26 .04 .17 .07 . .18 .02 .12 
.02 
.14 
(.01) (80) (.01)(162) (.01) (80) (.01) (98) (0) (.01) 
7 .04 .15 .06 .26 .04 .17 .07 .18 .02 .12 
.02 
.14 
(.01) (58) (.01)(133) (.01) (58) (.01) (98) (.01) (.01) 
8 .04 .14 .05 .28 .04 .18 .07 .18 .02 .13 
.02 1 3 
(.01) (58) (.01)(133) (.01) (58) (.01) (98) (.01) (.01) 
9 .03 .14 .05 .19 .04 .17 .06 .16 .02 .11 
.02 1 2 
(.01) (58) (.01) (80) (.01) (58) (02) (80) (.01) (.01) 
10 .03 .13 .05 .18 .04 .19 .06 .15 .02 13 
.02 
.11 
(.01) (58) (.01) (80) (.01) (58) .02 (80) (.01) 
• -1—* 
(.01) 
11 .03 .12 .04 .17 .05 .22 .06 .17 .02 14 
.02 
.15 
(.01) (58) (.01) (58) (.01) (58) (.02) (58) (.01) (.01) 
^"Figures in parentheses in the h columns, are the standard errors of h 
and those in the r2 columns are the degrees of freedom. The degrees 
of freedom are identical for DTEB and KMBF. 
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TABLE D-3. Hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness—corporate 
bond funds and long-term futures 1976-79 
Keystone B-l Keystone B-2 Keystone B-3 
TBOF 
2 
Contract h r 
GNMAF 
h r2 
TBOF 
h r2 
GNMAF 
h r2 
TBOF 
h r2 
GNMAF 
h r2 
1 .07 
(.05) 
.03 
(66) 
.08 .04 
(.03)(139) 
.01 0 
(.03) 
.05 
(.02) 
.03 .0 
(.01) 
.0 .01 
(.01) 
.01 
2 .01 
(.04) 
.0 
(80) 
.05 .02 
(,03X171) 
.03 .02 
(.02) 
.09 
(.02) 
.10 0 
(.01) 
0 .01 
(.01) 
.02 
3 .02 
(.05) 
0 
(80) 
.06 .02 
(.03)(171) 
.03 .01 
(.03) 
.09 
(.02) 
.09 0 
(.01) 
0 .01 
(.01) 
.02 
4 .03 
(.04) 
.01 
(80) 
.06 .03 
(.03)(171) 
(.03) .02 
(.03) 
.08 
(.02) 
.06 0 
(.01) 
0 .01 
(.01) 
.01 
5 .03 
(.05) 
.01 
(80) 
.13 .03 
(.03)(171) 
.04 .02 
(-03) 
.07 
(.02) 
.05 .01 
(.01) 
.01 .01 
(.01) 
.01 
6 .02 
(.041 
0 
(80) 
..05 ,.02 
(.03)(162) 
..02 , .01 
(.02) 
. .06 
.02 
.05 0 
(.01) 
0 .01 
(.01) 
.01 
7 .11 
(.05) 
.07 V 
(58) 
.06. .02- 
(.03)(133) 
.02- .01- 
(.03) 
.06 
(.02) 
.05. -0 
(.01) 
0 .02 
(.01) 
.02 
8 .02- 
(.05) 
0 
(58) 
.04 .02 
(.03)(133) 
.03 .01 
(.03) 
.03 
(.02) 
.02 -0 
(.01) 
0 .01 
(.01) 
.01 
9 .01 
(.05) 
0 
(58) 
..04 ..01 
(.04) (80) 
,.02 .01 
(.03) 
.07 
(.03) 
.06 -0 
(.01) 
0 .01 
(.01) 
.03 
10 .02 
(.05) 
0 
(58) 
.05 .09 
(.04) (80) 
.02 .01 
(.03) 
.07 
(.03) 
.06 -0 
(.01) 
0 .02 
(.01) 
.02 
11 .02 
(.06) 
0 
(58) 
.05 0 
(.04) (58) 
.03 .01 
(.03) 
.07 
(.03) 
.07 -0 
(.01) 
0 .01 
(.01) 
.09 
^Figures in parentheses in the h columns are standard errors of h. and 
those In the r^ column are the degrees of freedom which are identical 
for all funds 
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tart.e d-4. Hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness 3tock funds, S&P 500, and long-term 
futures 1976-79 
AMdV AMCAP AMBAL S&P 500 
TBCJF' GUMAT TBOF. GNMAF T30F GNMAF 
Contract h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r h 
2 
r:. 
1 .11. .16 .10 .11 .12 .21 .10 .14 .09 .31 .Q8d .21 1.34 .27 .34 .03 
(.06) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.27) (.43) 
Z .09 .17 .08 .10 .10 .22 .08 .10 .07 .30 .06 .15 1.06 .27 .71 .02 
(.02) (.02) (-02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.20) (.38) 
3 .11 .16. .09 .n_ .11 .19 .09 .11- .09 .31- .08 .19. 1.26 .24 
.34 .03 
(.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.25) 
(.39) 
4 .11 .17 .08 .08 .11 .18 .08 .09 .08 .27 .07 .16 1.18 .22 .75 
.02 
(.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.24) 
(.39) 
5 .10 .12 .07 .05 .10 .15 .07 .07 .08 .22 .06 .14 
1.12 .13 .63 .01 
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.27) 
(.40) 
6 .07 .09 .07 .07 .07 .10 .07 .09 .05 .16 .06 .14 .79 
.14 .74 .02 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.22) 
(.42) 
7 .07 .08 .07 .08 .08 .11 .08 .09 .07 .22 .07 .15 
.96 .15 .71 .02 
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) 
(.30) (.44) 
3 .07 .08 .07 .08 .08 .11 .06 .08 .07 .22 .06 .16 
.94 .15 .44 .01 
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) 
(.30) (. 38) 
9 .06 .07 .10 .12 .07 .10 .10 .16 .07 .21 .08 .22 
.38 .14 2.20 .18 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) 
(.29) (.52) 
10 .06 .06 .09 .11 .07 .09 .10 .15 .07 .21. .08 .22 
.38 .13 2.17 .13 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) 
(.30) (.J3) 
11 .08 .09 .08 .09 .08 .11 .08 .12 (.08) .23 .07 
.21 1.02 .15 1.31 .15 
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) 
(.32) (.56) 
^Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of h. Degrees of i.reedo<a are _dent..cal 
chose reported in che previous cable. 


